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GRUTTER'S FIRST AMENDMENT
PAUL HORwrrz*

Abstract: In Grutter v. Bollinger, the Supreme Court noted that universi
ties "occupy a special niche" in the First Amendment, and suggested
that they are entitled to a substantial degree of institutional autonomy.
This Article evaluates the First Amendment implications of this ruling.
It explores three possible First Amendment readings of Grutter. First,
Grutter may be viewed as a charter of institutional autonomy for
universities. That reading carries a variety of implications, not all of
which may be equally pleasing to Grutters supporters. Second, Grutter
may be read as advancing a substantive view of academic freedom based
on its value to democratic deliberation. This ruling carries significant
implications too, but it is hard to square with the larger body of First
Amendment jurisprudence or with the concept of professional
academic freedom itself. A third reading of Grutteis First Amendment
carries more profound and attractive implications: it suggests the Court
may be willing to abandon its preference for neutral rules over social
facts in First Amendment jurisprudence, and to take seriously the role
of "First Amendment institutions."
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INTRODUCTION

No shortage of ink has already been spilled on the U.S. Supreme
Court's decisions in the affirmative action cases, Grutter v. Bollinger
and Gratz v. Bollinger.1 And little imagination was needed to predict
how much of that commentary would run-as praise for the Court's
cautious, Solomonic balancing of the conflicting concerns of formal
equality and racial justice, or as condemnation of an unprincipled,
unsound departure from fundamental principles of equal justice under law.2 In any event, the subject of the symposia, colloquia, special
I See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
See, e.g., Joel L. Selig, The Michigan Affirmative Action Cases:JusticeO'Connor, Bakke Redux, and the Mice That Roared but Did Not Prevai 76 ThMp. L. REv. 579, 579 (2003); Deborah
Jones Merritt et al., Growing Beyond Grutter, JURIST (Sept. 5, 2003), at http://jurist.law.pitt.
edu/forum/symposium-aa/merritt.php ("Some praised Grutter and its companion case,
Gratz v. Bollinger, as a lawyerlike compromise. Others scorned the opinions as a patchwork
that confused admissions officers and the public."); E-mail from Walter Dellinger, Head of
National Appellate Practice, O'Melveny & Myers, and Douglas B. Maggs Professor of Law,
Duke University, to Dahlia Lithwick, Senior Editor of SLATz (June 25, 2003, 08:44 PST), at
http://slate.com/id/2084657/entry/2084857 (praising Grutter and Gratz precisely for
their Solomonic wisdom and arguing that "[w] hen it comes to an issue like this ... Supreme Court adjudication isn't the same as excelling at Logical Puzzles 101.... [because]
the most logical answers aren't necessarily the right ones"); see also Neal Devins, Explaining
2
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issues, and other countless discussions devoted to these cases3 has
been clear: Grutter and Gratz belong to Fourteenth Amendment case
law, subgenus affirmative action.
I propose to leave that debate to one side. Notwithstanding the
expertise and good intentions of many of those constitutional scholars who have joined one side or another of the affirmative action debate, a good deal of the discussion of Grutter and Gratz has simply rehearsed positions long since fixed on this issue. Perhaps it is in the
nature of the subject. As a matter of policy and morality, affirmative
action does not lend itself to a principled resolution that easily can
command popular consensus. As a matter of constitutional law, the
capacious terms of the Constitution, the meandering course of the
Court's opinions, and the opaque nature of the Court's discussions
invariably lead the legal debate back to the intractable moral and political questions. 4 Discussion about affirmative action may simply be
one more illustration of a basic principle of legal discourse-that the
political heat of an issue is inversely proportional to the light that legal debate can shed upon it.
This Article, then, is not a brief for or against affirmative action,
in higher education or elsewhere. It is not, at least in express terms, a
Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 347, 381-82 & nn.163-66 (2003) (collecting positive public reactions to Grutter);Joel K. Goldstein, Beyond Bakke: Grutter-Gratz and the
Promise ofBrown, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 899, 901 (2004) (calling the decisions "a triumph for
those advocating racial preferences in admissions decisions"); Goodwin Liu, Brown, Bollinger, and Beyond, 47 How. L.J. 705, 705 (2004) (noting that "civil rights advocates across
the country proclaimed victory" following the issuance of Grutter). For remarks that are
broadly critical of Grutter,see generally Larry A. Alexander & Maimon Schwarzchild, Grutter or Otherwise: RacialPreferences and HigherEducation, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 3 (2004); Abigail Thernstrom & Stephan Thernstrom, Secrecy and Dishonesty: The Supreme Court, Racial
Preferences, and Higher Education,21 CONST. COMMENT. 251 (2004). For discussions of Grutter that are also critical but come from the other end of the spectrum, see generally BarbaraJ. Flagg, Diversity Discourses, 78 TUL. L. REv. 827 (2004); Daria Roithmayr, Tacking Lef:
A Radical Critique of Grutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 191 (2004); Girardeau A. Spann, The
Dark Side ofGrutter, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 221 (2004).
3 For a sampling, see generally Affirmative Action in the 21st Century: Reflections on Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger: Special Issue, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 425 (2003);
Affirmative Action Symposium, 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 519 (2004); Symposium, From Brown to Bakke
to Grutter: Constitutionalizingand Defining Racial Equality, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (2004);
Symposium, From Brown to Grutter: Affirmative Action and HigherEducation in the South, 78
TUL. L. REv. 1765 (2004); Symposium, Law, Ethics, and Affirmative Action in America, 72 U.
CIN. L. REv. 873 (2004); Symposium, On Grutter and Gratz: Examining "Diversity"in Education, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1588 (2003).
4 For broadly similar conclusions from differing points along the political spectrum, see
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 139-40 (1999); CAss
R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 117-36
(1999).
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Fourteenth Amendment article at al T-he question raised by this Article is quite different.
To uncover that question, it may help to recall that Grutter addressed the constitutionality of affirmative action not once and for all,
but in a limited context. It asked only whether there is a "compelling
state interest in student body diversity" in "the context of higher education." 5 The answer to that Fourteenth Amendment question-whether
the University of Michigan Law School's (the "Law School") raceconscious admissions policy withstood the strict scrutiny required by
the Court's equal protection jurisprudence--depended in turn on certain important assertions about the First Amendment. Briefly restated,
the Court reasoned as follows:
" Universities "occupy a special niche in [the] constitutional tradi6
tion" of the First Amendment.
" That special role provides universities a substantial right of "educational autonomy," within which public higher educational institutions are insulated from legal intrusion. 7 Within that autonomous realm, universities are entitled to deference when making
academic decisions related to their educational mission.8
" Educational autonomy includes "[t] he freedom of a university to
make its own judgments as to ...

the selection of its student

body."9 More specifically, a public university has a compelling interest in selecting its student body in order to ensure a "robust
exchange of ideas," 10 which may be achieved by selecting a "diverse student body.""
" The Court's scrutiny of the Law School's admissions program, although ostensibly strict in nature, must take into account this
compelling First Amendment-based interest. 12
" Ergo, the Law School's race-conscious admissions policy withstands
Fourteenth Amendment strict scrutiny, given the compelling state

5 Grutter,539 U.S. at 328.
6 Id. at 329.
7Id.
8

See id.
9 Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (opinion
of Powel,J.)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
10 Grutter,539 U.S. at 329 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (opinion of Powell, J.) (quot-

ing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
11 Id.
12 See id.
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interest of "student body diversity" 13 and the level of deference accorded the university in tailoring its admission policies.
Much debate over the University of Michigan decisions has passed
lightly over these assertions or focused on them primarily for their role
in the larger Fourteenth Amendment discussion. But the implications
of this decision-that "attaining a diverse student body is at the heart
of [a university's] proper institutional mission," and that there is a
strong First Amendment interest in "educational autonomy"-ought
to be of equal interest to First Amendment scholars.' 4
If history is any guide, however, Grutteris unlikely to attract much
sustained attention as a First Amendment case. Consider the fate of
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.'8 Although Bakke has entered the legal canon and gained public notoriety for its central role
in the affirmative action debate, Justice Lewis Powell's pivotal opinion
in that case is also grounded in the First Amendment, as the Grutter
Court recognized. 16 As one of the leading students of the relationship
between American constitutional law and academic freedom has observed, Bakke represented a significant shift in the constitutional law
of academic freedom: a shift from a concept of academic freedom as
an individual right, to "a concept of constitutional academic freedom
as a qualified right of the institution to be free from government interference in its core administrative activities, such as deciding who may
17
teach and who may learn."
Yet Bakke receives virtually no mention in any of the leading First
Amendment treatises and casebooks.' 8 Indeed, most of these promi13 Id. at 325.
14See id. at 328, 329.
Is 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
16 See Grutter,539 U.S. at 329 (noting that Justice Lewis Powell's opinion in Bakke "invoked our cases recognizing a constitutional dimension, grounded in the First Amendment, of educational autonomy"). The parallels between Bakke and Grutterareall the more
striking in that they extend to the level of public reaction. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Bakke
Revisited, 55 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 8-10 (2003) (discussing the public reaction to Bakke, which
split between praise for Justice Powell's Solomonic opinion and criticism of the opinion
for being disturbingly unreasoned).
17j. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99 YALE
LJ. 251, 257 (1989) (emphasis added).
18 In fact, I could find only one mention of Bakke in any of the many casebooks and
treatises devoted solely to First Amendment law that I surveyed. See 1 RODNEY SMOLLA,
SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH §§ 12:21, 13:20, 17:34 (1996). Indeed, although some casebooks and treatises pay attention to issues concerning free speech in the
public school context, few devote any space at all to First Amendment issues dealing with
academic freedom in higher education.
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nent texts deal briefly or not at all with the entire subject of academic
freedom, on which both Bakke and Grutter are grounded. 19 Nor have
the law reviews done much to fill the gap. Although there is obviously
an extraordinary amount of legal scholarship dealing with Bakke as a
Fourteenth Amendment case and a significant but somewhat isolated
volume of legal scholarship dealing with academic freedom on its own
terms, very few scholars have dug deeply into the question of the relationship between Bakke--and now Grutter-and the First Amendment. 20 And those few treatments generally have not pressed the

question whether the First Amendment principles announced in
Bakke, and reaffirmed in Grutter, have (or should have) any application beyond the narrow context of race-conscious admissions policies
in public higher education. That general reluctance to make a home
for Bakke and its newest progeny in First Amendment scholarship, let
alone to deal seriously with its implications, is unfortunate.
This Article aims to fill that gap. It proposes to take Grutter seriously as a First Amendment case. It asks the following: What does Gruttey's First Amendment mean? What are the implications of its approach?

19Cf Neal Kumar Katyal, The Promise and Preconditionof EducationalAutonomy, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 557, 557 (2003) (arguing that "[a]cademic freedom has become something of a pariah concept").
20 A few treatments of this issue in the wake of Grutter have trickled out during the
long gestation of this Article. See generally J. Peter Byrne, The Threat to ConstitutionalAcademic Freedom, 31 J.C. & U.L. 79 (2004); Luis Fuentes-Rohwer & Guy-Uriel E. Charles, In
Defense of Deference, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 133 (2004); Richard H. Hiers, InstitutionalAcademic Freedom-A ConstitutionalMisconception: Did Grutter v. Bollinger Perpetuate the Confusion?, 30J.C. & U.L. 531 (2004); Katyal, supra note 19; Edward N. Stoner II &J. Michael
Showalter, Judicial Deference to EducationalJudgment: Justice O'Connor's Opinion in Grutter
Reapplies LongstandingPrinciples,as Shown by Rulings Involving College Students in the Eighteen
Months Before Grutter, 30 J.C. & U.L. 583 (2004); Leland Ware, Strict Scrutiny, Affirmative
Action, and Academic Freedom: The University of Michigan Cases, 78 TUL. L. RiEv. 2097 (2004).
Although these articles (and particularly the articles by ProfessorsJ. Peter Byrne and Neal
Katyal) are instructive, all of them focus primarily on the reading of Grutter discussed in
infra notes 212-396 and accompanying text, and not on other possible First Amendment
readings of Grutter, as this Article does. In addition, Professors Katyal, Leland Ware, and
Luis Fuentes-Rohwer and Guy-Uriel E. Charles focus mostly on the implications of the First
Amendment reading of Grutter for racially sensitive admissions policies, and not on the
broader implications of Grutterasa First Amendment case.
For some pre-Grutter attempts to address these issues, see generally Alfred B. Gordon,
When the Classroom Speaks: A Public University's FirstAmendment Right to a Race-Conscious Classroom Policy, 6 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 57 (2000); Darlene C. Goring,
Affirmative Action and the First Amendment: The Attainment of a Diverse Student Body Is a PermissibleExercise of InstitutionalAutonomy, 47 U. KAN. L. REv. 591 (1999).
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The answers to that question are surprisingly wide-ranging. Grutter, if read for all it is worth as a First Amendment opinion, yields a
wide harvest of potential implications for a variety of subjects, some
closely related to the First Amendment and others ranging farther
afield in constitutional law.
This Article offers three possible First Amendment readings of
Grutterand explores the implications of each of them. The first reading suggests that Grutter provides First Amendment support for a
strong principle of institutional autonomy for academic institutions.
Read in this light, Grutterhas a variety of interesting, sometimes contradictory implications:
" Notwithstanding the contrary case law, Grutter suggests that universities may be entitled to greater latitude in formulating speech
codes to address racist, sexist, or other harassing speech on campus.
" Grutter offers new avenues for universities that, on academic
grounds, wish to curtail some forms of religious speech on campus.
* As some litigants quickly recognized, Grutter may help fuel arguments against the Solomon Amendment, which forbids law
schools that receive public funding from barring on-campus recruiting by the military. Thus, a recent decision by the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit invalidating the application of
the Solomon Amendment against law schools, although not resting solely on Grutter,was substantially buttressed by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's decision in that case.2 1 But a serious reading
of Grutter also suggests that many of the plaintiffs in the Third
Circuit case, and a number of plaintiffs in similar cases, lack
standing to assert claims against the Solomon Amendment that
are grounded expressly on Grutters reading of academic freedom. And it raises broader questions about whether the Third
Circuit's decision would support a variety of outcomes that its
proponents might find less palatable.
" Ironically, Grutter supports universities' opposition to legislation
that would purport to enshrine the principles of academic freedom in the law.
" Despite the leading case on the subject, Grutter suggests that universities may be able to justify the maintenance of race-based
scholarship programs.
21

See Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 233-34 (3d

Cir. 2004).
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Grutter invites universities (or other higher educational institutions, such as military academies) to revisit the constitutionality
of publicly supported single-sex schools. It also may provide a basis for arguments in favor of the maintenance of racially exclusive
institutions of higher education, without specific regard to the
race involved.
Looking at this list of possible extensions of Grutter makes a few
things clear. First, each of these prospects should prove attractive to at
least some constitutional scholars. Second, it is unlikely that any individual scholar will find all of them attractive. Third, some who support one of the potential outcomes listed above will find others on the
list utterly repugnant to their understanding of the First Amendment
or other constitutional values. Yet, on this reading, 22 all of these applications of Grutteds First Amendment are compelled equally by the
logic of the decision.23
These applications should persuade First Amendment scholars
that they need to make a proper home in their work for Bakke and
Grutter Whatever explains the failure in First Amendment scholarship
to examine fully the implications of Bakke's institutional autonomy
theory of academic freedom, and now its sequel in Grutter, the omission should be remedied.
This is not the only available reading of Grutteds First Amendment, however. A second reading of Grutter is grounded on a substantive vision of academic freedom, and not simply on a morally neutral
support for institutional autonomy. On this reading, the Court in
Gruttertreated academic freedom as serving larger democratic values,
rather than narrower truth-seeking values. 2 4
This substantive reading of Grutter's First Amendment is interesting, and troubling, for several reasons. First, in advancing a substantive, democratically oriented vision of academic freedom, Grutterpresents interesting conflicts with the Court's broader rejection of a
substantive democratic or republican conception of free speech-or,
alternatively, it suggests that the Court paid little attention to the
significance of its own First Amendment language in Grutter. This
reading thus raises interesting questions of consistency between the
22 See infra notes 208-396
23 1 stress the importance

and accompanying text.
of the word "logic" here. I do not mean to suggest that all of
these implications will follow from Grutter--only that they could follow from Grutter,if its First
Amendment discussion is taken seriously. See infra notes 346-359 and accompanying text.
24See infra notes 397-437 and accompanying text.
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approach taken to the First Amendment in that case and the approach taken elsewhere in First Amendment doctrine. 25 Although an
argument could be made that Grutter's view of the First Amendment is
consistent with the approach taken elsewhere by some of the majority,
one or more of the Justices in the majority clearly adopt a different
approach in most of their First Amendment jurisprudence. 26 Conversely, a number of the Justices who dissented in Grutter have been
described elsewhere as taking a strong view on the importance of intermediary institutions in the law27-a position that is arguably consistent with the majority in Grutterand inconsistent with the dissenters'
position in that case.
Third, this substantive reading of Grutteis First Amendment underscores the vexing questions that the law of constitutional academic
freedom presents more generally. As this Article suggests, neither the
Supreme Court nor the lower courts have ever explained fully the
scope and meaning of constitutional academic freedom-or, rather, the
courts have alternated between extraordinarily sweeping statements
and narrow, qualified statements about the First Amendment bounds
of academic freedom. Nor have legal scholars been able to lend the
order and coherence to this area that the Court has not.28 Thus, if the
substantive reading of academic freedom in Grutter seems inconsistent
or insecure, it is because the Court has offered no clear explanation of
what constitutional academic freedom is or ought to be. Moreover,
whatever meaning constitutionalacademic freedom may have, it is clear
that the professional conception of academic freedom on which the
Court has drawn is itself constantly changing and contested.
One response to either of these readings of Grutter is that the Supreme Court never meant anyone to take Grutter (or Bakke before it)
seriously as a First Amendment case, and will simply ignore the First
Amendment implications of Grutterin future cases. 29 Perhaps Bakke and
25 See infra notes 397-437 and accompanying text.

See infra notes 438-471 and accompanying text.
See generally, e.g., John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist
Court'sJurisprudenceof SocialDiscovery, 90 CAL. L. REv. 485 (2002).
28 See Byrne, supra note 17, at 320 ("One reason that institutional academic freedom remains little more than a potential constitutional right is that it has not been explained satisfactorily by legal scholars."); see also Frederick Schauer, Towards an InstitutionalFirst Amendmenrt 89 MINN. L. REv. (forthcoming 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=668521
(date posted Feb. 18, 2005).
29 Professor Byrne suggests the same thing about Bakke's First Amendment implications:
An early reader of Bakke could be pardoned if she doubted that the Court was
serious about a First Amendment right of institutional academic freedom.
26
27
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Grutter,in their First Amendment dimensions at least, are the proverbial tickets good for one trip only.3 0 Thus, the relative lack of attention
to Bakke's First Amendment implications, and what I venture to predict
will be a similar silence with respect to Grutters meaning as a First
Amendment case, may be simply a tacit acknowledgement that the First
Amendment aspects of these cases are mere makeweights, best left forgotten lest they complicate matters if imported into other areas.
If that were the only conclusion that could be drawn from the
relative neglect of the First Amendment consequences of Bakke and
Grutter,it would still deserve public comment. Recent history suggests
that constitutional scholars do not care much for restricted-ticket
cases.31 Less trivially, however, it is surely worth pointing out that the
Court and constitutional scholars alike have treated Bakke seriously
(and will do the same for Grutter) as a case about affirmative action,
while paying far less careful attention to the First Amendment implications of those cases. The first two readings of Grutter that I offer
here, with all their implications, problems, and potential, suggest that
this relative inattention has been a mistake.
But these readings of Grutterare not the only way to understand
the First Amendment implications of the case. A third reading of
Grutteris also available, one that ultimately forms the most important
contribution of this Article. In this reading, Grutter,with its expansive
deference to educational institutions, is a rare case in the Supreme
Court's recent First Amendment jurisprudence-because it takes in32
stitutions seriously in the First Amendment.

Was it not merely a chimera of a doctrine, affirmed only for that day, to provide an acceptable ground on which Justice Powell could preserve affirmative
action while condemning racial preferences?
Byrne, supra note 17, at 315. Professor Byrne further suggests that the principle has had at
least some vitality beyond Bakke. See id. at 316.
30 See, e.g., Mark G. YsNdof, The Three Facesof Academic Freedom, 32 Loy. L. REv. 831, 85556 (1987) (suggesting that Bakke is a ticket good for one trip only in terms of its First
Amendment implications).
s1 For an example of this treatment, see generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), and
the already voluminous scholarship criticizing the Court's opinion in that case on precisely
this ground. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, When Freedom Isn't Free: The Costs ofJudicial Independence in Bush v. Gore, 64 OHIo ST. LJ. 265, 281-82 (2003); David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore:
What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CH. L. REv. 737, 749-51 (2001); Laurence H. Tribe, Erog
.v Hsub and Its Disguises:Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARv. L. REv. 170,
270-73 (2001).

32 For excellent discussion of this issue, see generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The ConstitutionalRights of Private Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 144 (2003); Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and theFirstAmendment, 112 HARv. L. REv. 84 (1998).
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For the most part, the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence in
recent decades has proceeded along very different lines. The Court
has refused to confer rights on the press that differ from those enjoyed by other speakers, notwithstanding the separate presence of the
Press Clause in the First Amendment. 33 It has focused increasingly on
content-neutrality as the linchpin of free speech analysis, including
much speech by religious individuals and institutions. 3 4 It has refused
to single out religious conduct for special accommodation against
generally applicable rules. 3 5 All of these developments speak to the

same trend. The Court repeatedly has sought to use generally applicable principles, such as neutrality and equality, as its guiding principles in First Amendment jurisprudence.
Although that approach may have much to recommend it, it also
serves to blind the Court to the real-world context in which many
speech acts take place. In particular, it blinds the Court to the importance of the institutions in which so much First Amendment activityworship, study, debate, reporting-occurs. The Court's failure to observe "the increasingly obvious phenomenon of institutional differentiation" may hamper its ability to appreciate fully the extent to which
different institutions might require different responses when First
Amendment issues arise.36
Grutter's First Amendment approach thus stands out as a rare,
though not unprecedented, exception to the Court's generally institution-indifferent approach. 37 By recognizing the special status of universities in our society and attempting to carve out special rules applying
to them alone, the Court has departed sharply from its usual practice.
For that reason, Grutte's First Amendment demands careful attention. I argue that this institution-sensitive approach can be rationalized
and ordered according to a number of basic principles that should
guide the Court if it continues to move in this direction. Moreover, this
approach is not limited to universities alone, but applies equally to a
variety of other First Amendment institutions that play a crucial role in
the formation of public discourse. At the same time, this reading raises
a number of important questions about the potential pitfalls of an in33 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798-802 (1978); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691-92 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
34 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a CentralProblem of Freedom of Speech:
Problems in the Supreme Court'sApplication,74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 50 (2000).
3

See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-80 (1990).

36 Schauer, supra note 32, at 87.
37 See infra notes 496-504 and accompanying

text.
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stitution-sensitive approach to the First Amendment in the context of
educational institutional autonomy-pitfalls that in some ways are exemplified by Grutter itself. Although I believe this institution-sensitive
reading of Grutter has much to recommend it as a shift in First
Amendment doctrine, and strongly argue for that approach here, the
concerns it presents deserve attention as well.
Part I of this Article provides some necessary background.3 8 It
discusses the development of the concept of academic freedom outside the courts, and describes some of the contending justifications
for what I call professional academic freedom.3 9 The second half of
Part I discusses the development of the constitutional law of academic
freedom, tracing its development from the early cases to Bakke and
Grutter.40 Part II fleshes out the possible implications of Grutter.41 It
begins by imagining some of the possible implications if, as one reading of Gruttersuggests, the Court has concluded that universities must
be given substantial deference in taking steps in service of any proper
academic goal. 42 It then discusses the ramifications of a second possi-

ble reading of Grutter-one in which the Court did not simply defer to
the academic judgment of the Law School, but positively endorsed a
substantive, democratically oriented conception of academic freedom. 43 Finally, Part Il discusses the First Amendment implications of

Grutter's willingness to take universities seriously, and accord them
special status, as First Amendment institutions."
I. PROFESSIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM

A. The Roots of ProfessionalAcademic Freedom
Any proper discussion of the nature and scope of academic freedom as a constitutional value must begin far beyond the Constitution
itself. Although the Supreme Court has largely developed the notion
See infranotes 45-207 and accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 45-101 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 102-207 and accompanying text.
38

41 See

infra notes 208-471 and accompanying text.
infra notes 208-396 and accompanying text.
43 See infra notes 397-437 and accompanying text. As a normative matter, it bears emphasis that I am not endorsing either of these readings of Grutter,let alone endorsing each
of the sometimes conflicting ramifications of these readings. Rather, the task of Part 11 is to
explore these possible readings of Grutterand their implications. See infra notes 208-471 and
accompanying text. By contrast, Part III does champion Grutter as a case about taking First
Amendment institutions seriously. See infra notes 472-575 and accompanying text.
44 See infra notes 466-569 and accompanying text.
4See
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of academic freedom as a constitutional value over the past fifty years,
it was not writing on a blank page. 45 Academic freedom in the United
States is the product of almost 150 years of discussion and development within the academy itself. To understand the growth of constitutionalacademic freedom, then, we must begin with an understanding
of the professionalnotion of academic freedom.
This Section therefore offers a brief history of the development
of academic freedom outside the courts. It is a decidedly truncated
version of a complicated story.46 Even a brief recitation of this history,
however, suggests three significant conclusions. First, academic freedom, even in its professional setting, comprises a set of shifting, contested norms and values. Second, and relatedly, efforts by courts to
define any single set of values as fundamental to academic freedom
are thus likely to be unavailing. To the extent the Supreme Court has
attempted to construct a stable definition of constitutional academic
freedom on the foundation provided by the understanding of professional academic freedom, it has built on unsteady ground. It should
be unsurprising, then, that even the concept of constitutional academic freedom discussed below has morphed quietly from one form
to another, depending on the underlying professional justification
selected by the Court.
Finally, this Section should make clear the dangers of a singleminded focus on the judicial conception of academic freedom. By employing the customary judicial language of rights, the courts have neglected the responsibilities that accompany academic freedom. In fact,
academic freedom typically is accompanied by a set of professional
norms and rules that may constrain academics' speech more than other
individuals' speech. Although this final point is not of immediate con-

45 See infra notes 102-207 and accompanying text.
46 For examples of more detailed treatments, see generally ThE CONCEPT OF ACADEMIC
FREEDOM (Edmund L. Pincoffs ed., 1975); RICHARD HOFSTADTER & WALTER P. METZGER,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES (1955); Byrne, supra

note 17; Matthew W. Finkin, On "Institutional"AcademicFreedom, 61 TEx. L. REv. 817 (1983);

Walter P. Metzger, The 1940 Statement of Pnnciples on Academic Freedom and Tenure, in FREEDOM
AND TENURE IN THE ACADEMY 3 (William W. Van Alstyne ed., 1993) [hereinafter Metzger,
1940 Statement]; Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Free-

dom in America, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1265 (1988) [hereinafter Metzger, Profession and Constitution]; David M. Rabban, Does Academic FreedomLimit Faculty Autonomy?, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1405
(1988) [hereinafter Rabban, Faculty Autonomy]; David M. Rabban, A FunctionalAnalysis of
"Individual"and "Institutional"Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment; in FREEDOM AND
TNURE IN THE ACADEMY, supra, at 227 [hereinafter Rabban, FunctionalAnalysis].
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cern, it may ultimately play an important role in framing an institutionally based vision of the constitutional role of academic freedom. 47
The development of the professional conception of academic
freedom in the United States begins in the period following the Civil
War. Prior to that time, academic freedom would have been a difficult
concept to grasp. 48 Colleges were far smaller institutions, with far
more modest goals. Learning consisted of rote instruction within a
limited curriculum. 49 Instructors were expected to hew close to those
subjects, and performed little if any research and independent scholarship. 5° Students themselves were assumed to be "wayward and immatur[e] ,"51 and in need of the close supervision of their instructors,
which further curtailed professors' research time and confined them
to the role of guardians and drillmasters. 52 Finally, the colleges were
under the close control of lay governing bodies. 53 Taken together,
these institutional factors left little room for the development of the
sort of robust scholarship and public activity that might require the
establishment of a set of principles of academic freedom. 54
For a variety of reasons, circumstances changed in the post-Civil
War period.5 5 One significant factor that contributed to the growth of
an American conception of professional academic freedom was the
influence of the German universities, which recognized a strong, if
limited, set of principles governing academic freedom. That influence
was "transplanted onto American soil" by American students and academics who studied in Germany in significant numbers in the mid- to
56
late-nineteenth century.
For German universities of the era, academic freedom consisted
of three central principles. First, Lehrfreiheit, roughly translated as
"teaching freedom," distinguished academics, who were civil servants,
472-575 and accompanying text.
See Byrne, supranote 17, at 269.
49 See, e.g., id.; Finkin, supra note 46, at 822.
47 See infra notes
4

50 See HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 46, at 279; Byrne, supra note 17, at 269;
Metzger, Profession and Constitution, supra note 46, at 1267-68 (noting that American college professors in this era had been "pedagogues pure and simple").
51 HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 46, at 279.
52 See id. at 280-81.

See Finkin, supranote 46, at 822.
See, e.g., HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 46, at 279; Byrne, supra note 17, at
268-69.
53
54

55 For a more extended discussion, see HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note 46, at

320-412; Byrne, supra note 17, at 269-73.
56 Metzger, Profession and Constitution, supra note 46, at 1269; see also HOFSTADTER &
METZGER, supra note 46, at 367-412; Finkin, supranote 46, at 822-29.
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from other government employees. Under this principle, professors
could pursue their teaching and scholarship "without seeking prior
ministerial or ecclesiastical approval or fearing state or church reproof."57 Significantly, Lehrfteiheit was a "distinctive prerogative of the
academic profession" in Germany and not a subpart of the civil liberties generally enjoyed by German citizens.5 8
Lernfreiheit, roughly translated as "learning freedom," amounted
to an acknowledgement that German university students were to be
treated as "mature and self-reliant beings, not as neophytes, tenants,
or wards." 59 Thus, students were free of the supervisory rules that
governed American college students of the same period. German students were free to choose their own courses, largely free of attendance or examination requirements, free to live in lodgings of their
own choosing, and free to govern their own lives.60
Finally, German universities enjoyed the right of Freiheit der Wissenschaft the right of academic self-governance. Notwithstanding the status
of the German university as a state-funded institution, with substantial
state control over appointments, universities were entitled to make
their own decisions on internal matters under the direction of the senior faculty.61 The concept of academic self-governance that undergirds
Freiheitder Wissenschaft is recognizable as a forerunner of the emphasis
on institutional autonomy that developed in the courts' discussions of
academic freedom and that culminated in Grutter v. Bollinger62
Although the American conception of academic freedom had its
roots in the German university system of the nineteenth century, it
was not until early in the twentieth century that it had its proper
birth, with the establishment of the American Association of University Professors (the "AAUP") and the drafting of its 1915 Declaration
of Principles (the "Declaration").6 3 Some aspects of the Declaration
are of particular relevance here. First, as Walter Metzger notes, the
drafters of the Declaration "evolved a functional rather than idealistic
57 Metzger, Profession and Constitution, supra note 46, at 1269; see also HOFSTADTER &
METZGER, supranote 46, at 386-87.
58
HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note
59

46, at 387.
Metzger, Profession and Constitution, supranote 46, at 1270.
60
See, e.g., id.

61 See Finkin, supra note 46, at 823; Metzger, Profession and Constitution, supra note 46, at

1270.

62 See, e.g., Metzger, Professionand Constitution, supra note 46, at 1312-19.
63 For this history, see, for example, HOFSTADTER & METZGER, supra note

46, at 468506; Byrne, supra note 17, at 276-79; Metzger, Profession and Constitution, supra note 46, at
1267-85.
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rationale for freedom of teaching and research." 64 That function revolved around the search for truth. 65 The primary purpose of the university was to "promote inquiry and advance the sum of human
knowledge." 66 Modern academic scholarship had an "essentially scientific character" 67 that could best thrive if researchers were afforded
"complete and unlimited freedom to pursue inquiry and publish
[their] results."68
To be sure, the Declaration recognized that teaching was also a
significant function of the university, and that academic freedom could
be justified on the grounds that professors needed the latitude to speak
with "candor and courage" if they were to serve as adequate role models.69 But this value was decidedly secondary. First and foremost, the
Declaration advanced the view that "free employment of the scientific
method would lead to the discovery of truths that exist autonomously
in the world."70 To the extent the university served a broader democratic function, it was not to serve as a mirror of society, or a breeding
ground of future leaders, but as a think tank: universities would serve as
a source of experts who could help legislators resolve "the inherent
complexities of economic, social, and political life." 71 Here, too, academic freedom was needed, if legislators were to trust in the "disinterestedness" of the academic experts' research and conclusions. 72
Thus, the first important conclusion one can draw from the Declaration is that academic freedom in America, at least as understood
in its early stages, was fundamentally a truth-seeking device. No
broader social or democratic values were served by it, except to the
extent that society benefited from a corps of disinterested experts.

64 Metzger, Professionand Constitution, supra note 46, at 1274.
65 See Byrne, supranote 17, at 279 (indicating that "the American tradition of academic
freedom emerged from the professional organization of scholars dedicated to the scientific search for truth").
66 Am. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, GENERAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ACADEMIC
(1915), fpeinted in FREEDOM AND TENURE IN THE ACADEMY 393, 397 (William W. Van Alstyne ed., 1993) [hereinafter FREEDOM AND TENURE].
67

FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC TENURE

Byrne, supra note 17, at 277.

68 Am. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS,

supra note 66, reprinted in FREEDOM
supra note 66, at 398.
69 Id., reprinted in FREEDOM AND TENURE, supranote 66, at 398.
70
Byrne, supra note 17, at 277.
71 AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, supra note 66, reprinted in FREEDOM
supra note 66, at 398.

AND TENURE,

AND TENURE,

72 Id., reprinted in FREEDOM AND TENURE, supra note 66, at 399; see also DEREK BOK, BEYOND THE IVORY TowER: SOCIAL RESPONSIBILrrIES OF THE MODERN UNIVERsrrY 5 (1982).
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Second, it is worth noting that the Declaration concerned itself
only with academic freedom for academics. Lehrfteiheit was the concern
here, not Lernfteiheit.73 Thus, although the AAUP often addressed issues of student speech, its founding principles dealt only with re74
search and speech by professors themselves.
Nor did the Declaration deal in express terms with institutional
autonomy, or Freiheit der Wissenschaft. As Walter Metzger writes, the
reason for this shift from the German model of academic freedom
"went to the heart of the difference between the German academic
freedom and their own." 75 Whereas German universities were state

institutions, which required some model of autonomy to protect them
against their masters outside the university gates, American universities were governed by lay bodies. It was those very governing bodies,
composed of potentially intrusive non-experts, not the state, that
posed the greatest perceived threat to free inquiry. 76 Because the
AAUP was unwilling to advocate the elimination of lay governing bodies, it adopted another approach altogether-crafting a set of principles designed to shelter academics from external or internal interference, from restrictions by the state or restrictions by governing
bodies. 77 In short, the Declaration "exalt[ed] the neutral university at
the expense of the autonomousuniversity."78
Finally, although the Declaration took the unusual step of protecting statements by academics outside their areas of expertise, a move
prompted by the AAUP's observation that academics were more likely
to encounter reprisal for statements in public on general topics than
for statements made in the classroom, 79 it is important to observe that
the committee "rejected any view that academic freedom implied an
absolute right of free utterance for the individual faculty member."8°
The Declaration is emphatic that "there are no rights without corresponding duties."8 1 Thus, "only those who carry on their work in the
73 SeAM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, supranote 66, reprintedin FREEDOM AND TENURE,
supra note 66, at 393 (suggesting that "[it need scarcely be pointed out that the freedom
which is the subject of this report is that of the teacher[,] [not the student]").
74 See Metzger, Professionand Constitution, supra note 46, at 1271-72.
75Id. at 1276.
76
See Byrne, supra note 17, at 275-76.
77
See Metzger, Professionand Constitution, supra note 46, at 1277-79.
78 Id. at 1280.
79 See id. at 1274-76.
80 Byrne, supra note 17, at 277.
81 AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, supra note 66, reprinted in FREEDOM AND TENURE,
supra note 66, at 401; see also Walter P. Metzger, Professionaland Legal Limits to Academic Freedom, 20J.C. & U.L. 1, 2-3 (1993).
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temper of the scientific inquirer may justly assert" any claim to academic freedom. 82 Significantly, the Declaration assumed that departures from proper professional norms would be monitored and punished by colleagues within the same discipline, rather than lay
governors. Nevertheless, from the outset, it was clear that although
academics enjoyed a substantial degree of freedom from interference,
that freedom was accompanied by limitations on their ability to speak,
at least to the extent that their speech represented a departure from
generally accepted standards of competence and professionalism.8 3
In 1940, the AAUP issued a new declaration, the 1940 Statement
of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure (the "Statement").84
Despite some important variations and differences, it remained true
to the salient features of the Declaration. s5 In particular, it renewed
the assertion that academic freedom stemmed primarily from the
need to safeguard "the free search for truth and its free exposition." 6
Thus, an academic's freedom to pursue research was "fundamental to
the advancement of truth." 87 Similarly, the Statement echoed the Declaration's focus on preventing interference with academic freedom by
the university itself, rather than outside forces, although it cautioned
that professors should be duly aware of their obligations to their institutions and speak accordingly.88 And the Statement again warned that
academic freedom "carries with it duties correlative with rights."89
Thus, we can draw a number of conclusions about the nature of
professional academic freedom in America, at least in its early stages.
First, it was primarily concerned with academic freedom's role in safeguarding the search for truth, not with any broader democratic or social functions served by higher education. Second, although it was
influenced by a German model of higher education that itself recognized the importance of institutional autonomy, the American version
of professional academic freedom was not as concerned with academic
82 AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, supra note 66, reprinted in
supra note 66, at 401.
83See Byrne, supra note 17, at 277-78.

FREEDOM AND TENURE,

84 See generally AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE (1940), reprinted in FREEDOM AND TENURE, supra note 66,

at 407.
85 See Metzger, 1940 Statement, supra note 46, at 3.
86 AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, supra note 84, reprinted in FREEDOM AND TENURE,
supra note 66, at 407.
87Id., repinted in FREEDOM AND TENURE, supranote 66, at 407.
88 See id., reprinted in FREEDOM AND TENURE, supra note 66, at 407-08.
8 Id., reprinted in FREEDOM AND TENURE, supranote 66, at 407.
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self-governance. Because American academics feared interference
from internal forces rather than external forces, their version of academic freedom emphasized the neutrality of the academic institution
rather than its insulation from outside influence. Third, it recognized
that any academic bill of rights must be accompanied by a set of obligations, subject only to the limitation that these obligations were to be
enforced by other academics rather than by lay governors. Academics
were to adhere to the accepted standards of their field of study. Academic freedom was not a liberty; it was a conditional license.
For present purposes, let us focus on the first conclusion-that
professional academic freedom was justified on truth-seeking grounds.
Two aspects of this conclusion are of particular interest here. First, as
Professor J. Peter Byrne has noted, this argument for academic freedom has long been a site of contestation.9 0 A variety of competing values have been advanced as additional, or even primary, values served by
higher education. In particular, a number of scholars have argued for a
"democratic value in higher education."91
Broadly speaking, the democratic justification for higher education "view[s] education as instrumental, conferring benefits on the
general public, rather than as a good in itself or in its diffuse, longterm consequences."9 2 Higher education thus is not valued, simply or
even primarily, for its contribution to the search for truth through
research and teaching. It is not simply a repository of experts. Nor
does it strive for neutrality among various visions of the good. Rather,
democratic education seeks to serve specific, non-neutral goals directly linked to society at large:
[It] is ... committed to allocating educational authority in
such a way as to provide its members with an education adequate to participating in democratic politics, to choosing
among (a limited range of) good lives, and to sharing in the
several sub-communities, such as families, that impart identity to the lives of its citizens. 93

See Byrne, supra note 17, at 279.
GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987); CLARK KERR,
ThE USES OF THE UNIVERSITY (1963).
9 Byrne, supra note 17, at 281.
90

91Id. at 281. See generally Amy

93 GUTMANN, supra note 91, at 42 (stating that "a democratic state of education tries to
teach ... what might best be called democratic virtue: the ability to deliberate, and hence to
participate in conscious social reproduction"). See generally Suzanna Sherry, Republican Citizenship in a Democratic Society, 66 fTx. L. REv. 1229 (1988) (reviewing GUTMANN, supra note 91).
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Obviously, this is a starkly different vision of the values and functions of higher education, and it may coexist uneasily with the classical
vision of the university and of academic freedom described above. 94
Certainly the differing emphases of these two visions of higher education may result in different views about what are acceptable practices
in an institution of higher education. Thus, a purely truth-oriented
vision of the university could lead to a strict principle of nondiscrimination, whether favorable or invidious, in university admissions. 95 By contrast, to the extent an emphasis on the democratic values of higher
education stresses the importance of universities in preparing and
filling the ranks of future leaders, affirmative action in admissions
would be "relevant to one of [the] legitimate social functions" of the
university.96 Thus, democratic educational values may complement or
diverge from truth-seeking justifications for higher education; the
question will depend on whether the "ideal of the true" and the ideal
of the "useful" lead to the same policy prescriptions. 97
I have focused on two particular visions of the value of universities, and thus, necessarily, of the purpose and value of academic freedom. Other competing values could have been discussed, although I
think these two are the most relevant and illustrative. 98 Given the existence of these competing approaches, it follows-and this is my second conclusion about the nature of professional academic freedom in
America-that a court that draws on one of these values alone in
defining and shaping constitutional academic freedom is making a
value-laden choice with potentially significant consequences. At the
same time, a court that attempts to incorporate multiple justifications
in defining academic freedom risks inconsistency, if not incoherence.
Professional academic freedom is not a stable or uniform concept. It
is a constantly shifting and deeply contested idea, grounded on very
different views of what universities are meant to achieve and how they
should operate. As if that tension were not enough, other writers have
9 Of course, it is also quite possible to construct democratic justifications for a broad
defense of academic freedom. See, e.g., GUTMANN, supra note 91, at 175-81.
95I emphasize that such a vision could do so because it need not lead to such a rule. It
would not be hard to craft an argument-indeed, Justice Powell seemed to accept such an
argument in Regents of the University of Californiav.Bakk--that a diversity of views and experiences, including those stemming from racial and ethnic background, contributes to the
university's truth-seeking function.
96GUTMANN, supra note 91, at 210.
9
7 Byrne, supra note 17, at 283.
98See id. at 279-80 (discussing the so-called "humanistic" justification for higher education).
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questioned whether an argument for academic freedom can be made
on any stable and defensible grounds.99 It is thus unsurprising that, as
we shall see, the courts have seesawed among various visions of what
constitutional academic freedom means.
I thus conclude this Section with one central observation. 100 Professional academic freedom, as opposed to constitutional academic
freedom, is a contested and shifting concept, subject to significant
disagreement about its purposes, its scope, and even whether it can be
justified at all. In understanding the courts' own shifting definition of
academic freedom as a constitutional value, including its discussion of
academic freedom in Grutter, we must appreciate the challenge the
courts have faced from the beginning: to arrive at a stable understanding of a value whose own immediate beneficiaries cannot settle
on its meaning.' 01 To the extent the courts' discussion of constitutional academic freedom seems inconsistent or incoherent, that fact
has much to do with the unstable foundation on which they have
built. Conversely, to the extent the courts can settle on a stable
definition of constitutional academic freedom, it is unlikely to be entirely convincing if, as seems inevitable, it diverges from the shifting
understanding of professional academic freedom.
B. The Roots of ConstitutionalAcademic Freedom
1. The Pre-Regents of the University of California v. Bakke Cases: The
Birth Pangs of Constitutional Academic Freedom
With this unstable foundation laid, we may turn from professional
academic freedom to constitutional academic freedom-that is, from
the understanding of academic freedom that exists outside the courts
to the constitutional understanding of academic freedom as a First
Amendment value.

99See generally THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM (Louis Menand ed., 1996); Stanley
Fish, Holocaust Denialand Academic Freedom, 35 VAL. U. L. REv. 499 (2001) (discussing problems with foundationalist arguments for academic freedom, but defending it on nonfoundationalist grounds); David M. Rabban, Can Academic Freedom Survive Postmodernism?,
86 CAL. L. REv. 1377 (1998) (reviewing THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM, supra).
100 The other lesson of the description of professional academic freedom that I have
offered here-that it carries with it duties as well as rights and may, in fact, constrain academic speakers more than ordinary speakers-is addressed again in Part Ill. See infra notes
472-575 and accompanying text.
101See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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As is the case for most First Amendment jurisprudence, academic
freedom as a constitutional value is primarily a creature of the twentieth century. 102 Although academic freedom made its first appearance
as a potential First Amendment value in a dissent by Justice William
Douglas in 1952,103 its true lineage can be traced to a case decided by
the Supreme Court five years later, Sweezy v. New Hampshire.0 4 Pursuant to a state statute, Paul Sweezy was subpoenaed and questioned by
the Attorney General of New Hampshire on a host of subjects, including lectures he had delivered at the University of New Hampshire. 05
He refused to answer and was jailed for contempt. 106
The Court overturned the conviction on narrow grounds: the
state legislature's delegation of authority to the Attorney General was
so vague that it was unclear what questions the legislature would have
wanted that officer to pursue. Holding Paul Sweezy in contempt for
failure to answer these questions thus violated his due process rights. 107
Before reaching this conclusion, however, the Court detoured for a
discussion of the First Amendment implications of the case. Writing
for a plurality of the Court, Chief Justice Earl Warren bluntly asserted
that the questions posed to Paul Sweezy constituted "an invasion of
petitioner's liberties in the area of academic freedom and political expression-areas in which government should be extremely reticent to
tread."108 The next passage is worth quoting at length:
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American
universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those
who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket
upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities
would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new dis102 That is not to say that it does not have earlier, deeper roots. For a discussion of
those roots, see Finkin, supra note 46, at 830-40.
103 SeeAdler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 509 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the threat of loyalty proceedings under state law as rendering members of subversive
organizations ineligible for employment as public school teachers because "[t]he very
threat of such a procedure is certain to raise havoc with academic freedom").
104 Seegenerally 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
105Id. at 236-45 (plurality opinion). For biographical information on Paul Sweezy, see
Louis Uchitelle, Paul Sweezy, 93, Marxist Publisher and Economist, Dies, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 2,
2004, at A25.
106 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 244-45 (plurality opinion).
107Id. at 251-55 (plurality opinion).
108 Id. at 250 (plurality opinion).
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coveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is that true in the
social sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted as
absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of
suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always
remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new
maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will
stagnate and die. °9
Some themes sounded in this passage are worth noting. First, the
Court's novel assertion that academic freedom would join political expression as an area "in which government should be extremely reticent
to tread" 10 clearly presages the Court's modern approach, prominent
in Grutter, of deferring to higher educational institutions-for the
Court makes clear that its concern is with the academic freedom of
universities, not elementary or secondary schools.
It is equally clear, however, that this statement cannot be overextended. Nothing in the plurality opinion in Sweezy suggests that the
Court thinks government ought to defer to university decision making
as a general matter.1 11 Its clear concern is with the regulation of speech
made in an academic context.1 12 There is no hint at this point that
government ought to steer clear of other aspects of university life. Nor
does the Court indicate that it would be concerned with restrictions
on speech initiated by a public university itself, rather than the state.
Moreover, although the passage embraces "[t]eachers and students"
alike, it leaves unaddressed the questions of whether a university is
entitled to restrict or to penalize speech by teachers, whether a university may restrict speech by students, and whether teachers in turn
may restrict student speech. 13
Second, the Court's conception of academic freedom is grounded
first and foremost on the view that academic freedom is necessary to
safeguard the search for truth. Academic freedom is necessary to ensure an environment in which "new discoveries," whether in the hard
sciences or in the social sciences, are possible. 114 To be sure, the Court
looks beyond the college gates to the "vital role in a democracy that is
played by those who guide and train our youth."115 But the Court here
Id. (plurality opinion)
Id. (plurality opinion)
M Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 235-55 (plurality opinion).
112 See id. at 249-50 (plurality opinion).
11 See id. at 250 (plurality opinion).
4
" Id. (plurality opinion)
109

110

115 Id. (plurality opinion)
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is not subscribing to the view that academic freedom is important to
inculcate democratic values within the university. Rather, academic
freedom is prized primarily because its contribution to truth-seeking
will yield discoveries or insights that ultimately will benefit society at
large. ChiefJustice Warren's opinion in Sweezy is thus far closer in spirit
to the Declaration than it is to the vision of academic freedom articulated in Bakke and in Grutter.
Justice Felix Frankfurter, joined by Justice John Harlan, concurred
in the result, but based the concurrence directly on First Amendment
grounds. Like the plurality, Justice Frankfurter viewed universities as
serving a truth-seeking function, not a democratic function. The public
benefit of a university, in his view, was not to create better citizens, but
to advance human knowledge. 116 He stated, "'In a university knowledge
is its own end, not merely a means to an end.'" 117 IfJustice Frankfurter
thus sought to protect a university's "'atmosphere'" of "'speculation,
experiment and creation,'"1 18 it was for truth-seeking purposes, not in
order to serve some larger vision of public dialogue or deliberative democracy.
Like the plurality, Justice Frankfurter argued that universities
ought to be left undisturbed by the state. As Professor Byrne notes, Justice Frankfurter "would have held that university freedom for teaching
and scholarship without interference from government is a positive
right,"" 9 which may be abrogated only for "exigent and obviously compelling" reasons. 12 0 But Justice Frankfurter gave more content to this
right, setting out its boundaries more clearly than the plurality's opinion had done. Quoting approvingly from a statement by a group of
South African academics, he suggested that "four essential freedoms"
govern the life of a properly functioning university: the freedom "to
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be
taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study."121
116 See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 261-63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result).
117 Id. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result) (quoting CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNIV. OF CAPE TOWN & THE UNIV. OF THE WITWATERSRAND, THE
OPEN UNIVERSITIES IN SouTH AFRICA 12 (1957) (presenting a statement of a conference
of South African senior scholars)).
118 Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result).
119 Byrne, supra note 17, at 290.
120Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262 (Frankfurter, J, concurring in the result).
121Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result) (quotations omitted). For a discussion of the historical background of the South African scholars' statement, see Richard
H. Hiers, InstitutionalAcademic Freedom vs. Faculty Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and
Universities:A DubiousDichotomy, 29J.C. & U.L. 35, 43-57 (2002).
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In those words-the freedom "to determine ... who may be admitted to study7-lie the jurisprudential roots of Bakke and Grutterand
their command of deference to university admissions programs. But if
Justice Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence has provided fertile ground
for future doctrinal developments, it is not because his opinion provides a meaningful definition of constitutional academic freedom or
proper guidance on its application. To the contrary, Sweezy's influence
stems from the combination of its sweeping grandiloquent rhetoric
and its lack of real guidance for future courts.1 22
Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Sweezy is a curious artifact.
The opinion appears to locate the First Amendment freedom it outlines in the protection of the autonomy of the university as a whole. It
seeks to protect the university as a separate sphere. To be sure, it does
so not strictly for its own sake, nor precisely for the sake of vigorous
dialogue within the university, but for the sake of the individual activities-writing, research, teaching-that will thrive in the proper hothouse atmosphere of discussion and debate. But the freedom is nonetheless to apply to the university as a corporate body. Yet the University
of New Hampshire had little to do with the facts of the case. Sweezy presents a struggle between the state and an individual academic, not a
university. Despite its grand trappings, then, Sweezy offers little clarity
about whether the First Amendment right to academic freedom
should be thought of as an individual or an institutional right. Nor
does it offer any prediction of how the courts will deal with intramural
conflicts between an academic and the university itself.
Compounding this uncertainty is a further question: how strongly
are we to read Justice Frankfurter's reference to the "four freedoms"
of a university? Two questions in particular follow from this inquiry.
First, are they to be read as particular freedoms available under the
First Amendment, or as general examples of the kinds of liberty that
will be safeguarded if the state is precluded from investigating academic speech only? A proper reading of the opinion, with its reference
to the presumptive freedom of "thought and action" in the academy
12 See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 17, at 292 (noting the "fertile ambiguity" produced by
"Frankfurter's loose and essayistic writing"); cf. Paul Horwitz, Law's Expression: The Promise
and Perils ofjudicial Opinion Witing in Canadian ConstitutionalLaw, 38 OSGOODE HALL LJ.
101, 120-25 (2000) (advocating an "open-textured minimalist" approach to judicial opinion writing in constitutional cases during the early stages of the development of new constitutional doctrine, which pairs a minimalist approach to the holding with "eloquent and
debate-encouraging language" in dicta, to spark dialogue while leaving room for future

development).
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from government intrusion, suggests that Justice Frankfurter intended the broader reading to apply. 23 But even if the statement had
come in the plurality opinion and not a mere concurrence, it again
sweeps far outside the facts of the case before the Court.
The concurrence also provides minimal guidance on another
question: what is the scope of these four freedoms? Are they absolute,
or subject to internal or external limitations? Here, Sweezy provides
some guidance, albeit minimal. The university is free to act within the
sphere of the four freedoms to the extent its decisions are based "on
academic grounds. "124 Thus, a determination such as an admission decision that is based on nonacademic grounds is entitled to no special
protection under the rubric of constitutional academic freedom. That
limitation, of course, begs the question as to what should be considered
"academic grounds" for a decision, and on this point the opinion is silent. Nevertheless, that internal limitation underscores the importance
to academic freedom doctrine of the Court's understanding of the
function of universities. As the discussion of Bakke and Grutter that follows suggests, much turns on whether the Court believes universities
are a site for the search for truth, or whether they serve additional
functions.
In one area, at least, Justice Frankfurter is sufficiently clear. Subsequent commentators have objected that a strong principle of constitutional academic freedom would grant constitutional rights to universities or academics not enjoyed by other First Amendment speakers. 25
But the concurrence properly emphasizes that the freedoms accorded
to the university do not confer a special status on the university for its
own sake, but for the ultimate benefit of the public. 26 Again, this suggests that Sweezy's vision of academic freedom has little to do with a civic
democracy view of education; the purpose of college is not simply to
breed more thoughtful, sensitive citizens. Rather, it is to provide the
public with the more immediate fruits of research, teaching, and scholarship-the advancement of knowledge. In any event, although the
categories of academic freedom listed by Justice Frankfurter-freedom
123 See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result) (emphasis
added).
124 Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result) (emphasis added).
125 See, e.g., Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 411 n.13 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (stating that "we note that the argument [that professors are entitled to academic freedom
protections under the First Amendment] raises the specter of a constitutional right enjoyed by only a limited class of citizens").
126 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result).
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to select a curriculum, to determine who may be admitted to study, and
so forth-are specific to educational institutions, the opinion suggests
that First Amendment academic freedom simply tracks the same core
activities protected when individuals engage in political speech. 127
Whatever unanswered questions it may have left in its wake,
Sweezy was a landmark moment in the development of constitutional
academic freedom. It marks the first occasion on which the Court
identified academic freedom as a First Amendment right, although
the plurality rested on other grounds. Sweezy strongly suggests that
academic freedom inheres in the institution as a whole. It is thus less
an individual right that operates as a trump against the state, and
more an attempt to define university life as an area into which the
state is presumptively forbidden to intrude. Still, any understanding
of Sweezy's implications must take account of its context. The case itself did not involve institutional speech. Nor did it involve less speechoriented matters such as university admissions. Most importantly,
Sweezy relies on a narrow conception of the purpose of a university,
one that emphasizes the search for truth and not any alternative
justifications for academic freedom.
This trend continued in the next major Supreme Court discussion of constitutional academic freedom, Keyishian v. Board of Regents
of the University of the State of New York. 128 Like the earlier case of Adler v.
Board of Education, which involved the same law, Keyishian was fundamentally a loyalty oath case.1 29 The case involved a challenge to a state
law requiring employees of public educational institutions to certify
that they were not Communists and to disclose any past affiliations to
the Communist Party.1 30
Unlike Sweezy, Keyishian was decided on First Amendment grounds. 131
Like the earlier case, however, the grounds offered had little to do with
academic freedom. The Court struck down the law as impermissibly
vague. Thus, no special rights of academic freedom, institutional or individual, were required to address the case before it. Again, however, the
Court could not resist adding a broader discussion of the institutional
context in which the case arose. Justice William Brennan wrote the following:

127See id. at 266 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result).
128See generally 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
129See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 589; Adler, 342 U.S. at 485.
130 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 591-94.
131Id. at 603-04.
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Our nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic
freedom, which is of transcendent value to all of us and not
merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore
a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.
...The classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas."
The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through
wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth "out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than
through any kind of authoritative selection." 132
In keeping with the narrow factual context in which it arose-state
regulation of teachers' political affiliations-and the narrow legal
grounds on which it was decided, although Keyishian sounds many of
the same themes as Sweezy, the discussion of academic freedom is
equally unnecessary. It situates academic freedom squarely within the
First Amendment and treats it as a right against the state, without addressing how or whether the public university itself may govern speech
on campus. And it emphasizes that any special rights enjoyed by the
university are "of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the
teachers concerned."133

What is significant here is the subtle shift in the Court's
justification for constitutional academic freedom. Although the passage
quoted above appears to invoke the same truth-seeking value offered by
the plurality and concurring opinions in Sweezy, there are, in fact, two
justifications at work here. The Court is concerned not only with the
knowledge that is the product of the search for truth, but with the civic
value of the process of discussion itself. It is less concerned with the particular truths that may emerge "'out of a multitude of tongues'"'13 4 than
it is with the capacity of vigorous discussion to produce citizens who are
accustomed to the "robust exchange of ideas."135
Keyishian's reference to the classroom as "peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas"' is, on this reading, misleading. 136 The marketplace of

132 Id. at 603 (quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y

1943)).
3

1 3 Id.
134Id. (quoting AssociatedPress, 52 F. Supp. at 372).

Is5 Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
136Id. (quoting Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. at 372). For discussions of Keyishian that fo-

cus on the marketplace of ideas concept, see, for example, Rabban, Functional Analysis,
supranote 46, at 228, 240; John A. Scanlan, Aliens in the Marketplace ofIdeas: The Government,
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ideas metaphor is generally understood to relate directly to the search
for truth: "the best test for truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market."13 7 Keyishian, on the other
hand, is less interested in the results of that competition than it is in the
social value of training future leaders and other citizens in the habit of
vigorous dialogue. If Keyishian finds its roots elsewhere in First
Amendment doctrine, then, they lie not in Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes's Abrams v. United States dissent but in Justice Louis Brandeis's
concurring opinion in Whitney v. California3 8 which was similarly concerned with inculcating a free citizenry that is accustomed to public
discussion and debate139

Keyishian thus marks a significant shift in the Court's understanding of academic freedom. Although the traditional justification for
academic freedom both in the academy and in the Court's jurisprudence had turned on the search for truth, the Court now suggested
that academic freedom serves quite another virtue: the training and
shaping of the nation's citizens. That shift is important for at least two
reasons. First, to the extent future applications of the constitutional
principle of academic freedom may turn on the underlying purposes
of academic freedom, it is important to understand what those purposes are. More broadly, though, constitutional academic freedom
must be understood not just on its own terms, but in terms of its relationship to First Amendment doctrine. Any democratically based
justifications raised in support of academic freedom might have equal
application and important implications elsewhere in the First
Amendment. Conversely, if democratic justifications for the First
Amendment have found little traction elsewhere in the case law, the
democratically oriented justification for academic freedom doctrine
would stand all the more exposed for its inconsistency with the
broader body of law.
Sweezy and Keyishian provided the richest descriptions of the
Court's understanding of the constitutional dimensions of academic
freedom until Bakke, albeit they left a variety of unanswered questions
and were grounded on at least two distinct theoretical bases. Subsethe Academy, and the McCarran-WalterAct,66 TEx. L. REV. 1481, 1520-46 (1988); XYudof, supra
note 30, at 841-58.
137 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1920) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
1
38 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis,J., concurring).
1s9 For discussion of Whitney, see generally Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the
Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv.
653 (1988); Paul Horwitz, Citizenship and Speech, 43 McGILL LJ. 445 (1998).
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quent case law did little to give further shape to the doctrine.1 40 In one
1972 case, Healy v. James,141 the Court did offer some additional views
about the scope of academic freedom. In holding that Central Connecticut State College had improperly denied the campus chapter of
Students for a Democratic Society certification as a campus group, the
Court necessarily suggested that academic freedom may in proper circumstances be a right held against the public university itself by members of the university community-in this case, students. To be sure, as
in Sweezy and Keyishian, the Court could have reached the same ruling
without referring to academic freedom. It could have held simply that
the college had failed to act in a viewpoint-neutral fashion with respect
to speech within what was basically a public forum. But the Court went
further, situating the student group's claim within "this Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic freedom."142
Healy thus suggests that the "four freedoms" identified in Justice
Frankfurter's Sweezy concurrence-including, presumably, the freedom
to determine who may be admitted to study--do not delineate spheres
of absolute nonintrusion for university officials. They are not only subject to the requirement that the university act on "academic" grounds,
but they also may potentially be subject to whatever competing academic freedom rights can be asserted by other members of the university community.143
At the same time, Healy suggests that those limits work both ways.
The Court made clear that student groups on campus would still be
required to abide by generally applicable rules of conduct governing
the university. Students for a Democratic Society could not "infringe
reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes, or substantially interfere
with the opportunity of other students to obtain an education." 144
Again, that conclusion is an unexceptional exercise of time, place,
and manner doctrine. Because the Healy Court invoked academic
140 See, e.g., Ailsa W. Chang, Note, Resuscitating the Constitutional "Theory" of Academic
Freedom:A Search for a Standard Beyond Pickering and Connick, 53 STAN. L. REv. 915, 922
(2001). But see William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the Supreme Court of the United States: An Unhurried HistoricalReview, in FREEDOM AND TENURE IN
THE ACADEMY, supra note 46, at 79, 118 (purporting to find "some clearer sense of what
counts as an academic freedom interest" in the post-Keyishiancase law).
141408 U.S. 169, 194 (1972).
142Id. at 180-81.
14 See, e.g., Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result). For a discussion of the competing interests involved in intramural speech within the university, see
generally Matthew W. Finkin, IntramuralSpeech, Academic Freedom, and the First Amendmen
66 "Ix. L. Rtv. 1323 (1988).
144Healy, 408 U.S. at 189.
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freedom, however, we may read the limitation for something more. It
suggests that academic freedom rights are subject to constraints
specific to the unique circumstances of the university. After all, Healy
involved certification of a student group, which allowed it to post notices on campus bulletin boards, to use campus facilities to hold meetings, and to take other such actions. 145 The Court's conclusion that
Students for a Democratic Society could have been refused
certification altogether if it was unwilling to abide by the university's
rules of conduct suggests that, when conflicts with the rules of civility
that govern university speech are concerned, permissible restrictions
on speech may be broader on campus than off campus.
2. Bakke: "... Who May Be Admitted to Study"
All of the cases discussed so far deal with paradigmatic speech
acts, and in each case the Court could have reached the same results
without any recourse to a novelty like academic freedom. Bakke146 is a
different story altogether. For the first time, the Court invoked one of
the "four freedoms" of Sweezy that has little to do directly with speech:
the freedom "to determine ...

who may be admitted to study."147

Bakke represents perhaps the Court's most significant affirmation to
that date that academic freedom was not simply an individual right,
but contained a significant component of institutional autonomy for
colleges and universities.1 48 If taken seriously as a First Amendment
case, Bakke develops considerably the doctrine of constitutional academic freedom. 149 Whether it ought to be taken seriously as a First
Amendment case, as we shall see, is another matter.
The facts of the case are well known and need not long detain us.
Allan Bakke brought suit challenging the admissions policies of the
University of California at Davis's medical school, which ensured admission to a specified number of minority applicants. 150 A fractured
Court held that the school's admissions policy was illegal, but that the
Constitution did not bar the consideration of race as one of a number
of "plus" factors in an admissions decision.
In his pivotal opinion, Justice Powell rejected all the grounds advanced by the university in support of its admissions program, save
145Id. at
1

176.
0 See generally 438 U.S. -265 (1978).
147Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result).
14 8 See Byrne, supra note 17, at 313.
149See, e.g., Vudof, supra note 30, at 854.
150
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269-70 (opinion of Powell, J.).
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one-"the attainment of a diverse student body."15 1 That interest was
linked directly to academic freedom, "a special concern of the First
Amendment." 152 Under the "fourth" element of constitutional academic freedom enumerated in Sweezy, a university must be free "to
make its own judgments as to education[,] includ[ing] the selection of
its student body."153 The Court drew on Keyishian to emphasize the importance of the "'robust exchange of ideas'" on campus. 5 4 That robust
exchange of ideas "is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student body."155 The university's judgment that racially diverse admissions
would help create an atmosphere of robust discussion thus posed a
"countervailing constitutional interest, that of the First Amendment,"156
which constituted a compelling state interest.1 57
If Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke is viewed strictly for its First
Amendment value, a number of aspects of the opinion merit discussion. First, the opinion offers further evidence that the Court's view of
academic freedom itself had changed over time, although its view was
stated with something less than clarity. As we have seen, the Court to
this point variously had described constitutional academic freedom as
serving both the search for truth and the more democratic function of
training leaders accustomed to engaging in the robust exchange of
ideas. The only case suggesting that a university should enjoy autonomy
in its admissions decisions, Sweezy, clearly was grounded in the search
for truth and no other value. Indeed, to the extent the Sweezy concurrence tracks the Declaration in hewing to the search-for-truth
justification, it was unlikely to offer much support for diversity-oriented
admissions policies, let alone race-conscious admissions. 158
But although Justice Powell relies on Sweezy for the right to make
admissions decisions, it is difficult to find any trace of its underlying
truth-seeking justification in Bakke. Instead, Justice Powell explains aca151Id. at 311 (opinion of Powell,J.).
152 Id. at 312 (opinion of PowelI,J.).
15
3 Id. (opinion of PowelI,J.).
54
1 Id. (opinion of Powell,J.) (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603).
155 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (opinion of Powell,J.).
6
15 Id. at 313 (opinion of Powell,J.).
157 Cf. Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Bakke: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 67 CAL. L. REv. 69, 75-76
(1979) (observing that Justice Powell's reliance on diversity in Bakke focused on "an interest of the institution ... rather than an interest held by the represented minority group")
(emphasis omitted).
158 See Byrne, supra note 17, at 314 ("To the drafters of the AAUP's 1915 Statement,
benefitting a scholar because of his race would have been as repulsive in principle as penalizing him."); Timothy L. Hall, EducationalDiversity: Viewpoints and Proxies, 59 OHIO ST.
L.J. 551, 578-79 (1998).
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demic freedom in terms closer to those used in Keyishian: universities
must be free to seek a diverse student body because the nation's future
leaders ought to be exposed to a wide range of "ideas and mores." 159
Bakke is also noteworthy for its indication that academic freedom
means universities "must have wide discretion in making the sensitive
judgments as to who should be admitted." 160 As Timothy Hall observes,
it was on this ground that the university staked its argument in Bakke. 161
But whatever autonomy the universities may have won in Bakke, it is far
from unbounded. Institutional autonomy is still subject to the constraint of "constitutional limitations protecting individual rights."162
Moreover, by settling on and emphasizing diversity as a compelling state interest, Justice Powell specifies the grounds on which universities may engage in admissions decisions, rather than leaving
those institutions free to make admissions decisions on any academic
grounds they wish to select. If any opinion in Bakke truly represents
the institutional autonomy strand of academic freedom, it is not Justice Powell's, but Justice Harry Blackmun's. 163 Rather than focus on
the particulars of the admissions program at issue, Justice Blackmun
simply places his faith in the hands of the universities, arguing that
"[t] he administration and management of educational institutions are
beyond the competence of judges and ... within the special competence of educators," subject to constitutional limits. 64
In sum, Bakke represents a significant change in the Court's
treatment of academic freedom. Notwithstanding Justice Frankfurter's
opinion in Sweezy, academic freedom up until this point had been relevant only to disputes involving academic speech, whether by professors
or students; the Court had never applied the principle to academic
institutional decision making. Justice Powell's treatment of diversity
left unclear whether his approval of diversity as a compelling interest
was based on the principle of deference to the autonomy of the university or on a more substantive, less deferential approval of the particular justification offered by the university for diversity in admissions.
159 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (opinion of Powell, J.).
160 Id. at 314 (opinion of Powell,J.).
161Hall, supra note 158, at 581.
162 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (opinion of PowelI,J.).
163 On this point, Professor Wendy Parker observes that Justice Harry Blackmun's
opinion is the true predecessor of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's opinion in Grutter v.
Bollinger See Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots: Grutter, School Desegregation, and Federalism,
45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1691, 1700 n.51 (2004).
164 Bakke 438 U.S. at 404 (Blackmun,J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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But it is at least evident that the Justice Powell opinion in Bakke had
moved a considerable distance from the truth-seeking justification offered in support of academic freedom by the AAUP and the Supreme
Court's earlier decisions. Nevertheless, given the peculiar place of academic freedom in the case-its status as a "countervailing constitutional interest" rather than as a clearly defined ground for decisionBakke's import as a First Amendment case was far from clear.165
3. Grutter: Revisiting Constitutional Academic Freedom
If, as I observed at the beginning of this Article, Bakke never
made its way into the First Amendment canon, one reason is surely
that few observers took Justice Powell's reasoning on this point seriously, at least in its implications for academic freedom. Mark Yudof,
for example, noted his suspicion that "the Powell approach to academic freedom.., was for that day and trip only and that this face of
academic freedom will quickly fade."'6
The evidence in favor of this view was mixed. On the one hand,
the Court in subsequent decisions paid lip service to the principle of
educational institutional autonomy set forth in Bakke. On at least two
occasions, the Court turned back student due process challenges to
university decisions dismissing them from academic programs. 67 On
both occasions, the Court stressed that courts owe great deference to
"genuinely academic decision [s]" made by university faculties.' 6 s
The Court in these decisions, as Yudof notes, simply refused to interfere with an established decision-making procedure within the university. When those procedures were challenged, however, or when a
university sought to carve out additional rights against the state on the
basis of institutional autonomy, the Court rebuffed those attempts.1 69
Thus, in 1984, in Minnesota State Boardfor Community Colleges v. Knight,
the Court rejected a challenge by community college instructors to a
state statute requiring public employers to bargain on certain issues
with the exclusive bargaining representative selected by their professional employees, holding that there was no "constitutional right of

166Id. at 313 (opinion of Powell, J.).
16 Yudof, supra note 30, at 855-56; see Byrne, supra note 17, at 315.
167 See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226-28 (1985); Bd. of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 79-80 (1978). Horowitz actually was decided shortly before
Bakke.
168
Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225; Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90-91, 96 n.6.
1
69 See Yudof, supra note 30, at 856-57.
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faculty to participate in policy making in academic institutions." 170
Thus, notwithstanding the Court's repeated call for deference to academic decisions based on "the faculty's professional judgment," faculty
were not constitutionally entitled to participate in the formulation of
academic policy.171 And in refusing to grant a university any privilege
against the disclosure of confidential peer review materials in job discrimination suits, the Court emphasized that its "so-called academicfreedom cases" all involved instances of content-specific speech regulation and nothing more. 172 As Yudof notes, "[t]he post-Bakke decisions
[thus] appear[ed] to reinforce the view that institutional academic
freedom in the public sector is a make-weight." 173
The Court's decision in Grutter makes clear that Bakke was something more than a ticket good for one day and time only. In holding
that the Law School had "a compelling interest in attaining a diverse
student body," based on principles of academic freedom grounded in
the First Amendment, the Supreme Court gave a far more detailed explanation of the purpose and scope of educational institutional autonomy than the discussion offered by Justice Powell in Bakke.174 Justice
O'Connor's discussion of academic freedom in Grutter may be considered more carefully by looking in turn at a number of key elements.
a. Deference to EducationalInstitutions
The most significant hurdle facing the Law School in Grutterwas
the Court's increasingly demanding use of strict scrutiny in reviewing all
governmental classifications by race, whether for benign or invidious
purposes.1 75 Although the Court purported to be applying strict scrutiny
here, it is surely right to observe that its actual approach demonstrated
"remarkable latitudinarianism." 176 The key to understanding that ap170 465 U.S. 271, 287 (1984).

171See id. at 288.
172 Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 197 (1990).
173Yudof, supra note 30, at 857. But see Bruce C. Hafen, Developing Student Expression
Through InstitutionalAuthority: Public Schools as Mediating Structures, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 663,
716 (1987) (arguing that the Court's reliance on institutional academic freedom in Ewing

demonstrates that Justice Powell's discussion of educational institutional autonomy in
Bakke was not merely a "theoretical stretch made necessary by the peculiar demands of
affirmative action as a national policy").
174 Grutter,539 U.S. at 328.
175 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors,

Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); Richmond v.
JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989).
176 Peter H. Schuck, Reflections on Grutter,JURIST (Sept. 5, 2003), at http://jurist.law.

pitt.edu/forum/symposium-aa/schuck.php.
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proach lies in the Court's posture of deference toward academic institutions. The Court places its approach within its purported "tradition of
giving a degree of deference to a university's academic decisions, within
constitutionally prescribed limits." 177 Thus, Justice O'Connor suggests,
strict scrutiny of the Law School's admissions policies must "tak[e]
into account complex educational judgments in an area that lies primarily within the expertise of the university," albeit within constitutional limits.'

78

This deference is extraordinary for a number of reasons. First, it
represents a strong reaffirmation that the Court stands by its prior
statements singling out universities as institutions uniquely worthy of
substantial deference. Certainly the Law School was accorded deference far beyond that granted to any other institution whose
affirmative action policies had come before the Court since Bakke.
Moreover, notwithstanding the Court's rhetoric, it is unlikely that
the deference the Court showed toward the Law School can be based
simply on the fact that universities make "complex educational judgments." 179 Every institution makes complex judgments. As Peter Schuck
notes, those institutions whose programs had failed strict scrutiny between Bakke and Grutter-local governments, government agencies,
and others-are not situated so differently from academic institutions. 18° They all operate with some greater level of expertise and experience with respect to their own affairs than a court would be likely
to possess. They presumably structure their policies with the particular
circumstances of their institution in mind. And they are subject to a
host of "political, ideological, competitive, social, legal, and institutional pressures," both internal and external.18' The Court's hands-off
treatment of the Law School's program must have been based on its
regard for the special social role of educational institutions, and not
merely on its respect for the expert judgment of educators.
Finally, if one takes the Court's opinion seriously, it is clear that
deference to the Law School's educational judgment performed real
work in Grutter In the face of the Court's stringent approach in recent
cases to the requirement that racial distinctions be "narrowly tailored
to achieve [the] compelling state interest," 182 it is hard to believe that
177Grutter,539 U.S. at 328.
178Id.
179Id. at

328.

180
Schuck, supranote 176.
181Id.
18

Grutter,539 U.S. at 378 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).

2005]

Grutter's FirstAmendment

the Court would have left the Law School so free a hand to shape its
admissions policies had it not proceeded from a posture of deference
to university decision making.183 So, if one assumes the Court meant
what it said and did not refer simply to the need to defer to educational institutions as a makeweight in support of its Fourteenth
Amendment conclusions, deference made a significant difference in
Grutter
The Court's approach is all the more remarkable because it is not
clear that the level of deference displayed in Grutteris justified by the
case law. Although the Court cites its decisions in Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing and Board of Curatorsv. Horowitz in addition to
Bakke, and both cases speak in strong terms about the importance of
respecting the discretion of university faculties, neither opinion
comes close to suggesting the kind of deference applied here. 184
Those cases merely held that even if students were entitled to due
process protection when public universities made decisions affecting
their enrollment, the procedures in place at those schools were
sufficient to satisfy those rights. Neither case suggested that the Court
would pay universities the level of deference that they were given by
the Gruttermajority.
Conversely, when universities argued on institutional autonomy
grounds for a limited carve-out from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's disclosure requirements for peer review materials, the Court did not hesitate to shut down the argument, asserting
the right to determine for itself what constitutes legitimate or illegitimate academic decision making.1 5 It is a curious form of deference to
deny a university the right to maintain the confidentiality of peer review materials while permitting it to exercise its own best judgment in
crafting admissions policies that may skirt the boundaries of the Fourteenth Amendment.

183See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Searchingfor Strict Scrutiny in Grutter v. Bollinger, 78 TUL.
L. Riv. 1941, 1943 (2004) (noting that Gruttefs strict scrutiny approach is "undeniably
relaxed"); Ware, supra note 20, at 2111 ("The academic deference principle, and its
influence on the majority's strict scrutiny analysis, was critical to the outcome in Grutte.
The majority's interpretation of strict scrutiny in university admissions was far more re-

laxed and flexible than it has been in other cases."); Schuck, supra note 176 (arguing that
"Justice O'Connor's strict scrutiny has all the strictness of an indulgent mother who gives
her affable son the keys to the family car without questioning him about his drinking").
184 See, e.g., Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225 n.ll.
185See Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 198-99.
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b. Academic Freedom and InstitutionalAutonomy
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutterlinks the Court's deferential
treatment of the Law School to the broader constitutional value of academic freedom. "[U]niversities," the Court makes clear, "occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition." 186 Specifically, the Court
affirms Justice Powell's statement in Bakke that universities enjoy a constitutional "dimension" of "educational autonomy," including the right
to make their own decisions regarding whom to admit to study. 187 The

Court did not note, as it has in the past, the shifting and uneasy nature
of the question whether academic freedom inheres in the individual,
the institution, or both. 88
What is not clear from Grutter is whether any exercise of institutional autonomy by a university, or at least one involving "academic
decisions,"la9 operates within a sphere of government noninterference. The Court seconded Justice Powell's invocation of the university's right to "make its own judgments as to ...the selection of its
student body."190 But that point is tied closely to the Court's discussion
of the particular merits of diversity in education, which I discuss immediately below. Would a university's invocation of academic freedom
insulate from attack some other set of admissions criteria not tied to
diversity, if those criteria raised constitutional questions? Grutter does
not answer that question. The implications of this unresolved issue
are treated at length later in this Article.
c. Academic Freedom and Student Diversity
The core of Grutters First Amendment discussion is its treatment
of the Law School's proffered compelling interest: "obtaining the
educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body." 191 On this
point, the Court provided an illuminating discussion with profound
potential implications for constitutional academic freedom. Drawing
186Grutter,539 U.S. at 329.
187Id.

188 See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 n.12 ("Academic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but also, and
somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decisionmaking by the university itself ... )
(citations omitted); see also Piarowski v. Ill. Cmty. Coll. Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir.
1985). For criticism of the Supreme Court's reliance in Grutter on institutional autonomy,
see generally Hiers, supra note 20.
189 Grutter,539 U.S. at 328.
19
0 Id. at 329 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
191Id. at 317 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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on Justice Powell's citation of Keyishian in Bakke, the Court accepted
that a diverse student body will contribute to the "robust exchange of
ideas," and held that the Law School's search for a critical mass of mi192
nority students would serve that end.

Significantly, the Court's holding that the Law School had a
compelling interest in the educational benefits of diversity was "informed by [its] view that attaining a diverse student body is at the
heart of the Law School's proper institutional mission." 193 This statement can be read in a number of ways. Perhaps the Court simply was
acknowledging that the Law School's institutional autonomy gave it
the freedom to set its own educational goals, which would qualify as a
compelling interest. That reading is supported by the prelude to the
Court's discussion of educational diversity, which sounds precisely
those notes. Similarly, perhaps the Court meant to suggest that any set
of admissions policies-including but not limited to diversity-oriented
policies-that qualified under some unarticulated definition as the
result of an "academic decision" would be entitled to the same degree
of deference.
In truth, there seems to be something more going on here. Although this section of the Court's opinion focuses on the First
Amendment, and although the scope of this Article is limited to that
issue, obviously the Court's treatment of academic freedom is
significantly underwritten by the Fourteenth Amendment context in
which the case arose. Thus, a third natural reading of the Court's
opinion in Grutter suggests that, far from deferring to the general expertise of academic officials, the Court here was actively endorsing the
educational benefits of diversity. If so, of course, that is precisely the
kind of "complex educational judgment[ ]" that the Court had just
declared itself incompetent to evaluate. 194
Certainly that reading of the Court's treatment of the Law
School's diversity argument is supported by the depth and breadth of
its discussion of the benefits of racial and ethnic diversity in education. Far from quietly relying on the Law School's own determination
on that issue, the Court provided extensive discussion of the educational benefits of student exposure to classmates of different backgrounds: it "promotes cross-racial understanding, helps to break down

19 2

Id.at 329.
Id.
194Grutte, 539 U.S. at 328.
193
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racial stereotypes, and enables [students] to better understand per195
sons of different races."
Significantly, the Court's tribute to the benefits of student diversity looked beyond the immediate pedagogical benefit of learning in a
diverse environment, to focus on the external benefits of student diversity-its value in preparing students as citizens, workers, and leaders. 196 The Court stressed the democratic value of diversity in education, its capacity to prepare students "for work and citizenship."197
Diversity in this view serves a dual purpose: to prepare students for
citizenship by exposing them to diverse views, and to ensure that a
diversity of views are heard in the polity by taking measures to provide
the benefits of higher education to members of diverse racial and
ethnic groups.1 98 And the Court added that in the context of elite legal education, diversity helps members of different races achieve
eventual leadership and so ensures that those leaders have "legitimacy
in the eyes of the citizenry."'199
Having canvassed the Court's prior case law on academic freedom, it should be evident on this account that Grutteris not merely a
restatement of the Court's prior views. There is little here that the
authors of the Sweezy majority or concurrence would recognize as following from their handiwork. In particular, there is no trace in Grutter
of the truth-seeking rationale for constitutional academic freedom
that was the centerpiece of both opinions in Sweezy, and that was the
core of the AAUP's Declaration.
Nor does Grutter rest on the reasoning in Keyishian, or even the
reasoning in Bakke. True, Grutter shares with the earlier cases a shift
from a truth-seeking to a democratic rationale for academic freedom.
But Keyishian and Bakke ultimately remained safely within the college
gates, because the Court in both opinions argued that a proper
democratic education would give students exposure to the vigorous
clash of ideas. Thus, Justice Powell, quoting Keyishian, focused on the
contribution made by a diverse student body to an "atmosphere of
speculation, experiment and creation" in the academy. 20 0 Grutter

195Id. at 330 (alteration in original) (quotations and citations omitted).
196See id. at 330-33.
197 Id. at 331 (emphasis added).
198 See id. at 331-33.
199Grutter,539 U.S. at 332.
200 Bakke 438 U.S. at 312 (opinion of Powell,J.) (quotation omitted).
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shares that concern, but adds something more. 201 Here, the concern
is not merely with the quality of education, with its capacity to prepare
students for work and citizenship; the Court is concerned that education be representative, irrespective of the immediate educational
benefits supplied by a diverse student body.202
To be sure, that reasoning follows as much (or more) from the
Court's Fourteenth Amendment premises as its First Amendment
premises. But the two cannot be easily disaggregated. Grutterpresents
a detailed vision of the social role of education, particularly elite
higher education. Although that vision necessarily sounds in terms of
equal protection, it is ultimately still a statement about the "proper
institutional mission" of the university, and thus about the basis for
constitutional academic freedom. 203
I do not mean at this juncture to criticize that vision. Indeed,
whether or not Grutteris a sound application of the specific principles
of constitutional academic freedom, it arguably is consistent not only
with our constitutional ideals, but also with a longstanding stream of
thought about the broader democratic purposes of the university. 20 4

But Grutter's vision of academic freedom is still indisputably one that
would be unrecognizable to the framers of the Declaration and to the
drafters of the early academic freedom cases. 20 5

In sum, then, Grutter may represent a significant moment in the
development of the law of academic freedom. Again, as with Bakke,
whether it does or not will depend on whether the Court takes its own
words seriously or treats the case as a sport for First Amendment purposes. 20 6 But as a First Amendment case, Grutter raises a number of
issues worthy of serious attention and reflection. First, it buttresses the
view that educational institutions are entitled, on First Amendment
grounds, to substantial autonomy in their decision making. Second, it
reaffirms that "complex educational judgments" will be given substan201 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (discussing diversity's contribution to lively classroom
discussion).
202 See id. at 330-32.
203
SeeJack Greenberg, Diversity, the University, and the World Outside, 103 COLUM. L. REv.
1610, 1619 (2003) ("Justice O'Connor structures her argument so that preparation for the
world beyond graduation has the constitutional protection of being a subset of academic
freedom.").
m4See Lee C. Bollinger, A Comment on Grutter and Gratz v. Bollinger, 103 COLUM. L.
REv.1589, 1591-92 (2003).
205 See Hall, supra note 158, at 578-79 (making a similar point with respect to Bakke).
206 See Yljdof, supra note 30, at 855-56 (discussing the fate of Bakke as an academic
freedom case).
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tial deference by the courts-indeed, enough deference to overcome
strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.2 07 Third, although it
is difficult to discern which elements of the Court's discussion of educational diversity speak to its First Amendment understanding and
which speak to issues of equal protection, Grutteralso may represent a
further move away from a truth-seeking rationale for constitutional
academic freedom, and toward one that focuses instead on the internal and external democratic goals served by higher education.
II.

TAKING GRUTTER SERIOUSLY

This Part aims to do something the Court and commentators likely
will not do. It proposes to take Grutter v. Bollinger seriously as a First
Amendment decision. If read for all it is worth, Grutterhas a number of
wide-ranging and significant First Amendment implications.
For these purposes, Gruttermay be read in one of two ways. First, it
could be read for its enthusiastic support for the "constitutional dimension, grounded in the First Amendment, of institutional autonomy."2 08
That reading assumes that the particular educational goals put forward
by a university are less important to the courts than the fact that the
goals are propounded by educators making "complex educational
judgments." 209 On this view, provided a university policy is based on
genuine academic reasons, it is entitled to act substantially free of government interference. It may act only "within constitutionally prescribed limits," but as Grutter itself suggests, it certainly may push those
limits and in fact will be given considerable latitude to do so. 21 0 This
institutional autonomy reading of Grutteroffers support for positionsoften conflicting positions-taken by partisans on both sides of a host
of First Amendment, constitutional, and educational policy debates.
The second reading of Grutterfocuses not on institutional autonomy, but on the Court's democratically oriented justification for academic freedom, and thus for the Law School's admissions policies in
that case. It asks what First Amendment implications follow from a
conception of academic freedom centered on the democratic func207 Grutter,539 U.S. at 328.
0
m See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).
20 See id. at 328; see also Katyal, supra note 19, at 557 ('Universities should have a zone
of freedom in which to conduct their academic affairs because they are better at making
choices about educational matters than are generalist courts.").
210 539 U.S. at 328; see also Katyal, supra note 19, at 558 (warning that universities
should resist the temptation "to use their autonomy wantonly to carry out policies that
cross the constitutional line").
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tion of higher education-its role in preparing students to serve as
citizens and in serving as an entry point for a more representative set
of elite professionals, citizens, and leaders. 211 This approach to Grutter
carries a different set of implications for particular First Amendment
disputes. More importantly, however, this reading of Grutter suggests
that significant fault lines exist between the Court's approach in this
case and its approach in other areas of First Amendment doctrine.
A. InstitutionalAutonomy and Its Implications
Begin with the assumption that Grutterstands for the proposition
that courts will defer to a substantial degree, though within loosely
defined constitutional limits, to an institution of higher education's
academic judgments about whether certain programs or measures will
serve its educational interests. 212 What measures might a university
justify under this standard?
1. Hate Speech on Campus
An obvious candidate for reexamination under Grutter's strongly
deferential approach to university officials is the question of the constitutionality of campus speech codes. The late 1980s and early 1990s
saw a flurry of efforts by universities to regulate hostile speech targeted at individuals on campus by virtue of their race, sex, ethnicity,
and so forth.2 13 The University of Michigan, for example, adopted a
policy on discrimination and discriminatory harassment that created
grounds for disciplining anyone who engaged in "[a]ny behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis
of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran
status," provided the behavior met certain other conditions. 214 Among
the specified circumstances in which this sort of speech would be
grounds for discipline were cases in which the speech "has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfering with an individual's academic efforts, employment, participation in University spon211See Grutter,539 U.S. at 331-32.
212 See id. at 328 (I'he Law School's educational judgment that such diversity is essen-

tial to its educational mission is one to which we defer..., within constitutionally prescribed limits.").
213 The materials discussing this topic are voluminous. For a history of these developments, see generally TIMOTHy C. SHIELL, CAMPUS HATE SPEECH ON TRIAL (1998).

214 Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852, 856 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
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sored extra-curricular activities or personal safety."215 Although these
measures sparked enormously heated debates, they were largely
abandoned or allowed to fade into obscurity after several courts
found such codes unconstitutional.2 16
Those cases relied largely upon general First Amendment doctrine, rejecting or giving short shrift to any argument that the courts
should defer to the judgment of the universities that had promulgated the codes. Thus, in 1989, in Doe v. University of Michigan, the district court struck down the University of Michigan policy described
above on vagueness and overbreadth grounds. 217
Academic freedom did no significant work in the case. To the
contrary, the court suggested that the general First Amendment principles it cited, such as the importance of content neutrality, "acquire a
special significance in the university setting, where the free and unfettered interplay of competing views is essential to the institution's educational mission." 218 But academic freedom provided no thumb on
the scales here. The decision would surely have been the same regardless of whether or not the court had acknowledged the university setting of the case. Indeed, the judge who decided this case later suggested that the decision largely to omit any discussion of academic
freedom was quite deliberate, and he distinguished, oddly, between
the constitutional academic freedom issues raised by the case and the
First Amendment issues that it raised. 2 19 A similar code promulgated
by the University of Wisconsin met the same fate in a 1991 district
court case, without any mention at all of academic freedom.220
By comparison, in 1995, in Dambrot v. Central Michigan University,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that academic freedom concerns might arise in reviewing a university's discriminatory harassment policy, but held that the speech in questionracially offensive locker room talk by a college basketball coach215 Id.
216 See ROBERT

M.

O'NEIL, FREE SPEECH IN THE COLLEGE COMMUNITY

20-21 (1997);

Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 852; see also Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1184-85 (6th
Cir. 1995).
217 See Doe, 721 F. Supp. at 852.
218 Id. at 863.
219 See Avern Cohn, A Federal TialJudge Looks at Academic Freedom, in UNFETrERED ExPRESSION: FREEDOM IN AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL LIFE 117, 131 (Peggie J. Hollingsworth

ed., 2000) ("[I] n my written decision I used the words academicfreedom only twice and then
obliquely. My concerns were directed to the First Amendment implication of the code in
action.").

220 See generally UWM Post, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 774 F.
Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991).

20051

Grutter's FirstAmendment

"served to advance no academic message" and therefore did not
"[e]nter the [m]arketplace of [i]deas [o]r the [r]ealm of [a]cademic
[f]reedom. 221 Dambrot thus admitted the relevance of academic freedom to its First Amendment inquiry, while narrowing the scope of academic freedom to embrace only classroom speech. Like other courts
faced with academic freedom claims, the Sixth Circuit resolved the issue by using First Amendment doctrine that is generally applicable to
222
other public employees.
The speech code cases thus are marked by two distinguishing factors. First, they proceed on the view that standard First Amendment
analysis-are the codes content-neutral or content-based, and is the
university, or some parts of it, a public forum?-may be applied in the
context of university speech as it would be applied elsewhere. Second,
and relatedly, they pay lip service to academic freedom but are unwilling to let claims based on academic freedom shift the balance. If hate
speech is susceptible to regulation on campus, the university must
perforce address the same speech in the same way as any other public
body, and it may restrict only speech that otherwise properly would be
subject to regulation by any other public institution. 223
In the heyday of the speech code debate, a number of academics
entered the lists in favor of a more permissive approach to the regulation of discriminatory speech on campus.

224

Those advocates argued

in part that the law had failed to take adequate account of the harms
wreaked by discriminatory speech on its targets-failed, in Professor
Mari Matsuda's words, to consider the victim's story.225 But they ar-

gued as well that campus speech codes could be justified on pedagogical grounds. Thus, Professor Matsuda argued that students on
campus, young and often far from home for the first time, are espe-

22155 F.3d 1177, 1188, 1190 (6th Cir. 1995).
222See id. at 1185-86 (discussing application of Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983),

and similar cases); see also Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 415 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(adopting same approach); Rebecca Gose Lynch, Pawns of the State or Priests of Democracy?
Analyzing Professors' Academic Freedom Rights Within the State's ManagerialRealm, 91 CAL. L.
REv. 1061, 1074-98 (2003); Chang, supra note 140, at 926-28.
22 See Rodney Smolla, Academic Freedom, Hate Speech, and the Idea of a University, in
FREEDOM AND TENURE IN THE ACADEMY, supranote 46, at 196, 224 n.125.
224 See generally MARIJ. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993); Richard Delgado, Campus
Antiracism Rules: ConstitutionalNarrativesin Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 343 (1991).
225 See generally Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Story, in MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 224, at 17.
ASSAULTIVE
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cially vulnerable to racist speech, and that universities therefore carry
a special obligation not to tolerate such conduct.2 26
More centrally to this Article, it has been argued by some proponents of campus speech codes that campus speech codes are appropriate not only because of the vulnerability of students but also because they represent the settled judgment of the university that
particular kinds of speech do not contribute to its educational mission. A university may reasonably determine that the kind of speech
covered by a discrimination policy or other code affecting campus
speech is simply not of the intellectual quality demanded in an environment of scholarly inquiry-just as it would not hesitate to conclude that a professor teaching creationism in a biology class may be
subject to discipline or dismissal, or that a student pursuing an argument in favor of Holocaust revisionism may receive a failing grade in a
history class. When the university concludes, in light of all the circumstances, that "the proscribed speech hurts, more than it promotes,
high-quality intellectual debate in a university community," it may
properly take action to restrict that speech.22 7
Other scholars have taken a slightly more nuanced position, arguing that given the special educational mission of a university, and its
duty to protect and encourage the most vulnerable members of the
campus community, administrators must be given more discretion to
regulate racist speech than might be available to other regulators, but
within carefully circumscribed limits. In Professor Kent Greenawalt's
terms, universities might be allowed to restrict speech if they adopted
regulations that are both "narrow" in scope and "noncategorical" in
nature, treating all vicious remarks similarly, rather than discriminating among such remarks on the basis of categories such as race. 22 8 At
the margins, however, as Professor Greenawalt's formulation suggests,
it is not clear that these careful approaches are altered significantly by
226 See id. at 44-45. Chi Steve Kwok has argued that some advocates of affirmative action in university admissions and campus speech codes, such as Professor Matsuda, adopt
startlingly divergent assumptions about the vulnerability of students depending on which
policy they are addressing. See generally Chi Steve Kwok, A Study in Contradiction: A Look at
the Conflicting Assumptions Underlying Standard Arguments for Speech Codes and the Diversity
Rationale, 4 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 493 (2002).
227 Mary Becker, The Legitimacy ofJudicial Review in Speech Cases, in ThE PRICE WE PAY:
THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND PORNOGRAPHY 208, 211
(LauraJ. Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995).
228 KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS,

COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES

OF SPEECH 76 (1995). For a similar approach, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE
PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 197-204 (1993).
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considerations of academic freedom. Although they begin by recognizing the special role of the university, they often end with recommendations about the proper scope of campus speech codes that
simply track existing categories of First Amendment jurisprudence:
narrowness as against vagueness and non-categorical approaches as
against content- or viewpoint-specific regulation.22 9
Ultimately, then, the campus speech code debate is fought on
different grounds in academic circles and in the courts. The academic
debate has turned less on the applicable doctrine than it has on the
question of the mission of the university.230 Is it the unfettered search
for truth?231 If so, it may be difficult (although not impossible) to justify speech codes. Is it the free and robust exchange of ideas, not simply for purposes of truth-seeking but for the democratic education
inherent in "allow[ing] students to interact as citizens do in the wider
polity?"2 3 2 Then, arguments may be made on both sides: speech codes

must be prohibited because they obstruct the free exchange of ideas,
or they must be permitted because racist speech itself impedes some
students' ability and willingness to participate in the broader debate.23 3 This debate has been largely beside the point for the courts
that have actually decided speech code cases; what has mattered there
is simply whether the codes can withstand the strict scrutiny aimed at
speech regulation by standard First Amendment doctrine. The universities' attempts to bring a deeper sense of context to the courts'
deliberations have been unavailing.
The reading of Grutter I have emphasized above-a reading that
places in the foreground the Court's substantial deference, on First
Amendment grounds, to the university's right to make "complex educational judgments" in shaping policies to serve its educational mission-would significantly shift the balance of power with respect to
speech codes at public universities from the courts back to the
229 See GREENAWALT, supra note 228, at 76-77. In fairness, Professor Greenawalt is addressing how universities might proceed given the courts' application of conventional First
Amendment analysis in these cases; he is not writing on a blank slate.
230 For an example of various contending visions regarding academic freedom and its
consequences for campus speech codes, see Cohn, supra note 219, at 123-34.
231 See, e.g., Donald J. Weidner, Academic Freedom and the Obligation to Earn I 32 J.L. &
EDUC. 445, 465 (2003); Vince Herron, Note, Increasing the Speech: Diversity, Campus Speech
Codes, and the Pursuitof Truth, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 407, 434 (1994).
232 Kwok, supranote 226, at 505; see Robert C. Post, Free Speech and Religion, Racial and
Sexual Harassment:Racist Speech, Democracy, and the FirstAmendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv.
267,321 (1991).
233 See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 452.
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schools. 23 4 This approach respects the fact that there is, finally, no one
"educational mission." Different universities may properly emphasize
different aspects of the academic mission.2 35 One school may emphasize pure research and truth-seeking, or believe that learning ought to
occur in an unchecked environment of vigorous and even out-ofbounds debate. Another may focus on teaching over research, and
come near adopting an in loco parentis relationship toward its students.
Another may believe in the exchange of ideas among a diverse (and
ethnically diverse in particular) range of individuals, but believe that
this kind of exchange is most likely to flourish if it is subject to a carefully bounded set of civility norms. 2 6 Surely all of these fall well within
what a university may properly view as its educational mission. Indeed,
a campus is a large and varied place, and a university or its component faculties may believe that different missions are at the forefront
of different sectors of university life.
On all these matters, according to the deference reading of Grutter, the courts must remain agnostic. A university may set its own
course, and having done so, the courts must respect its considered
determination that some set of rules or policies is vital to the
fulfillment of that mission. According to this view, courts err when
they apply standard First Amendment analysis, without more, to the
case of a campus speech code. Those distinctions that a university may
choose to draw between different kinds of speech, or different types
of offensive speech, are not mere content distinctions; they are also a
product of the university's "complex educational judgments" and
23 7
should be respected.
234 Grutter,539 U.S. at 328.
235 See GREENAWALT, supra note

228, at 74.
236I therefore think that criticisms of the University of Michigan and other, similarly
situated schools along the lines of those offered by Brian Fitzpatrick-that it is hypocritical
to laud diversity in admissions while discouraging diversity in speech-are only superficially attractive. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Diversity Lie 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
385, 392-93 (2003); cf. Robert F. Nagel, Diversity and the Practice of Interest Assessment, 53

DUKE LJ. 1515, 1521 (2004) (noting "the anomaly that the diversity movement ... should
have come into full flower during approximately the same period when many universities
have undertaken strenuous efforts to sanitize discourse"). It seems entirely plausible that a
school may think the two policies are not inconsistent, but complementary. That certainly
does not render either policy wise as a matter of educational policy or constitutional law,
but it does render the general criticism unpersuasive without additional support.
237 Grutter,539 U.S. at 328; cf W. Bradley Wendel, A ModerateDefense of Hate Speech Regulations on University Campuses, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 407, 408 (2004) (advancing a defense

of campus hate speech regulation in particular circumstances where the university is operating within the sphere of its expertise and according to its mission).
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Thus, the gift of Grutter's deference to educational mission is the
same with respect to speech codes as it is with respect to admissions
policies: the gift of discretion. A university may conclude quite reasonably that a campus speech code is unwarranted or that it conflicts
with its educational mission. But if it believes that its vision of its educational mission would be better served by imposing restrictions on
campus speech, it ought to have wide latitude to do so. In each case,
the determination rests with the school. If a university enforces a
speech code upon careful professional judgment about its own desired ends, "the state is powerless to interfere." 23 8
The few courts that have examined campus speech codes have
thus arguably fallen into error by assuming that academic freedom
concerns do not alter the need to perform the traditional First
Amendment analysis that would be performed in other speech contexts. Under Grutter's First Amendment, their task would be quite different. First, they must look for evidence that the university's restrictions on speech were justified by reference to its educational mission.
Second, they must ask whether the restrictions were the product of a
genuinely "academic" decision-making process. Finally, given a
finding that the university met the first and second conditions, the
courts should accord wide latitude to the nature and scope of the
measures adopted by the university. In that inquiry, the courts must
assume the university's good faith absent contrary evidence. 23 9
In short, the elaborate architecture of First Amendment jurisprudence-its inquiries about whether a public forum is present and
what kind of forum, and its effort to smoke out content and viewpoint
distinctions-must take a back seat to a deferential, context-specific
inquiry into whether a university's speech code relates to its educational mission. Under this test, it is quite conceivable that the courts
would uphold restrictions on campus speech.
238

J. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University, 79 GEO. L.J. 399,
425 (1991). Professor Byrne limits his reconmendation to cases in which the university
"acts to safeguard liberal education, which is understood both as the disinterested pursuit
of truth according to disciplinary criteria and the elaboration and instruction in culture."
Id. That analysis assumes that prohibitions of racist speech on campus are justified only
when they serve the particular functions of a university, which Professor Byrne is concerned to identify. Because this Section assumes that the Grutter Court privileged deference to academic institutions generally over any particular vision of the university, it need
not accept that aspect of Professor Byrne's argument. It does, however, play a more
significant role in the next Section of this Article. See infra notes 397-437 and accompanying text.
239Grutter,539 U.S. at 329.
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Interestingly, in his concurrence in 2000 in Board of Regents of the
University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, Justice David Souter (joined
by Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen Breyer) recognized that a
strong institutional autonomy approach to university policies affecting
student speech might carry precisely this implication. 240 As he recognized, an institutional autonomy approach like that suggested by Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hampshire "might seem to clothe the
University with an immunity to any challenge to regulations made or
obligations imposed in the discharge of its educational mission." 241
For that very reason, Justice Souter was at pains to emphasize the limited nature of the Court's prior academic freedom jurisprudence and
the fact that Southworth interposed student First Amendment rights as
against the university's First Amendment right to institutional autonomy. "[I]t is enough to say," he concluded, "that protecting a university's discretion to shape its educational mission may prove to be an
important consideration in First Amendment analysis of objections to
student fees. "242

However limited his conclusions about the status of institutional
autonomy as a First Amendment right of universities may have been,
though, Justice Souter at least acknowledged that this approach indeed may support a university's right to restrict student speech on
campus. That is the approach taken by the majority in Grutter-a majority that included Justice Souter.
Ultimately, I take no position on whether such codes are wise. 243

The question here is simply whether they are permissible.Under Grutters
First Amendment, as long as the wisdom of campus speech restrictions
is left in the university's hands, the court need not conduct the same
searching inquiry into constitutionality. Thus, Grutters First Amendment may well support the imposition of speech codes on campus.

240

529 U.S. 217, 239 n.5 (2000) (SouterJ., concurring in the judgment) ("Indeed, ac-

ceptance of the most general statement of academic freedom (as in the South African
manifesto quoted by Justice Frankfurter [in his Sweezy concurrence]) might be thought
even to sanction student speech codes in public universities.").

Id. at 237 (SouterJ., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 239 (SouterJ., concurring in the judgment).
245 See GREENAWALT, supra note 228, at 72-73 (noting that the constitutionality and the
wisdom of university speech regulations are two different questions).
241

242
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2. Content Distinctions on Campus, with Special Attention to
Religious Speech
Universities have become a prime ground of contention in the
Court's ongoing effort to determine what constitutes permissible or
impermissible regulation of religious speech and activity in the public
sphere. In recent years, some of the Court's most important pronouncements on the boundaries of acceptable government support for
or regulation of religion under the Establishment Clause have taken
place in the context of the university.2 44 Here, too, Gruttermay suggest a
different approach.
Debates over the inclusion of religious speech in campus life
have centered on a simple conflict. On the one hand, it is argued,
public institutions must comply with the absolute prohibition of certain kinds of state support for religion indicated by the language of
the Establishment Clause and the separationist approach of the Warren-era Supreme Court. On the other hand, the Court and various
advocates before it have turned increasingly to a speech-oriented
model in evaluating public religious conduct.2 45
This conflict was illustrated in the Supreme Court decision of
Widmar v. Vincent in 1982. There, a student religious group challenged
a decision of the University of Missouri at Kansas City prohibiting it
from meeting on university grounds "'for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching. "'' 24 6 The university argued the restriction
was necessary to comply with the Establishment Clause.2 47 The Court
was unanimous in agreeing that the university was not required to restrict religious speech on campus, but it was fractured on the question
of whether the university could restrict the speech.
For the majority, Justice Powell-the author of the pivotal opinion in Bakke, it should be noted-assumed the proper course of analysis was through public forum doctrine. Because the university had
created a forum for the activities of varied student groups, it was not
entitled to discriminate among those groups based on the content of
their speech.2 48 On this point, the Court's analysis was rather thin; any
244 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 837-46
(1995); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264-65 (1982).
245 See generally, e.g., Steven G. Gey, When Is Religious Speech Not "FreeSpeech"?, 2000 U.

ILL. L. REv. 379.
246 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265-66 (quoting Board of Curators, Reg. No. 4.0314.0107

(1972)).
247See id. at 275.
248 See id. at 267-70.
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consideration of whether the university truly had engaged in content
discrimination, or whether the case actually involved some form of
viewpoint discrimination, 249 would receive more careful consideration
in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia.250
The Widmar Court did acknowledge that a university is not, in all
respects, the same as a traditional public forum, and the Court suggested that its decision did not question a university's "authority to
impose reasonable regulations compatible with [its educational] mission upon the use of campus and facilities." 251 At the same time, it asserted that persons entitled to be on campus, including students, enjoy the usual array of First Amendment rights.

252

In rejecting any special right of the university to exclude the religious speech at issue, moreover, Justice Powell turned in part to the
Court's own prior academic freedom jurisprudence. Because the university "is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas," he suggested, it was under a particular obligation not to discriminate among the speakers in
that "marketplace." 253 Of course, that phrase had found its way into the
academic freedom jurisprudence in Keyishian. In Bakke, Justice Powell
had quoted that case (carefully omitting the sentence containing that
phrase) for the proposition that a university may select for diversity
when choosing its students. 2 54 The marketplace of ideas metaphor thus

supported the university's discretion in Bakke. Here, the same phrase
served to narrow that discretion. Thus, despite its mention of academic
freedom and its suggestion that universities might enjoy some breathing room in the grant of access to university facilities, Widmar again
proceeded on a standard First Amendment analysis basis that rendered
any constitutional principle of academic freedom irrelevant.

249See

id. at 284 n.2 (White,J., dissenting).

250See 515

U.S. at 819.

251 Widmar, 454

U.S. at 268 n.5. The WidmarCourtprovided the following explanation:

Our holding in this case in no way undermines the capacity of the University to establish reasonable time, place, and manner regulations. Nor do we
question the right of the University to make academic judgments as to how
best to allocate scarce resources or "to determine for itself on academic
grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who
may be admitted to study."
Id. at 276 (citations omitted) (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring
in the result)).
252See id.at 268-69.
25
3 Id. at 267 n.5 (quotation and citation omitted).
25 4
SeeRegents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,312 (1978) (opinion of Powel,J.).
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The Court took a similar approach in Rosenberger There, again,
the case turned on the workings of public forum doctrine and the requirements of content and viewpoint neutrality, not on the University
of Virginia's unique status as a university. Thus, in asserting that "[t]he
first danger to liberty lies in granting the state the power to examine
publications to determine whether or not they are based on some ultimate idea and if so for the State to classify them," the Court seemed
to assume that any constitutional test that would generally apply to
state action applied in precisely the same way to a public educational
55
institution.
Indeed, to the extent that the university's status as an educational
institution weighed in the balance, it was weighed againstits discretion
to regulate viewpoints on campus. As in Widmar, the Court treated the
university's status as a locus of "thought and experiment that is at the
center of our intellectual and philosophic tradition" 256 as a constraint
on its discretion, rather than a basis for according it autonomous
status under the law. As for Widmar's statement that a university might
be entitled to greater leeway in "mak[ing] academic judgments as to
how best to allocate scarce resources,"2 57 the Court effectively cut back
sharply on this apparent grant of discretion, labeling it no more than
a lame recognition that a university may "determine [ ] the content of
the education it provides." 258
Three relevant conclusions may be drawn from these cases. First,
where conflicts arise between student speech on campus and the university's own efforts to direct or to limit that speech, the Court is inclined to turn to standard First Amendment tests in resolving those
conflicts.

259

Second, as a corollary to the first conclusion, claims of

constitutional academic freedom will buy universities little additional
discretion. Third, to the extent academic freedom is involved in these
cases, the majority of the Court has treated it as an additional obligation to follow rules of content- and viewpoint-neutrality, rather than as
a grant of discretion to universities to shape and channel the content
of on-campus speech more freely.

255 See

Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 835; see also Southworth, 529 U.S. at 229.
Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 835.
257Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276.
m Rosenberger,515 U.S. at 833.
259 See Southworth, 529 U.S. at 233 (indicating that the proper protection of students'
First Amendment interests requires the application of a viewpoint neutrality rule where a
university allocates funding support to student groups).
26
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Grutters First Amendment might approach these cases quite differently. Perhaps because they believe these conflicts are best dealt
with under the rubric of the Establishment Clause, or perhaps because of their reasonable belief that the courts ultimately will treat
these cases according to established First Amendment jurisprudence,
universities have not argued that they are entitled to regulate religious
speech on campus in service of their educational mission. No doubt
many universities quite properly believe that because their educational mission includes the provision of access to a wide variety of
forms of student speech in order to encourage a vibrant pluralism of
religious and other views on campus, such an argument would actually contradict their own idea of a university.26° Accordingly, they may
believe that if there is any basis for treating religious speech differently, it must come from the Establishment Clause.
But a Grutter-based argument in favor of restricting religious
speech on campus is hardly inconceivable. Even leaving aside strongform arguments in favor of a strictly secular campus, a plausible weakform argument could be made in favor of some careful restrictions on
campus religious speech. For example, a university might argue that
campus speech should be directed toward the creation of spaces in
which students can engage in productive dialogue and debate. Many
religious organizations and activities may provide opportunities for
that kind of dialogue; indeed, even some forms of religious proselytization may provide that kind of productive exchange of ideas. But religious worship is not, at least in some traditions, an opportunity for
dialogue. It is, rather, a communal experience that assumes a group
of like-minded individuals and may (again, in some traditions only)
exclude non-believers. Even if this is too harsh a view, a university may
simply make the considered judgment that worship services, however
meaningful and valuable, are far from the core educational mission of
a modern public university.
I would hesitate a long time before suggesting that such an argument would succeed, even under Grutter's vision of substantial deference to a university's academic judgments. But it must at least be clear
that a court applying Grutters deferential approach would differ considerably in its view of the same case from one applying traditional First
Amendment standards. First Amendment scrutiny of speech allocation
260 Cf. id. at 233 ('The University may determine that its mission is well served if students
have the means to engage in dynamic discussions of philosophical, religious, scientific, social,
and political subjects in their extracurricular campus life outside the lecture hall.").
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decisions taking place in a public forum is highly exacting, and begins
from the assumption that all speech that is not distinguishable on time,
place, and manner grounds is equally valuable and equally entitled to
share in the use of the commons. By contrast, a court starting from the
position of Grutters deference to an educational institution assumes
that the most important factor is the university's own evaluation of the
value of particular forms of speech within the college gates.
Under this approach, provided that a university can make a colorable claim that its policy is the result of a considered academic
judgment, the court must treat that judgment with something less
than the exacting scrutiny usually demanded under the First
Amendment. Something of the flavor of this approach is evident in
Justice Stevens's concurrence in Widmar There, he suggested that
"the use of the terms 'compelling state interest' and 'public forum' to
analyze the question presented in this case may needlessly undermine
the academic freedom of public universities."261 He thus would have
held that a university may limit access to speech within the college
gates to a greater extent than could the administrator of other public
forums, provided it can supply a valid reason for the limitation.262
Because the only reason put forward by the University of Missouri
in that case was its "fear of violating the Establishment Clause," Justice
Stevens concurred in the Court's judgment.2 63 But his approach, which
refuses to "encumber[]" universities "with ambiguous phrases like
'compelling state interest,'" would plainly give greater scope to universities to move beyond an Establishment Clause rationale and advance
other, more academically based reasons for imposing restrictions on
certain forms of religious speech, and it would subject those reasons to
a far more forgiving level of scrutiny.2 64
Thus, if read seriously, Grutters emphasis on the importance of
deferring to the academic judgments of universities would compel a
different approach to the question of religious speech on campus. Because universities' restrictions on religious speech are commonly
grounded on nonacademic arguments such as a concern about violating the Establishment Clause, it is not clear that the results of such disputes would differ significantly. But this approach would still be
significant if only for its assumptions that universities are not obliged to
treat all forms of speech the same, and that they are not subject to the
261 Widmar,454 U.S. at 277-78 (StevensJ, concurring).
262See id. at 280 (Stevens, J., concurring).

263 Id. (StevensJ., concurring).
2
64 Id. at 279 (Stevens,J., concurring).
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same kinds of scrutiny that may apply to other administrators of what
may be characterized as public forums. If a university could advance a
plausible academic argument in favor of any restrictions on particular
forms of religious speech, Grutte's First Amendment would place a
good deal of weight on that argument.
3. The Solomon Amendment
Under the bylaws of the American Association of Law Schools (the
"AALS"), every member school is bound to a policy of equal opportunity in employment, including equal treatment without regard to sexual orientation. 265 Schools are expected to limit the use of their facilities in recruitment or placement assistance to those employers who are
willing to abide by these principles of equal opportunity.266 One potential employer is the U.S. military, which discriminates against gays and
lesbians. 2 67 Because of its policies, the military has been the subject of
various protests, limitations, and outright restrictions on its ability to
recruit law students on campus. 268
Congress responded to this state of affairs in 1994 by passing the
so-called Solomon Amendment. 269 Under the Solomon Amendment,
a university or its "subelement," such as a law school, may not prohibit
or prevent the government from recruiting students on campus, or
266 ASS'N OF AM. LAw SCHOOLS, INC., BYLAwS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAw
SCHOOLS, INC. § 6.4(b) (amended 2004) [hereinafter AALS, BYLAws], http://www.aals.

org/bylaws.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2005). Separate principles apply to religiously
affiliated law schools. See ASS'N OF AM. LAw SCHOOLS, INC., INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES TO
GUIDE RELIGIOUSLY-AFFILIATED MEMBER SCHOOLS AS THEY IMPLEMENT BYLAw 6-4(A) AND
EXECUTIVE COMMITIEE REGULATION 6.17 (1993) [hereinafter AALS, INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES], http://www.aals.org/interp.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
266 See AALS, BYLAWs, supra note 265, § 6.19.
267 See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2000) (mandating the discharge of members of the armed
forces who engage in a "homosexual act").
268 See, e.g., Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 291 F.

Supp. 2d 269, 278-81 (D.N.J. 2003) (FAIR 1), rev'd, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004) (FAIR I),
cert. granted,No. 04-1152, 2005 WL 483339 (May 2, 2005).
269 For commentary regarding the Solomon Amendment, see, for example, W. Kent

Davis, Swords into Ploughshares:The DangerousPoliticization of the Military in the Post-Cold War
Era, 33 VAL. U. L. REv. 61, 105-07 (1998). See generally Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards,

Challengingthe Wisdom of Solomon: The FirstAmendment and Military Recruitment on Campus,
13 WM. & MARY BILL R-s.J. 205 (2004); Sylvia Law, Civil Rights UnderAttack by the Military,
7 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 117 (2001); Francisco Valdes, Solomon's Shames: Law as Might and
Inequality, 23 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 351 (1998); Amy Kapczynski, Note, Queer Brinksmanship:
Citizenship and the Solomon Wars, 112 YALE L.J. 673 (2002); Lindsay Gayle Stevenson, Note,
Military Discriminationon the Basis of Sexual Orientation: "Don'tAsk, Don't Tell" and the Solomon
Amendment, 37 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1331 (2004); Peter H. Schuck, Equal Opportunity Recruiting,
AM. LAw., Jan. 2004, at 57.
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restrict the government's access to student information for recruiting
purposes.2 70 Failure to comply with this provision carries with it
significant funding consequences for both the law school and the university. A law school's non-compliance may result in the government
withdrawing all Defense Department funding from the university as a
whole, and a significant portion of non-defense government funding
271
from the law school itself.
Since the passage of the Solomon Amendment, law schools have
attempted by a variety of means to reconcile their nondiscrimination
policies with its terms. 272 In recent years, however, the government has
become increasingly strict in its interpretation of the Solomon
Amendment and increasingly active in enforcing it. As a result, many
law schools effectively suspended their nondiscrimination policies
with respect to military recruitment.2 7 3
Recently, a number of different groups of plaintiffs brought various lawsuits challenging the government's enforcement of the Solomon Amendment.2 74 The complaints brought by these plaintiffs, who
include a variety of law schools, law professors, law students, and student and professional groups, raise a number of statutory and constitutional claims, including First Amendment, due process, and equal pro27 See 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (W'est Supp. 2005).
271See FAIR , 291 F. Supp. 2d at 277-78 (discussing the current state of the Solomon
Amendment and its implementing regulations). An amendment to the Solomon Amendment reinforces this legal regime by stating clearly that military recruiters must be granted
the same access to students that other employers receive and by adding to the list of agencies that may withhold funding for noncompliant schools. See Pub. L. 108-375, § 552(b) (1),
118 Stat. 1811, 1911-12 (2004) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 983(b) (1)).
272 See Law, supra note 269, at 123-29. Chai Rachel Feldblum and Michael Boucai of
Georgetown University Law Center have published a handbook for law schools seeking to
"ameliorate" the perceived conflict between law schools' nondiscrimination policies and
their obligations under the Solomon Amendment. See CHAI RACHEL FELDBLUM & MICHAEL BouCAI, DUE JUSTICE, AMELIORATION FOR LAw SCHOOL COMPLIANCE WITH THE
SOLOMON AMENDMENT, A HANDBOOK FOR LAw SCHOOLS 7-8 (2003), available at http://

www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/documents/handbook.pdf.
273 SeeFAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 282-83.
274 See generally Complaint, Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Conn. 2005) (No.
Civ.A.3-03-CV-1777 (JCH)), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/Documents/burtvrumsfieldcomplaint.doc (last visited Apr. 15, 2005); Complaint, Burbank v.
Rumsfeld, No. Civ.A.03-5497, 2004 WL 1925532 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2004), available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/Documents/UofPennFacultyComplaint.doc
(last
visited Apr. 15, 2005); Complaint, Student Members of SAME v. Rumsfeld, 321 F. Supp. 2d
388 (D. Conn. 2004) (No. CivA3-03-CV1867 (JCH)), available at http://www.yale.edu/
outlaws/Complaint.pdf; Complaint, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v.
Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D.NJ. 2003) (FAIR 1), (No. CivA03-4433 (JCL)), available
at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/documents/Sola-Comp.pdf.
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tection objections to the enforcement of the Solomon Amendment.
Many of these arguments sound in standard First Amendment termsthe Solomon Amendment constitutes a form of viewpoint or content
discrimination, is void for vagueness, violates the plaintiffs' First
Amendment association rights, and so forth. 275 Not surprisingly, all of
the plaintiffs have also argued that the Solomon Amendment violates
their academic freedom. 276 For the most part, these arguments are
barely fleshed out in the complaints and appear to be mere supplements to the other arguments. 277
One set of plaintiffs, however, has advanced an academic freedom
argument that clearly perceives the influence that Gruttets First
Amendment discussion may have in the Solomon Amendment litigation. The Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights ("FAIR"), a
recently formed, largely anonymous "association of law schools and
other academic institutions," has suggested that "Grutter supports the
idea that universities should be free to define their own concepts of
discrimination ... and that law schools have a powerful interest in
placement policies that avoid invidious discrimination." 278 Its com-

plaint is replete with language about law schools' educational missions,
the "pedagogical value" of the schools' policy regarding on-campus
recruiters, which "pronounc [es] values that students do not necessarily
learn from casebooks and lectures," and the schools' interest in "nurtur[ing] the sort of environment for free and open discourse that is
the hallmark of the academy."279 Unlike the plaintiffs in the other
275 See, e.g., Complaint It 36-47, Burt (No. CivA3-03-CV-1777 (JCH)); Complaint 1 39,
Burbank (No. CivAO3-5497); Complaint 1 45-47, 51-53, FAIR I (No. CivAO3-4433 (JCL)).
276 See, e.g., Complaint
33, Burt (No. Civ.A.3-03-CV-1777 (JCH)); Complaint 37-39,
Burbank (No. Civ.A.03-5497); Complaint 1 44, FAIR I (No. CivA03-4433 (JCL)).
277 The student plaintiffs in Student Members of SAME v. Rumsfeld, who are members of
student groups at Yale Law School, do not mention academic freedom in express terms in
their complaint at all. They do, however, raise the argument at least tangentially in their
opposition to the government's motion to dismiss. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 10-11, Student Members of SAME v.
Rumsfeld, 321 F. Supp. 2d 388 (D. Conn. 2004) (No. Civ.A.3-03-CV1867 (JCH)) (citing
Grutter,539 U.S. at 329, and Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-87 (1960), in support of

the proposition that the plaintiffs' asserted right to receive information under the First
Amendment is especially crucial in the university context), available at http://www.law.
georgetown .edu/solomon/Documents/reply-toMTD2.pdf.
278

FORUM FOR ACADEMIC & INSTrrUTIONAL RIGHTS, QUESTIONS & ANSWERS ABOUT THE
AMENDMENT LITIGATION
5, 11, available at http://www.law.georgetown.

SOLOMON

edu/solomon/documents/FAIRQandA.doc (last visited Apr. 15, 2005); see id. at 8 ("Our

claim is that law schools are entitled to define their institutional values, at least insofar as
those self-definitions do not violate rights specifically protected by the constitution.").
279

Complaint 11 23-25, FAIR I (No. Civ.A.03-4433 (JCL)).
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Solomon Amendment lawsuits, FAIR and its fellow plaintiffs have said
that academic freedom comprises "the principal basis of the [ir] legal
28
challenge." 0
The district court ultimately rejected that position, at least at the
preliminary injunction stage. In Forum for Academic & Institutional

Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld (FAIR), Judge John Lifland of the District of
New Jersey denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the Solomon Amendment, holding that plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims (a point discussed below), but
had failed to show a likelihood of success on their constitutional
claims. Judge Lifland acknowledged that Grutter required courts to
defer to academic decisions made by universities, but suggested that
the fact that "such institutions occupy 'a special niche in our constitu-

tional tradition' implies that they remain part of, and not sovereign
to, that constitutional tradition." 281 Here, the court made clear, any
academic freedom interests asserted by the plaintiffs failed in the balance against the asserted interests of the government itself.
More interesting was another aspect of the court's decision: its
conclusion that "[t]he concept of academic freedom seems to be inseparable from the related speech and associational rights that attach
to any expressive association or entity."282 In other words, "the right to
academic freedom is not cognizable without a foundational free speech
or associational right."28 The court effectively concluded that because
academic freedom is merely a "First Amendment interest,"284 and because the Solomon Amendment did not interfere directly with any
speech act on the part of individual speakers, such as professors, any
academic freedom claim in the case would have to arise from and be

280 FORUM FOR AcADEMIC & INSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, supra note 278, at 1. That is not to
say that the other plaintiffs have ignored academic freedom generally or Grutter
specifically. Their arguments, too, are replete with references to both the general principle
of academic freedom and Grutte. But the FAIR case represents perhaps the most fully
fleshed-out version of the argument from Grutter and academic freedom. Curiously, the
plaintiffs in Burt v. Rumsfld, a challenge brought to the application of the Solomon
Amendment by a group of professors at Yale Law School, appear to have argued that their
right to autonomy as academics also qualifies as a Fifth Amendment substantive due process right. See 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 187-89 (D. Conn. 2005) (rejecting this argument).
281
FAR , 291 F. Supp. 2d at 302 (quoting Grutter,539 U.S. at 329).
2
8 Id.

283 Id. at 303.
284Id. at 302.
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parasitic on some independent First Amendment violation. 285 Because
the court found no such violations here, any academic freedom claim
28 6
necessarily would fail.

Recently, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The panel held
that the Solomon Amendment violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights in two ways, both of which therefore violated the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions.287
First, drawing on a fairly aggressive reading of the Supreme
Court's decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,288 the court held that

the plaintiff law schools are expressive associations, with "'clear educational philosophies, missions and goals.'" 289 One such mission is the
establishment and advocacy of policies of nondiscrimination, which
are to be inculcated in students "by expression and example." 290 Because the imposition of the Solomon Amendment undermined this
mission, and because the government had failed to show it was
sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve its own compelling interest in
recruiting military lawyers, the Solomon Amendment violated the
First Amendment. 291 Second, the court held that the Solomon
Amendment was a form of compelled speech. By requiring law
schools to assist military recruiters in their recruitment efforts, the
Solomon Amendment required law schools to "propagate, accommodate, and subsidize" the military's recruitment program, and thus to
advance a message of discrimination that ran counter to the schools'
own policies and beliefs. 292 Because, again, the military had failed to

show that it could not recruit effectively by other, less restrictive
means, the provision could not survive strict scrutiny.2 9 3
There is no doubt that the Solomon Amendment, both on its
terms and in the manner in which the government has enforced it in
the past three or four years, is Draconian in its effects. There are also
2 See id. at 302-03 ("If the Solomon Amendment violates Plaintiffs' right to academic
freedom, it is because it also intrudes on their rights to free speech and expressive association.").
28
6 See FA?
1I, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 314.
287 See FAIR 1, 390 F.3d at 229-46.
288 See generally 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
289
FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 231 (quoting Circle Sch. v. Pappert, 381 F.3d 172, 182 (3d Cir.

2004)).
2w

Id. at 232.

See id. at 233-35.
m Id. at 242; see id. at 237-38.
295 See id. at 242.
21
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substantial reasons to criticize the underlying policy of discrimination
in the armed forces for which the Solomon Amendment serves as a
supporting instrument. It is therefore not surprising that many legal
scholars have welcomed the Third Circuit ruling as a strong victory in
the law schools' institutional struggle against discrimination. The federal government sought Supreme Court review of the Third Circuit's
opinion and, given the importance of the issues at stake, the High
Court will hear the case next Term. 294 Moreover, at least one district
court has followed the Third Circuit in enjoining the application of the
Solomon Amendment, in this case with respect to recruitment activities
at Yale Law School.29 5 Thus, a brief examination of the FAIR litigation
may be useful and timely. For present purposes, however, my discussion
of the litigation is somewhat limited in scope. I do not want to deal substantially with the arguments that ultimately formed the basis of the
Third Circuit's opinion, although I comment on one aspect of that reasoning.2 96 Rather, I want to suggest that the Solomon Amendment litigation raises several interesting points about the institutional autonomy
reading of Grutterthat I have developed here.
First, although the point is somewhat submerged in the Third
Circuit's reasoning, it is strongly arguable that the course of the FAIR
litigation was influenced significantly by Grutte's principle of substantial deference to decision making by higher educational institutions.
Compare the different treatment accorded to the law schools' arguments by the district court and the Third Circuit. Although the district court accurately quoted Grutter as speaking in terms of "'a degree
of deference,'" in reality it gave short shrift to the real degree of deference accorded there.2 97 By contrast, although the Third Circuit
barely referred to Grutter,it did acknowledge that law schools "are entitled to at least as much deference" in setting out the nature and
purpose of their existence as expressive associations "as the Boy
Scouts," given Grutters recognition that "universities and law schools
294See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Forum for Academic & Institutional
Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004) (FAIR/ M, 2005 WL 482352, cert.
granted,No. 04-1152, 2005 WL 483339 (May 2, 2005).
2- Burt, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156, 187 (D. Conn. 2005).
2 Professor Michael C. Dorf provides a critical early discussion of the opinion. See Michael C. Dorf, A FederalAppeals CourtRules That Universities Can Bar Military Recruiters Without Losing Federal GrantMoney: A Welcome Result Based on Flawed Reasoning,FINDLAW'S LEGAL
COMMENT. (Dec. 8, 2004), at http://writ.findlaw.com/dorf/20041208.htn-l; see also Richard W. Garnett, Law Schools & the Military: Don't Ask, Don't Tel4 Don't Recruit, COMMONWEAL,

Jan. 14, 2005, at 8.
27 See FA IRI, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 302 (quoting Grutter,539 U.S. at 328).
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'occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.'" 298 Although it
was speaking in terms of what it labeled "Daledeference7-that is, the
Supreme Court's instruction in Dale that the courts must defer substantially to an association's own view of what would impair its ability
to operate-its decision to defer to the plaintiffs' own statements
about their expressive purposes drew both on Dale and on "[t]he Su-

preme Court's academic freedom jurisprudence."29 9
Moreover, this was deference with teeth. As Judge Ruggero Aldisert noted in his dissenting opinion in the Third Circuit, courts usually
defer substantially to the government in constitutional claims involv-

ing the military. 300 "Judicial deference ... is at its apogee when reviewing congressional decision making ...

in the realm of military af-

fairs." 30' Yet the majority of the panel made short shrift of the

government's arguments in the strict scrutiny section of its analysis. It
held that the government "has ample resources to recruit through
alternative means," such as placing recruitment ads on television,

without any apparent deference to the presumed judgment of Congress and the military that no other means of recruitment were as effective. 30 2 Thus, this was not simply Dale deference; the court did not
simply defer to the law schools' assessment of their goals as an expresFAIR H, 390 F.3d at 233 n.13 (quoting Grutter,539 U.S. at 329).
m Dale, 530 U.S. at 653; FAIR I, 390 F.3d at 233-34 & n.13. Notably, the Burt court
stated the following in a footnote:
While not a factor in its decision, the court notes that the deference the Dale
Court accorded expressive associations would appear to be particularly appropriate in the university setting, in light of the Supreme Court's 'tradition
of giving a degree of deference.. .' to universities because they 'occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition.'
354 F. Supp. 2d at 186 n.29 (alteration in original) (quoting Grutter,539 U.S. at 328-29)
(citations omitted).
300 FAIR I, 390 F.3d at 254 (Aldisert, J., dissenting); see also Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1986) (rejecting Free Exercise claim brought by plaintiff whose
religious headgear fell outside military dress regulations, at a time when incidental burdens on religious exercise still were subject to strict scrutiny); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453
U.S. 57, 64-65 (1981) (noting the great deference given to Congress in military matters).
301 Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (quotations and citations omitted),
quoted in FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 254.
302 CompareFAIR II, 390 F.3d at 235, with Goldman, 475 U.S. at 509 (rejecting the argument that military dress regulation had not been supported by record evidence because
"the desirability of dress regulations in the military is decided by the appropriate military
officials, and they are under no constitutional mandate to abandon their considered professional judgment"), and United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985) (indicating
that the validity of military regulations "does not turn on a judge's agreement with the
responsible decision maker concerning the most appropriate method for promoting
significant government interests").
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sive association, while applying the usual level of scrutiny in cases involving clashes with military policy when it came time to balance the
law schools' goals against the competing government interest. Instead, its deference to the law schools spilled over into the interestbalancing portion of its constitutional analysis, weighing heavily in the
law schools' favor despite a substantial tradition of deference to military policy. As I have argued, that spillover effect is also highly evident
in the Grutter Court's constitutional analysis, and helps explain its departure from conventional strict scrutiny.
It is not hard to conclude, then, that although the Third Circuit's
decision was not grounded expressly on Grutter,its approach nevertheless was underwritten substantially by the Supreme Court's decision in that case. Without the thumb on the scales of the law schools
that Grutterprovides, it is difficult to see the Third Circuit's opinion in
FAIR as perfectly consistent with the Supreme Court's prior decisions
in military cases.
Still, if we are to take Gruttet's educational autonomy reading seriously, this may be the right outcome. Given the Supreme Court's
treatment of the Law School's program in that case, Grutter can only
be read fairly as requiring the courts to accord substantialdeference to
university decisions. As Peter Schuck has quite properly noted, the
Court's "latitudinarian" treatment of the Law School's admissions policy is truly striking, particularly when contrasted with the Court's
normal brand of Fourteenth Amendment strict scrutiny.303 That
treatment is best read as suggesting that university decisions are insulated substantially under the First Amendment from the normal processes ofjudicial review.
Nor is it a sufficient rejoinder to suggest, as the district court did,
that universities "remain part of, and not sovereign to," the Constitution and its limitations. 3 04 If Grutters gentle treatment of the Law
School's program means anything, it surely means that "constitutionally prescribed limits" are themselves fluid and context-dependent.3 05
They are, in Professor Robert C. Post's terms, the product of a continuous negotiation between internal constitutional law and external
cultural norms.3 06 Thus, as I have argued, Grutter suggests that within
the bounds of institutional autonomy provided by the First AmendSeeSchuck, supra note 176.
so FAIR, 291 F.Supp. 2d at 302.
303
4

moGrutter,539 U.S. at 328.

See Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and
Law, 117 HARV. L. REv. 4, 8-9 (2003).
306
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ment, universities enjoy substantial freedom to experiment with policies that serve their educational missions. Within those boundaries,
they are free at least to flirt with, and even to bend, traditional constitutional limits.3 0 7 Indeed, the product of those experiments itself will

go a long way toward defining the boundaries of appropriate constitutional conduct.
In short, it was not enough for the district court in FAIR simply to
state that universities are "not impervious to competing societal interests."30 8 The point of Grutters First Amendment is that universities
have substantial freedom to negotiate between those interests, and
the balance they strike should generally be respected as the product
of "complex educational judgments in an area that lies primarily
within the expertise of the university."3 0 9 Thus, the Third Circuit's decision in FAIR may be more persuasive if it is read not simply as a case
about expressive association or compelled speech, but as a case about
Grutterdeference to educational autonomy.
I do not mean to suggest conclusively that the court was therefore
wrong in denying FAIR's motion for a preliminary injunction, or that
the Third Circuit was right in directing that an injunction issue
against the government. Nor do I intend to advance a strong argument as to whether FAIR ought to prevail at trial. Although I am admittedly sympathetic to the plaintiffs' aims, it is possible that, even
with the thumb on the scales of the plaintiffs provided by Grutters
command of educational autonomy, the government's claims might
still prevail, at least as against an argument for Grutter deference. A
court applying academic freedom doctrine might properly conclude
that FAIR's lawsuit looked less like the internal admissions policy at
issue in Grutter,and more like the unsuccessful privilege claim in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC-a positive claim for something more
than "the protect[ion] [of] the normal decision-making processes of
educational institutions."3 1 0 Certainly the unique context of the case,
in which FAIR challenged the law schools' obligation to abide by the
terms of their public funding, offers a complicating factor that was
not present in Grutter Even on this point, however, the Supreme
Court has suggested in dicta that universities may occupy a more privileged position than other actors when they accept government fund307 For expansion on this point, see infra notes 472-575 and accompanying text.
08
m FAIR 1, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 302.
309 Grutter,539 U.S. at 328.
s0 Yudof, supra note 30, at 856.
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ing that carries conditions that affect academic freedom.3 1' It is also
unclear whether the Supreme Court should treat on-campus recruiting rules as a matter of "academic" policy. If they are not, those rules
would not be entitled to constitutional deference under Grutter.3 12
Nevertheless, the reading of Grutter advanced in this Section does
provide significant support for the argument that university and/or
law school plaintiffs in litigation against the Solomon Amendment
ought to be granted substantial deference to structure their academic
policies-including their decisions about on-campus access to employment recruiters-in order to suit their educational missions.
Whether that institutional autonomy ought to overcome the substantial interests of the government in maintaining access to potential recruits is another question. Surely, however, if institutional autonomy is
enough to support university admissions policies that might otherwise
fail the Court's application of strict scrutiny, as in Grutter,it ought to
weigh heavily in the balance against the government's asserted interests in the Solomon Amendment litigation.
Another interesting question raised by the decision in FAIR is
whether the Third Circuit based its decision on the expressive association and compelled speech arguments rather than the educational
autonomy argument because it felt it had to do so. The district court,

311
Thus, in Rust v. Sullivan, the Court did suggest that government funding could not
overcome all First Amendment claims on the part of the recipient of funds. 500 U.S. 173,
200 (1991). In particular, it noted the following:
[T]he university is a traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to
the functioning of our society that the Government's ability to control speech
within that sphere by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of
Government funds is restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines
of the First Amendment.
Id. That dicta, however, only suggests that specific vagueness and overbreadth arguments,
which were made and rejected by the district court in FAIR I, might prevail in a government
funding context. It does not suggest that a free-standing claim of academic freedom necessarily would prevail in any contest with the government over the terms of public funding for
universities. For a valuable discussion of the dicta in Rust, see Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 IOWA L. Rv. 1377, 1457-62 (2001).
312 See Grutter,539 U.S. at 328 (noting the Court's tradition of "deference to a university's academic decisions") (emphasis added). As a legal matter, I would find unpersuasive
such an effort to place decisions about recruiting outside the province of academic policy.
I think the FAIR plaintiffs, and the Third Circuit, overstate the connection between a law
school's general academic mission and the fairly discrete activity of on-campus recruiting.
Indeed, having taught through two recruitment seasons at two different law schools, I can
barely recall having run across, let alone talked to, any on-campus recruiters. But, under
the reading of Grutter that I have offered here, surely a law school's assertion that recruiting is a part of its academic mission ought to be entitled to substantial deference.
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after all, concluded that academic freedom claims must be grounded
on "foundational free speech or associational right[s]" to be sustainable.3 1 3 Perhaps the Third Circuit, too, concluded that academic free-

dom claims of the kind pressed by the plaintiffs in FAIR are parasiticthat one cannot bring a free-standing claim of academic freedom under the First Amendment, although academic freedom itself may lend
weight to arguments based on other First Amendment claims.
If so, I argue that the Third Circuit was wrong on this point, and
that the district court, which ruled expressly on this point, also erred.
Unless the university's right to select those who shall be admitted to
study, which has been recognized since Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Sweezy, is conceived of as a species of associational right,
Bakke and Grutterthemselves involved no foundational speech or association claims. Nor does it fully capture what was going on in those
cases to conceive of admissions decisions as a form of associational
right. Although the academic freedom arguments in those cases arose
as defenses rather than as claims for relief, Grutters vehement discussion of the vital First Amendment role of universities does not suggest
that academic freedom is a shield only and not a sword. Rather, Grutters First Amendment recognizes that universities play a special role
in the First Amendment firmament, and must be granted discretion
to design and to implement a broad range of educational policies,
whether conceived as direct speech acts or as decisions that shape the
structure and composition of universities as a whole.
Thus, Gruttes command of deference to educational institutions
is more than a mere atmospheric addition to the quiver of arguments
in the FAIR litigation. It has some substantive weight of its own, although how much weight it has is still an open question. As the FAIR
litigation advances to the Supreme Court, amici such as the AALS, if
not the plaintiffs themselves, ought to make some effort to develop
further the question of whether academic freedom can itself serve as
a free-standing First Amendment claim.3 14
I have as yet barely touched on a third issue raised in the FAIR litigation and in the other pending assaults on the Solomon Amendment.
The district court in FAIR suggested that all of the plaintiffs in this
case-FAIR, "an association of law schools and law faculties";315 the Society of American Law Teachers; two law professors; three law students;
313 FAIR I, 291 F. Supp. 2d at 303.
314 Cf. Byrne, supranote 20, at 141 (arguing that academic institutions must do a better
job of filing amicus briefs that address the issue of institutional academic freedom).
315 FAIR , 291 F. Supp. 2d at 275.
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and two law student groups-had standing to pursue their claims
against the government.3 16 The court based its conclusion on the view
that the individual plaintiffs and associations enjoyed First Amendment rights as "beneficiaries, senders, and recipients of the message of
non-discrimination sent by their schools' non-discrimination policies."3 1 7 The Third Circuit easily upheld the standing of FAIR itself,
without addressing the standing of the other plaintiffs.3 18

That conclusion suggests, consistent with the Court's pre-Grutter
academic freedom jurisprudence, that members of the university
community enjoy a substantial degree of First Amendment freedom
on campus, notwithstanding the institutional setting.3 1 9 Grutter itself,
however, sounds in institutional terms. The freedom described there
is not an individual right of professors to enjoy the communicative
benefits of a diverse student body, but the discretion of an educational
institution to set educational policies and to make academic decisions-to fulfill a "proper institutionalmission."3 20
Thus, one fair reading of Gruttersuggests that academic freedom
is a fundamental institutional right, not one enjoyed by a university's
faculty or students. At the very least, it suggests that educational
autonomy itself is an institutional right, not an individual right, and
therefore may be invoked only by the institution itself.32 1 That conclusion is fortified in a case like the Solomon Amendment litigation. For
whatever the position of the law schools themselves with respect to the
Solomon Amendment, it is far from clear that the individuals and
316 See id. at 285-96.
317 Id. at 294.
18
3 See FAIR 1, 390 F.3d at 228 n.7.

319 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (stating that "[Mt
can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate").
320 Grutter,539 U.S. at 329 (emphasis added).
321 Id.; cf. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 412 ("Appellees ask us to recognize a First Amendment
right of academic freedom that belongs to the professor as an individual. The Supreme
Court, to the extent it has constitutionalized a right of academic freedom at all, appears to
have recognized only an institutional right of self-governance in academic affairs."). The
conclusion in Urofsky might be more apt in cases like Grutterand the Solomon Amendment
litigation, which involve educational policies set by the institution as a whole, than in Urofsky itself, which involved state-imposed limitations on information-gathering activities by
professors themselves. Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 404. For commentary on the standing issues
raised by Urofsky, see Kate Williams, Note, Loss of Academic Freedom on the Internet: The Fourth

Circuit'sDecision in Urofsky v. Gilmore, 21 Rv. LrrIG. 493, 507 (2002). See generally Alvin J.
Schilling & R. Craig Wood, The Internet and Academic Freedom: The Implications of Urofsky v.
Gilmore Standingas a ConstitutionalConcern: A Required Threshold Issue, 179 WEST's EDUC. L.
REP. 9 (2003).
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groups within those institutions agree on the propriety or impropriety
of on-campus military recruitment. If we permit individual students or
faculty to assert institutional autonomy claims in place of the institution itself, we might face a situation in which some students and professors attempt to alter the educational policy of their institutions
without apparent regard to the official policies of the institution itself,
let alone the views of any professors or students who want the military
to recruit on campus. 322
Because the plaintiffs in FAIR apparently included at least one
law school, and the faculty of another, the academic freedom claims
in FAIR could still proceed even if they could only be invoked by educational institutions. 3 23 But this reading of Grutter does raise questions
about the status of many of the other plaintiffs in the Solomon
Amendment litigation-both the FAIR litigation itself and the other
cases still pending before other district courts. Those plaintiffs include a variety of parties other than the law schools themselves, let
alone the parent universities of which the law schools are only subunits. The membership of FAIR itself includes not only law schools
acting collectively as corporate bodies, but also law school faculty
members, acting as a body but not necessarily with the imprimatur of
the institution to which they belong. 324 And, of course, there are still

other plaintiffs in the other Solomon Amendment cases: the Society

322 For example, a number of law student groups comprised of service members, reservists, veterans, and non-veterans filed an amicus brief in the Third Circuit in the FAIR litigation, arguing that the exclusion of the military from on-campus recruiting would "undercut
their ability to participate meaningfully in the classrooms and halls of American law
schools." Brief of Amici Curiae UCLaw Veterans Society et al. in Support of Appellees at 26,
Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Ci. 2004)
(FAIR 11) (No. 03-4433), availableat http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/Documents/
AmicusUCLAWVets24Feb04.pdf.
323 See FAIR , 291 F. Supp. 2d at 289 (noting that the second amended complaint
identified the Golden Gate University School of Law and the faculty of Whittier Law School
as members of FAIR, and that two more law schools had informed the court by letter that
they were also members of the association). The decision says nothing about the nature of
those law schools' commitment-whether they represented the decision of the faculty as a
whole or of the law school itself, whether that decision was authorized in turn by the governing body of the university, and so forth. Since the district court issued its opinion, FAIR
has announced that "30 law schools and law faculties" have joined the organization. See FoRUM FOR ACADEMIC & INSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, JoIN FAIR, at http://www.law.georgetown.
edu/solomon/oinFair.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2005) (providing Solomon Amendment
response and protest information).

324

See, e.g.,

FORUM FOR ACADEMIC & INSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, MEMBERSHIP FORM, avail-

able at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/Documents/membership.forml 2-04.pdf.
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of American Law Teachers, individual professors and students, and
student groups.
These plaintiffs may have standing to raise a variety of First
Amendment claims in litigating against the Solomon Amendment.
But it is arguable that they simply lack standing to pursue any institutionally based claims of academic freedom, or to demand the kind of
deference that Grutter commands when such claims are made.

25

Al-

though this point was not at issue in FAIR itself, given both the proper
standing of the law school members of FAIR and the independent
grounds on which FAIR was decided, it might be of great importance
in future cases grounded primarily on academic freedom. If the importance of the point is not apparent in FAIR itself, it is much clearer
in the other recent challenges brought against the Solomon Amendment. The Burt v. Rumsfeld lawsuit was brought by forty-four members
of the Yale Law School faculty and the Student Members of SAME v.
Rumsfeld litigation was brought by Yale Law School students, yet the
law school itself was not a party to either case. 326 The plaintiffs in the
Burbank v. Rumsfeld litigation are faculty and students at the University
of Pennsylvania Law School, not the law school itself.327 Thus, as at

least one court has recognized, whatever claims they are entitled to
bring, they may not be entitled to rely on the educational autonomy
reading of Grutter that I have advanced here.32 8 This reading of Grutter
suggests that any academic freedom claims in those particular casesat least, any academic freedom claims grounded on institutional
autonomy rather than on some individual's right to speak or receive
information-must be dismissed.
A fourth point that has occasioned some interest in the legal
academy itself is the role of the AALS, which filed an amicus brief in
325See Urofsky, 216 F.3d at 412.
326 See Burt, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 196; Student Members of SAME v. Rumsfeld, 321 F.

Supp. 2d 388, 390 (D. Conn. 2004). The court's decision granting standing to the Yale Law
School faculty members who served as plaintiffs in Burt turned on the fact that the plaintiffs included a voting majority of the law school faculty, who thus were treated as "equivalent to [Yale Law School]" for standing purposes. See Burt, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 199. At the
same time, the court ventured that the university "appear[ed] to have no First Amendment

rights in jeopardy" in the case. Id. at 200 n.2. Obviously, given my reading of Grutteras according educational institutions a right to deference as institutions,I believe the latter conclusion is simply wrong.
327See Complaint
8-9, Burbank (No. Civ.A.03-5497).
328 See Student Members of SAME, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 393-94 (rejecting student groups'
expressive association claim on the basis that the relevant "association" here was Yale Law
School, whose policies "are set by the faculty and can change at any time," and not the
student groups themselves).
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the FAIR litigation but declined to join the suit as a plaintiff. Although
the point is surely not dispositive, there is an irony lurking behind the
academic freedom arguments that have been advanced by the law
school and faculty members of FAIR. As I have noted, membership in
the AALS commits law schools to a policy of equal opportunity in employment, including equal treatment without regard to sexual orientation.3 29 Thus, whether or not individual law schools oppose the
Solomon Amendment, the benefits of membership in the AALS may
subject a law school to soft or hard pressure to conform its policies on
military recruitment to the position favored by the AALS. Law schools
that oppose the Solomon Amendment and that want to speak out
against it, but that also welcome military recruiters despite their discriminatory policies, may thus be caught between the undoubtedly
more grave coercive pressure of the Solomon Amendment and the
unofficial but equally real pressure brought to bear by the AALS.
This raises the awkward question whether law schools that are
simply reacting to the AALS's demands rather than formulating nondiscrimination policies of their own can truly be said to be entitled to
the sort of deference to expert educational judgments that Grutter,on
the reading presented here, demands. 330 If they are acting in response
to the top-down instructions of the AALS, have they really made a
"complex educational judgment in an area that lies primarily within
the expertise of the university" when they refuse to comply with the
Solomon Amendment?3 3' Similarly, if we rely on Dale as the Third Circuit did, is an expressive association entitled to Dale deference if its
policies are not the result of its own considered goals as an expressive
association, but rather are the product of pressures from outside that
association?
Again, I emphasize that I do not think this point is dispositive.
However attractive, or customary, it may be for law schools to seek
32 See AALS, BYLAWS, supra note 265, § 6.3 (b). Separate principles apply to religiously
affiliated law schools. See AALS, INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES, supra note 265, at 1.
330 Cf Katyal, supra note 19, at 558 (concluding that "universities must engage in a
greater degree of sef-governance... before educational autonomy can insulate their practices from judicial review").
331 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328; see also Memorandum from Mark V. Tushnet to the
Deans of Member and Fee-Paid Schools and Members of the House of Representatives
(Sept. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Tushnet Memorandum] ("Putting it bluntly ... how can the
Association assert that its member schools have made academic freedom judgments when
the policies at issue were adopted because of pressure from the Association, not because of
member schools' own reflection on their missions?"), http://www.aals.org/03-33.html (last
visited Apr. 15, 2005). Professor Tushnet was the president of the AALS when he wrote the
memorandum.

20051

Grutter 'sFirstAmendment

membership in the AALS, they are not required to do so. Choosing to
continue as a member of the AALS, and thus to abide by its nondiscrimination policy, is itself a considered educational and expressive
judgment. Whether they are influenced by the AALS or independently arrive at their policy, law schools are in no different a position
for purposes of the Grutterdeference argument. Still, given the disapproval in some quarters that met the AALS's refusal to join the FAIR
lawsuit as a party, the issue-as Professor Tushnet put it, not a "technical problem," but "only an awkwardness"-is worth noting.332 As
with the standing issue, it may not be of crucial importance in the
Solomon Amendment litigation, but it may raise questions in future
cases about the circumstances in which an educational institution can
properly lay claim to the protective mantle of deference to its considered judgment on matters of educational policy. Perhaps the AALS
was right to hesitate to join the lawsuit.
Finally, the Third Circuit's decision in FAIR raises important
questions about the consequences of an educational autonomy reading of Grutter As we have seen, this reading of Grutter suggests that if
universities can use Grutter to expand the range of voices engaging in
campus speech, they might be equally entitled to limit campus
speech.333 By relying principally on the Supreme Court's decision in
Tushnet Memorandum, supra note 331.
333 See supra notes 213-264 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 336-345 and accompanying text. This issue is also apparent in the FAIR litigation. Notwithstanding FAIR's
commitment to "free and open discourse," Complaint 1 24, FAIR I (No. Civ.A.03-4433
(JCL)) the plaintiffs' arguments in the FAIR litigation also would appear to support the
imposition of speech restrictions on law school campuses. Indeed, the complaint revealingly illustrates the conflict between a view of academic freedom that believes on-campus
discourse should be free and unfettered and one that emphasizes the need to restrict oncampus speech to ensure civility and prevent the silencing of disfavored groups. See id. 20
("Diversity serves no purpose if students and faculty feel inhibited from engaging in discourse. Thus, law schools have promoted, demanded, and strictly enforced, not merely
diversity, but also tolerance and respect.").
Chai Feldblum and Michael Boucai's handbook offering ways for law schools to "ameliorate" their compliance with the Solomon Amendment strikes a similarly ironic note. See
generally FELDBLUM & BouCAI, supra note 272. On the one hand, the authors allow that
.one should expect a range of views on the part of faculty, students and staff regarding the
acceptability of homosexuality," let alone the Solomon Amendment itself. Id. at 8. On the
other hand, they make clear that in their view, discussion of these issues in the context of
.amelioration" activities such as teach-ins should be anything but free and open, on the
basis that the mere fact that military recruiters are present on campus is sufficient to represent the view that "the service of openly gay individuals is destructive to the military." Id.
at 11. Accordingly, they would permit, if not quietly encourage, ignoring supporters of the
Solomon Amendment even within teach-ins and other educational programming. See id.
(stating that "a law school can legitimately choose not to include any panelists supporting
832
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Dale (albeit, I have suggested, in a way that is underwritten by the profound deference exhibited by the Court in Grutter), the Third Circuit
suggests that its ruling may have similar implications. If a university's
status as an expressive association enables it to overcome even the
substantial governmental interest in providing a well-staffed military,
an interest that normally sweeps aside all contrary arguments in the
courts, then what happens when a university cites FAIR for illiberal
purposes? What of a university that wishes to exclude members of certain races, or to impose discriminatory policies without suffering consequences such as the deprivation of favorable tax status? 33 4 There is

no logical reason why the arguments raised in Grutter,Dale, and FAIR
could not apply in such a case.
To be sure, the government has a compelling interest in nondiscrimination. But that argument did not defeat the Boy Scouts of America in Dale. Nor did the traditionally compelling interest in military policy immunize the Solomon Amendment from attack in FAIR

3

5

Thus,

FAIR like Grutter,may yet serve as the basis for decisions that may disturb those who have applauded the decision the most loudly. For those
who support Grutters policy of deference to educational institutions for
its own sake, this may not be unduly disturbing. But for more fairweather friends of this reading of Grutter,it ought to raise the question
whether grounding the attacks on the Solomon Amendment on Grutter--or on Dale, for that matter-was the wisest course of action.
In sum, the institutional autonomy-based reading of Grutteroffers
real ammunition for law schools that wish to challenge the enforcement of the Solomon Amendment. Law schools' policies of nondiscrimination and their efforts to enforce those policies in a variety of
settings (arguably including on-campus recruitment) represent considered academic judgments that are entitled to substantial deference,
notwithstanding any contrary government interests in maintaining an
the military's policy in the [educational] program"); id. at 12 ('Law schools ... need not
feel they must expend excessive energy to find [individuals who support the Solomon
Amendment or military policy with respect to gays and lesbians] in order to have a 'balanced' program."); id. at 13-16 (advocating various means of supporting groups and activities on one side of the debate only). The handbook evinces little recognition that some
students or faculty might oppose the government's policy on gays in the military and support on-campus military recruiting. See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 296, at 9 (noting arguments to the same effect); Diane H. Mazur, Is "Don'tAsk, Don't Tell" UnconstitutionalAfter
Lawrence? What It Will Take to Overturn the Policy, 15 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 423, 441
(2004) (arguing that excluding military recruiters from law schools only serves to widen a
problematic gap between military and civilian society).
3m See BobJones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 579-82 (1983).
-6 See FAIR II, 390 F.3d at 245 & n.27.
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on-campus presence for military recruitment. But the argument for
institutional autonomy in the Solomon Amendment context also
raises some significant questions. Thus, if those academic judgments
concerning recruiting are properly within the discretion of the law
schools as academic institutions,then any institutional autonomy-based
arguments against the Solomon Amendment must be invoked by the
institutions themselves, not individual professors or students or their
representatives. Accordingly, Gruttei's First Amendment demands a
searching look at the fitness of many of the parties to the Solomon
Amendment lawsuits, even as it also suggests that those lawsuits may
have added merit as a result of Grutter In addition, it raises troubling
questions about when an educational judgment can truly be said to be
the product of an institution's own decision-making process and not
simply a result of outside pressure.
4. The Academic Bill of Rights
Assume that the justifications for academic freedom discussed
above are correct-that academic freedom is justified because of its
contribution to the search for truth or because of its contribution to a
truly democratic education and, by extension, a truly democratic polity.336 Further assume that these are the values that undergird the
Court's decision in Grutter What, then, could be wrong with legislation
that enshrines these values in the law? What could be wrong with legislation that purports to support academic freedom as I have described it?
That question is raised by recent efforts, in Congress and in the
individual states, to champion legislation called the Academic Bill of
Rights. Drafted by conservative commentator David Horowitz and
backed by his and other groups, the document states, in part, that decisions concerning the hiring, firing, tenure, or promotion of faculty;
students' grades; curriculum decisions; and other aspects of university
life should not be made "on the basis of ...political or religious beliefs." 337 The Academic Bill of Rights is grounded on views that most
readers of this Article likely support: that the university serves "the
pursuit of truth," that "pluralism, diversity, opportunity, critical intelligence, openness and fairness" are "the cornerstones of American
society," and that academic freedom serves to "secure the intellectual
s36See supra notes 63-97 and accompanying text.
S37 ACADEMIC BILL OF RIGHTS, reprinted in SARA DOGAN ET AL., STUDENTS FOR ACADEMIC FREEDOM, HANDBOOK app. A, at 53, 53-56 (n.d.), available at http://studentsfor
academicfreedom.org/texts/SAF%20handbook%20FINAL%202.pdf.
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independence of faculty and students and to protect the principle of
338
intellectual diversity."

In short, if taken at face value, the Academic Bill of Rights ought
to be largely uncontroversial to those who adopt conventional views of
academic freedom. It should be no more objectionable than, for example, a law that declares that universities must guarantee and support a diversity of views on campus.
Whether the Academic Bill of Rights should be read literally is
quite a different question. Horowitz and his supporters are mostly political conservatives, and because their evident concern is the perception that the university has been colonized and made the almost exclusive preserve of political liberals, the Academic Bill of Rights could
be viewed simply as a covert device to force the hiring of greater
numbers of conservative academics and nothing more.33 9 If, however,

as Horowitz and his supporters contend, conservatives not only are
underrepresented on campus, but are underrepresented as a result of
active and deliberate choices stemming from political bias, what is
wrong with redressing this imbalance?
Although Horowitz disclaims any desire to see the Academic Bill
of Rights enacted as binding law s3 4 it has been the subject of a num-

ber of legislative developments. A version of the Academic Bill of
Rights has been introduced as a nonbinding resolution in the House
of Representatives,3 41 and a similarly nonbinding version was passed
by the Georgia Senate.3 42 A binding version of the Academic Bill of
Rights which focused on student rights rather than faculty issues was
withdrawn from the Colorado legislature, but only after a number of
Colorado university officials reached a memorandum of understanding endorsing the views provided in the bill.3 43

338 Id.
339 See Stanley Fish, Intellectual Diversity": The Trojan Horse of a Dark Design, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 13, 2004, at B13 (quoting Horowitz as stating, "I encourage [students]
to use the language that the left has deployed so effectively on behalf of its own agendas");
Yilu Zhao, Taking the Liberalism out of LiberalArts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2004, at B9.
30 See Fish, supra note 339, at B13; Zhao, supra note 339, at B9.
341 SeeH.R. Con. Res. 318, 108th Cong. (2003).
342 See S.R. 661, 150th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2004).
34 See Zhao, supra note 339, at B9; Memorandum of Understanding Endorsed by
Elizabeth Hoffman, President of the University of Colorado, Larry Penley, President of
Colorado State University, Raymond Kieft, Interim President of Metropolitan State College
of Denver, Kay Norton, President of the University of Northern Colorado, and Shawn
Mitchell, State Representative House District 33 (n.d.), http://www.studentsforacademic
freedom.org/reports/comemorandumofunderstanding.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).
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Again, these bills are nonbinding or, as in the Colorado case, inoperative with respect to faculty hiring and other fundamental university decisions. But what if a binding version of the Academic Bill of
Rights was passed? The Academic Bill of Rights purports to stand on
the same principles that the Court relied on in Grutter-a belief in the
importance of academic freedom and intellectual diversity. What
would Grutter's First Amendment have to say about such legislation?
The answer is, I think, clear but not without irony. Looking to the
institutional autonomy reading of Grutter, an academic institution
whose educational mission is itself substantive-a university whose
mission involves a conclusion about "political or religious beliefs--is
entitled to substantial deference in framing and advancing policies
that support those substantive views. A religious university whose educational mission is to advance Southern Baptist views may refuse to
hire or to promote academics whose views counter or depart from
those beliefs. A secular university's economics department that concludes that Marxism is a dry well may eliminate courses advancing
Marxist theory, just as surely as a science department may conclude
that its truth-seeking mission would hardly be advanced by providing
lectures advancing a Ptolemaic view of astronomy. A university that
believes its educational mission requires it to advance liberal views on
racial diversity may oppose the inclusion of more voices championing
conservative views on racial diversity. To be sure, a university would
have to advance credible evidence that its substantive views were indeed a part of its educational mission, but if it could, Grutters First
Amendment would invalidate any attempt to subject it to the strictures of the Academic Bill of Rights.
As I noted, however, this is not without irony. For the Academic
Bill of Rights is, on its face, entirely consistent with the rationales for
academic freedom-truth-seeking, intellectual diversity, and the
like-that the Supreme Court has typically treated as supporting a
constitutional right to academic freedom. These are also the same
values that undergird the institutional autonomy reading of Grutter344
Yet, if I am correct, the rule of deference to decisions made by academic institutions that emerges from these values would foreclose the
enforcement of an Academic Bill of Rights. By contrast, it is at least
arguable that these values cut against prohibitions on hate speech or
344 See Fish, supra note 339, at B13 ("It's hard to see how anyone who believes (as I do)
that academic work is distinctive in its aims and goals and that its distinctiveness must be
protected from political pressures (either external or internal) could find anything to
disagree with here.").
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religious speech on campus. Yet, as I have suggested, the institutional
autonomy reading of Gruttercompels the conclusion that a university
may impose these restrictions, as long as they are part and parcel of its
academic mission.
We might draw two conclusions from this seemingly contradictory
state of affairs. The first is that the institutional autonomy reading of
Grutter is a prophylactic rule that has slipped its moorings. Like many
prophylactic rules, it draws a wide boundary around the values it seeks
to protect, even when that boundary no longer corresponds to the values in question. Thus, although the institutional autonomy reading of
Grutter is based on the value of truth-seeking and other standard rationales for academic freedom, it serves those values only indirectly, by
giving universities wide latitude to set their own academic policies. In so
doing, as the contrast between the campus hate speech and Academic
Bill of Rights examples suggests, this version of Grutte's First Amendment gives universities latitude even when their academic policies
would disserve the very rationales offered in support of academic freedom. Such a rule still could be justified, however, if we believe that universities may adopt a diversity of approaches to educational policy and
academic freedom. Additionally, it could be justified if we believe that
we are better off entrusting decisions on educational policy to educational institutions without reservation rather than allowing courts or
legislators to make case-by-case determinations.
The second possible conclusion points to a deeper concern,
which I touched on earlier-that the academic freedom values the
Academic Bill of Rights seeks to protect are themselves incoherent,
inaccurate, or non-existent. If Horowitz's defense of intellectual diversity as a core value of academic freedom fails under Grutters institutional autonomy principle, perhaps that is because universities do not
all agree that intellectual diversity is an important value.3 45 Or perhaps

they agree on the end but not the means. This again suggests, as I
have argued above, that courts-and supporters of the Academic Bill
of Rights-cannot rely safely on a fixed justification for or definition
of academic freedom.
I will canvass those issues more fully below. For now, it is simply
important to note that even as the institutional autonomy reading of
Grutter may support efforts by universities to impose policies that do
not treat all ideas or speakers alike, it may also bar legislators and
345 Cf. id. (arguing that neither intellectual diversity nor "[c]itizen building" are academic activities).
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regulators from imposing otherwise unobjectionable norms of intellectual diversity or equal treatment on universities from above.
5. Race-Based Scholarships
Grutte's deferential First Amendment-based treatment of the
university's right to determine who shall be admitted to study, and the
forgiving nature of its treatment of the narrow tailoring part of its
Fourteenth Amendment inquiry, suggests that courts, colleges, and
state and federal education officials now may revisit another heated
issue affecting university admissions-the constitutionality of racebased scholarships.3 46
The leading case on this issue, Podberesky v. Kirwan,347 addressed
the University of Maryland's Banneker scholarship program, a meritbased scholarship program available only to African-Americans. 348
The University of Maryland maintained a separate scholarship program available to all students, but that program's merit standards
were more stringent. Daniel Podberesky, a Hispanic student who met
the Banneker scholarship requirements but not the requirements of
the generally available scholarship program, challenged the University of Maryland's maintenance of a separate program.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit decided Podberesky as if Bakke's diversity interest did not exist, relying instead on the
Supreme Court's stringent scrutiny of remedial racially conscious
measures in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 349 Thus, it looked-

searchingly and critically-for evidence that the scholarship program
346

For commentary on this issue, see generally, for example, Kirk A. Kennedy, Race-

Exclusive Scholarships: ConstitutionalVel Non, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 759 (1995); Brian K.
Landsberg, Balanced Scholarship and Racial Balanc 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 819 (1995);
William E. Thro, The ConstitutionalProblem of Race-Based Scholarships and a PracticalSolution,

111 EDuc. L. REP. 625 (1996); B. Andrew Bednark, Note, Preferential Treatment: The Varying
Constitutionality of Private Scholarship Preferences at Public Universities, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1391

(2001); Amy Weir, Note, Should Higher Education Race-Based FinancialAid Be Distinguished
From Race-BasedAdmissions?, 42 B.C. L. REv. 967 (2001); Mark Spencer Williams, Comment,
Skin FormulasBelong in a Bottle: North Carolina'sDiversity ScholarshipsAre UnconstitutionalUnder Grutter & Gratz, 26 CAMPBELL L. REv. 135 (2004). The Wall StreetJournalhas reported

on the balancing act that educational institutions have engaged in with respect to race-

based scholarships since Grutter. See Daniel Golden, Not Black and White: Colleges Cut Back
Minority ProgramsAfter Court Rulings, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 2003, at Al; cf. Sara Hebel, The
Michigan Rulings: Court Rulings May Open the Doorfor More Use of Race in Student Aid, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., July 4, 2003, at S6.
-7

38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).

m Id. at 152.
39 City ofRichmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989); see Podberesky, 38 F.3d

at 152-53.
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was justified as a response to "the present effects of past discrimination." 350 The University of Maryland was unable to meet this high
hurdle; whatever racial tensions still existed at the university were not
sufficiently linked to past discrimination to justify the program. 35 1 In
any event, the program-which gave scholarships to all qualifying African-American students, and not just those African-American students from the state of Maryland-was not narrowly tailored to rem352
edy the past discrimination at issue.
Given the uncertain status of Bakke at the time Podberesky was decided, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Fourth Circuit thought to
apply Croson rather than to examine the diversity rationale in evaluating the scholarship program. Moreover, it is not clear whether the
University of Maryland advanced diversity as a rationale for its program. 353 It is thus understandable that commentators following Pod-

beresky assumed a diversity-based argument for race-based scholarships
3 54
might be unsustainable.
Grutter suggests that race-based scholarships may stand on surer
footing than the Podberesky panel assumed.35 5 This argument does not
require as much detail as those offered above, because it is little more
than a rehearsal of the Court's reasoning in Grutter Quite simply,
Grutter holds that universities may legitimately tailor their admissions
programs to meet the educational goal of maintaining a diverse student body. That interest is grounded in the First Amendment, and
measures taken by the university to ensure that diversity, short of "outright racial balancing,"3 56 will be viewed with some substantial degree
of deference, despite the ostensibly "strict" level of constitutional
scrutiny applied by the Court under the Fourteenth Amendment.

30 Podberesky, 38 F.3d at 153.
351 Id. at 154-57.
352 Id. at 158-59.
3 The University of Maryland's failure to raise the diversity rationale may have to do
with the historical context in which it arose. The constitutionality of race-based scholarship
programs was a disputed issue at this point, and at the time of the litigation, the University
of Maryland may have believed the argument was not available. See, e.g., Weir,supra note
346, at 975-76 (noting that the Department of Education had issued a statement in 1990
declaring that race-based scholarships were unconstitutional and violated Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, and only in 1994 issued revised policy guidelines suggesting that
race-based financial aid was available to create a diverse student body).
34 See, e.g., Thro, supra note 346, at 632.
35 That is not, however, necessarily what some educational institutions, which have to plan
outside the sanctuary of the law reviews, have concluded. See Golden, supranote 346, at Al.
356 Grutter,539 U.S. at 330.
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That reasoning applies equally to the case of race-based scholarships. If a university has a compelling interest in a diverse student
body, and may mold its admissions requirements toward that end,
surely it has an equal interest in ensuring that it also can "attract and
retain" those students who serve the educational mission of maintaining student diversity.35 7 This is particularly true to the extent that such

scholarships enable the school to attract and to retain a critical mass
of minority students. 3 58 Grutter thus suggests that universities ought to
be able to rely confidently on their educational interest in student
diversity in maintaining race-based scholarship programs.3 59
6. Single-Sex Schools, Historically Black Colleges and Universities,
and Other Exclusive Educational Institutions
A final controversial issue to which Grutters First Amendment
ultimately may speak is the constitutionality of publicly funded singlesex or race-based educational institutions. As with the regulation of
religious speech, I do not argue that Grutternecessarily demands a sea
change in the law's current treatment of those institutions. It may,
however, give ammunition to those who wish to argue in favor of a
different approach.
In both cases involving publicly funded single-sex education that
have reached the Supreme Court, the Court has struck down those institutions' admissions policies as a form of gender discrimination. In
the first case, Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,36° the Court sustained a challenge by a male applicant to a state-supported single-sex
357 Weir,
358

supra note 346, at 987.

Admittedly, this argument does not settle the question of whether a university may
maintain race-based scholarships with lower requirements than those scholarships made
available to students who do not belong to the relevant minority groups. See Podberesky, 38
F.3d at 152; Kennedy, supra note 346, at 770. The answer may depend on whether one
believes that the admissions program employed by the University of Michigan Law School
(the "Law School") was as "flexible [and] nonmechanical" as the Supreme Court suggested it was in Grutter, or whether it actually placed a thumb on the scales that weighed
admission decisions heavily in favor of minority applicants. 539 U.S. at 334. To the extent
that a minority-based scholarship maintains a fixed lower eligibility requirement than the
eligibility requirement for generally available scholarships, it may come closer to the admissions program outlawed by the Court in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). A university that maintained a larger pool of scholarship funds for minority students without
applying a lowered eligibility standard for access to those funds, however, could argue
credibly that its actions fell outside the scope of Gratz.
359 Cf. Gerald Torres, Grutter v. Bollinger/Gratz v. Bollinger: View from a Limestone
Ledge, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1596, 1599 (2003).
- 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
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nursing school. The state of Mississippi attempted to justify the school's
admissions policy on the ground that it "compensates for discrimination against women." 36 1 The Court, however, found that the school's
discriminatory policy reflected "a desire to provide white women in
Mississippi access to state-supported higher learning," not a desire to
compensate them for any discrimination that they previously faced.3 62
Moreover, because the Court found that women at the time earned
most of the baccalaureate nursing degrees granted in both the United
States and the state of Mississippi itself, it was difficult to show that the
program was necessary to compensate women for discrimination in the
field.3 63 Nor could the school justify its policy on the grounds of any
pedagogical benefits enjoyed by women in a single-sex environment.
The record did not indicate that admitting men to nursing classes affected teaching style, student performance, or classroom discussion.3 64
In any event, because men were allowed to audit classes at the school,
those pedagogical arguments would have been belied in the context of
the case.

365

Similarly, in United States v. Virginia (VMJ), the Court rejected the
State of Virginia's arguments in favor of its state-supported "incomparable military college, Virginia Military Institute (VMI)," which was
open only to men. 66 The state advanced pedagogically based arguments that VMI's single-sex educational environment offered "important educational benefits" that would be hampered if women were
permitted to attend the academy.3 67 Further, it claimed that the school
contributed to a diversity of educational approaches in the state's array of publicly funded institutions of higher learning.3 68
The Court, however, concluded that the program had not been
established for the purpose of advancing diversity in the state's educational programs.3 69 It also held that to the extent that the school's
"adversative" method of training did constitute a unique approach to
learning, the State of Virginia could not justify excluding women
from the benefits that unique institution offered.37 0 Indeed, because
-61 Id. at 727.
362Id. at 727 n.13.

See id. at 729.
3" See id. at 731.
Hogan, 458 U.S. at 730.
s"518 U.S. 515, 519 (1996) (VAIl).
M7 Id. at 535.
"' Id. at 539-40.
"6

Id.
370Id. at 540.
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the women's military academy established by the state to compensate
for the continued sex segregation of VMI did not offer a similar adversative style of training, it was a mere "pale shadow of VMI,"

71

and

could not salvage the continued maintenance of separate facilities.
For present purposes, it is important to note that neither Hogan
nor VMlabsolutely foreclose single-sex education. 372 Indeed, as Justice
O'Connor observed in Hogan, "[iun limited circumstances, a genderbased classification favoring one sex can be justified if it intentionally
and directly assists members of the sex that is disproportionately burdened."3 73 And in VM, the Court repeatedly emphasized the "unique"
opportunity offered by VMI's long history, resources, reputation, and
unusual style of instruction, adding that the Court did not "question
the State's prerogative evenhandedly to support diverse educational
opportunities."3

74

It is possible that Virginia's system of sex-segregated

military academies could have passed muster if a court had found that
such academies had been opened simultaneously and enjoyed similar
resources,3 75 and perhaps had also found that there was some pedagogically sound reason for the maintenance of gender segregation in
the educational system.
Advocates for single-sex education for women, in fact, have advanced a host of pedagogical arguments in favor of such programs.
According to the (admittedly mixed) research, female students benefit
strongly from single-sex education. They are more likely to engage in
classroom discussion, to receive attention from their instructors, to
excel in math and science, and to pursue professional interests in
those fields. They are also less likely to suffer the indignities of peer
harassment, and ultimately more likely to enjoy a better self-image and
371 VMI, 518 U.S. at 553 (quotation and citation omitted).
37 For discussion of single-sex education, see generally, for example, William Henry
Hurd, Gone with the Wind? VMI's Loss and the Future of Single-Sex Public Education, 4 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'y 27 (1997); Denise C. Morgan, Finding a Constitutionally PermissiblePath
to Sex Equality: The Young Women's Leadership School of East Harlem, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
Rrs. 95 (1997); Amy H. Nemko, Single-Sex PublicEducation After VML The Casefor Women's
Schools, 21 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19 (1998); Catherine A. O'Neill, Single-Sex Education After

United States v. Virginia, 23J.C. & U.L. 489 (1997); Verna L. Williams, Reform or Retrenchment? Single-Sex Education and the Constructionof Race and Gender,2004 WIs. L. REv. 15; Jenny
L. Matthews, Comment, Admission Denied: An Examination of a Single-Sex Public-School Initiative in North Carolina,82 N.C. L. REv. 2032 (2004).
373 458 U.S. at 728.
374 VM, 518 U.S. at 534 n.7.
375 See United States v. Virginia,

44 F.3d 1229, 1250 (4th Cir. 1995) (Phillips, J., dissenting), rev'd, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (stating that completely equal but separate male and female schools, with no difference in the benefits conferred on students, might survive equal
protection scrutiny).
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to seek broader opportunities, including jobs in fields that traditionally
have been closed to or less attractive to women, than girls or women
who attend co-educational institutions. 376 Put in Grutter's terms, singlesex education for women may "promote[ ] learning outcomes."377
All of these considerations gain added strength when considered
under the deferential approach to educational mission that Grutter
represents. To the extent that universities enjoy insulation, on First
Amendment grounds, when making "complex educational judgments," and to the extent that a non-diverse student body enables a
school to achieve its educational mission, Grutter suggests that these
institutions should be able to claim substantial deference for their decision to admit a narrower,rather than a broader, range of students to
the student body. In short, read for its emphasis on deference, Grutter
suggests that what is good for the goose is good for the gander: if diversity-based admissions can be justified as a sound means of achieving a school's educational mission despite the strict scrutiny of the
Fourteenth Amendment, sex-segregated admissions policies ought to
be able to command the same degree of deference from the courts.
What of racially exclusive colleges and universities-specifically,
historically black colleges and universities? 378 This concern sounds
loudly in Justice Clarence Thomas's dissent in Grutter, building on
concerns he has voiced elsewhere concerning the preservation of historically black colleges and universities. 3 79 As Justice Thomas observed,
Grutterin fact may help preserve these institutions. 380 If it does, however, it will do so on grounds that might well support broader efforts at
experimentation with racially segregated educational systems.
The history of segregation in the American educational system,
including its system of state-supported higher education, certainly
76

SeeJennifer R. Cowan, DistinguishingPrivate Women's Collegesfrom the VMIDecision, 30
COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 137, 141-42 (1997); Nemko, supra note 372, at 59-62. See generally ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, SAME, DIFFERENT, EQUAL: RETHINKING SINGLE-SEX SCHOOLING (2003).
377539 U.S. at 330.
378 See Aifreda A. Sellers Diamond, Serving the Educational Interests of African-American
Students at Brown Plus Fifty: The Historically Black College or University and Affirmative Action
Programs, 78 TbL. L. REv. 1877, 1881-92 (2004) (discussing the history and value of these
institutions). As Professor Diamond notes, historically black colleges and universities, in
fact, are defined statutorily, as those institutes of higher education "'established prior to
1964, whose principal mission was, and is, the education of Black Americans.'" Id. at 1881
(quoting Higher Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1061(2) (2000)).
37 See Grutter,539 U.S. at 364-66 (ThomasJ, dissenting); United States v. Fordice, 505
U.S. 717, 745-46 (1992) (Thomas,J., concurring).
3w See Grutter,539 U.S. at 365 (ThomasJ, dissenting).
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suggests that any pedagogical benefits claimed for historically discriminatory institutions would face the same problems that the Mississippi nursing school faced in Hogan. The law is clear that states may
not maintain a system of racially identifiable, effectively segregated
institutions.381 Although historically black colleges and universities in
the United States maintain high enrollments of African-Americans,
they may not simply exclude white or other non-black students,
though the number of such students is generally small. 382

A number of legal and educational scholars have argued in recent years that the promise of Brown v. Board of Education has proved
chimerical, and that black students would be well served by primary
or higher education in a supportive, nurturing, racially exclusive environment.38 3 Nevertheless, as these scholars recognize, many publicly
supported historically black educational institutions may be in constitutional peril under the Court's current equal protection jurisprudence because these institutions have been fatally tainted by their
long association with segregationist premises, even if they have long
since outgrown the occasion for their birth.384
As Justice Thomas quite reasonably argued in his dissent, Grutter's
First Amendment-grounded posture of deference to educational institutions' proffered academic justifications for admissions policies lends
ammunition to the maintenance of these historically black institutions.
Indeed, it might do so even if those institutions admitted few or no
non-black students. If the majority in Grutterwas entitled to treat with
deference the Law School's claim that a diversity-based admissions policy would benefit its educational mission, so too a historically black college should be entitled to deference if it argues that "racial homogene381 See generaUy Fordice,505 U.S. at 717.
See Grutter,539 U.S. at 364-66 (Thomas,J, dissenting).
383 See generally, e.g., Frank S. Adams, Why Brown v. Board of Education and Affirmative
Action Can Save Historically Black Colleges and Universities,47 ALA. L. REV. 481 (1996); Wendy
Brown-Scott, Race Consciousness in Higher Education:Does "Sound EducationalPolicy" Support
the ContinuedExistence of Historically Black Colleges?, 43 EMORY L.J. 1 (1994); Robert L. Carter, Public School Desegregation:A Contemporary Analysis, 37 ST. Louis U. LJ. 885 (1993);
Drew Days Ill, Brown Blues: Rethinking the Integrative Ideal 34 WM. & MARY L. REy. 53
(1992); Mark Strasser, Plessy, Brown, and HBCUs: On the Imposition of Stigma and the Court's
MechanicalEqual ProtectionJurisprudence,40 WASHBURN L.J. 48 (2000); Pamela Smith, Note,
All-Male Black Schools and the Equal Protection Clause: A Step Forward Towards Education, 66
TUL. L. Rav. 2003 (1992); Christopher Steskal, Note, CreatingSpaceforRacialDifference: The
Casefor African-Amencan Schools, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 187 (1992).
t84 See, e.g., Adams, supra note 383, at 483 ("Despite the view of Justice Thomas and
many others [concerning] the present day value of HBCUs, the current state of the law
threatens the continuing existence of these institutions in prior de jure racially segregated
states. . . ."); Strasser, supra note 383, at 64-67.
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ity will yield educational benefits." 38 5 Although universities are still required to act "within constitutionally prescribed limits," 386 Grutter at
least suggests that a university that advanced sound pedagogical reasons for its racially exclusionary policies might be entitled to some
significant leeway. This would be true at least as long as the school was
not a mere vestige of dejure segregation, did not impact its students
adversely, and "persist[ed] with[ ] sound educational justification." 387
As with single-sex education, such justifications are available,
plausible, and plentiful. Historically black universities may argue,
based on their history and continuing role in the African-American
community, that they provide a unique educational environment with
its own particular set of values. 3 88 Professor Wendy Brown-Scott summarizes some of the common attributes of historically black universities as follows:
The features of many HBIs [historically black institutions]
which distinguish the academic experience include open enrollment, emphasis on public and community service, the
inculcation of moral and ethical values, the promotion of
democracy, citizenship, and leadership skills but also critical
analysis as a catalyst for social change, demonstrated concern
for the physical health and well-being of the student body
and the communities from which they come, preparation for
specific careers through liberal arts education, and African
and African-American studies curricula.389
These unique attributes have contributed to significant "learning outcomes": greater intellectual development, positive social and psychological effects, greater ease in interpersonal relations, and greater cultural awareness. 3 90 Nor can any pedagogical evaluation of these
schools ignore the fact that, to the community which they primarily
serve, they are honored as vital and important contributors to the

s8 Grutter,539 U.S. at 365 (Thomas,J., dissenting).
386
Id. at 328.
387Fordice, 505 U.S. at 746 (Thomas, J., concurring).
38

See Roy L.

BROOKS, INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION? A STRATEGY FOR RACIAL EQUAL-

rry 235-43 (1996) (providing an admiring account).
389 Brown-Scott, supra note 383, at 10-11.

s90See Adams, supra note 383, at 496-97 (quoting James Washburn, Note, Beyond
Brown: EvaluatingEquality in HigherEducation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1115, 1151-52 (1994)); see also
Leland Ware, The Most Visible Vestige: Black Colleges After Fordice, 35 B.C. L. REv.633, 635
(1994) (discussing benefits of historically black colleges and universities).
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well-being of the African-American community and are not seen as
mere vestiges of segregation.39 1
All of these pedagogical arguments in favor of predominantly
black schools surely are entitled to the same degree of deference as
the arguments for diversity presented in Grutter If read for all that it is
worth, then, Grutter would appear to support the maintenance of
these universities against an equal protection challenge. Whatever
relief that may provide to supporters of historically black universities,
however, it must be acknowledged as a matter of logic that those arguments could be raised in favor of a variety of experiments with racially exclusive higher education. Would the Court support the establishment and public funding of an all-white university, provided it
could advance sound academic reasons in favor of such an institution?
A university deliberately and expressly serving Hispanic students, or
members of some other group, and excluding others? Even if that
outcome seems unlikely for a variety of reasons, it is still the case that
the argument is supported by the constitutional logic of Grutter392
Certainly Justice Thomas is not the only one to recognize this
implication of the Court's approach. Long before Grutter, Charles
Lawrence expressed his discomfort with a diversity rationale for
affirmative action in higher education admissions, observing that Justice Powell's reasoning in Bakke, with its emphasis on deference to the
views of the educational establishment, "could as easily justify an all
white school as one that is racially diverse." 93 Strong supporters of
Grutter acknowledged the same discomfort not long after the ruling
394
was handed down.

391See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 378, at 1883-84 (discussing the reasons her students
cite for attending the Southern University Law Center, a historically black institution, and
noting that many students cite the role of such institutions "as a reminder of educational
legacy or cultural connectedness"); John A. Moore, Note, Are State-Supported Historically
Black Colleges and UniversitiesJustifiable After Fordice ?-A Higher EducationDilemma, 27 FiA.
ST. U. L. REv. 547, 547 (2000).
39 See Dixon, supra note 157, at 78 ("It would seem to follow (from Bakke's focus on diversity as a permissible but not compelled educational value] that academic freedom
would permit some colleges to seek homogeneity if they had a rational basis for doing
so."); Katyal, supra note 19, at 564 ("If the university is free to discriminate against whites,
the argument goes, why isn't it free to do the same to African-Americans?"); id. at 564 n.22
(citing examples of this argument).
393 Charles R. Lawrence II, Each Other's Harvest: Diversity's Deeper Meaning, 31 U.S.F. L.
REv.757, 771 (1997).
sw Goodwin Liu, Remarks at the American Constitution Society Conference, Session
E: Segregation, Integration and Affirmative Action After Bollinger 33-34 (Aug. 2, 2003)
(noting that the "academic freedom argument ... would seem to swing both ways" and
could support arguments for segregated universities if they could be justified on educa-
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Grutter certainly does not absolutely compel the conclusion that
courts must accept a regime of single-sex or racially segregated higher
education. Hogan, United States v. Fordice,and other cases suggest most
institutions would be hard pressed to prove that any racially exclusive
admissions policies were motivated by purely pedagogical purposes.
Nevertheless, the "tension" acknowledged by the supporters of Gruttees acceptance of the diversity rationale is not a mere phantom. Grutteds logic compels the conclusion that a wide range of educational
missions may be entitled to deference on constitutional academic
freedom grounds, even if they skirt different boundaries of the Fourteenth Amendment than did the Law School's admissions policy in
Grutteritself.
7. Conclusion
As this discussion has endeavored to show, the logical implications of the institutional autonomy reading of Grutte's First Amendment are wide-ranging and significant. They counsel a different approach, and potentially different outcomes, with respect to a variety of
controversial First Amendment issues. Under Grutteis First Amendment, universities may have much greater discretion than currently is
presupposed to shape the speech activities of their institutions, including the imposition of speech codes and the preclusion of at least
some forms of religious speech. They may also provide universities
with additional ammunition to contest the government's withdrawal
of funding where, as with military recruiting on law school campuses,
the government activity conflicts with their educational mission.
Moreover, as in Grutter itself, the implications of Grutters First
Amendment carry beyond cases directly implicating speech itself. The
"countervailing [First Amendment] interest" 95 of educational institutional autonomy that is identified in Bakke and reinforced in Grutter
may alter the landscape of other areas of constitutional jurisprudence
as well. Thus, universities, bolstered by Grutters First Amendment, may
tional grounds), available at http://www.acslaw.org/pdf/Affirmative%20Action.pdf;
see
John Payton, Remarks at the American Constitution Society Conference, Session E: Segregation, Integration and Affirmative Action After Bollinger 34 (Aug. 2, 2003) ("acknowledg[ing] the tension [in the academic freedom argument]" and suggesting that the Law
School "tried not to make too much of the academic freedom point" in its brief to the Supreme Court), available at http://www.acslaw.org/pdf/Affirmative%20Action.pdf; cf Katyal,
supra note 19, at 557-58 (asserting that only one brief (on which Professor Katyal worked)
in the Grutterappeal offered a substantial argument based on educational autonomy).
39 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (opinion of Powell,J.).
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win greater freedom to employ a variety of race-conscious policies, including the use of race-specific scholarships and other funding mechanisms. Indeed, they may be able to argue in favor of single-sex or singlerace admissions policies. As I have suggested above, because the arguments in favor of single-sex or single-race admissions policies would be
grounded in pedagogical rather than remedial justifications, all-white
or all-male institutions might find as much shelter under Grutter as allfemale institutions or historically black colleges and universities.
A few points deserve emphasis here. First, I do not intend to suggest that any of the varied outcomes that I have discussed above are
likely to follow from Grutte: Indeed, I would venture to predict that
although some version of the arguments that I have outlined will be
advanced in the courts in future cases, many will fail. At the very least,
given the significant reshaping of settled precedent that some of these
outcomes represent, these arguments are unlikely to fare well in the
lower courts, although some of them ultimately might find vindication
in the Supreme Court. The point of this discussion has not been to
predict real-world litigation outcomes, but to ask which outcomes follow from Grutter's First Amendment discussion as a matter of logical
implication.
The importance of this first reading of GruttersFirst Amendment,
however, does not rest on its ultimate success in the courts. Indeed,
that is one of the key points of this Article. Notwithstanding the
Court's bold First Amendment rhetoric in Grutter, it is quite possible
that it will turn out to be a "sport" in First Amendment case law, as
Bakke arguably was before it.396 Nonetheless, Grutterand Bakke still demand greater consideration within the world of First Amendment
scholarship. If Grutter'sFirst Amendment eventually does have greater
influence beyond the narrow confines of race-conscious admissions
policies, the importance of carefully studying this aspect of Grutterwill
be obvious. Regardless, Grutter will raise serious questions for First
Amendment scholars even if it does turn out to be a sport. For example, what are the First Amendment principles announced in Grutter?
Do they have greater application beyond the facts of that case? Do they
merit greater application? And if the Court refuses to apply those principles elsewhere, why? In short, no matter what happens in the courts,
Grutterdeserves serious consideration as a First Amendment case.
Finally, it should be evident that the outcomes discussed in this
Section point in no particular direction. A university might stress
39

See Byrne, supra note 17, at 315; Yudof, supra note 30, at 855-56.
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Grutter in arguing for campus speech restrictions, or in asserting its
right to permit a wide degree of potentially offensive speech. It might
assert that its educational mission demands more religious speech on
campus or less religious speech. It might argue in favor of the educational benefits of a homogeneous student body, while leaving room
for the argument that Gruttersupports an all-white or all-male school
as much as a traditionally African-American school. Indeed, under
this reading of Grutter, the latter position might be stronger than the
former, if the all-white school raised legitimate pedagogical arguments in its defense and the African-American school was tainted in
the eyes of the courts by its origins in dejure segregation.
On this reading, then, Gruttes's First Amendment is not about
substantive values, but about deference. Provided a university can supply
a plausible academic justification of a policy, that policy may be accorded substantial deference notwithstanding its potential conflict
with First Amendment jurisprudence or with other constitutional provisions. This reading of Gruttertherefore is bound to please some constituencies and to displease others, depending on the particular educational policy at stake.
To the extent that one wishes to police the legal community for
consistency, Gruttei's First Amendment thus provides a nice testing
point: are those who showered the decision in praise equally willing to
live with a set of educational outcomes they find unwise or distasteful?
For example, would the plaintiffs who have employed Grutter's emphasis on institutional autonomy to oppose the discriminatory policy
of the Solomon Amendment be equally content to see that emphasis
used to support an educational institution's ability to discriminate in
favor of a different set of students or potential employers? Conversely,
will those who criticized Grutter nevertheless adopt its First Amendment arguments to support their own set of educational policies?
There is, however, another possibility. As I emphasized at the beginning of this Section, Grutter's First Amendment is susceptible to
more than one reading. Instead of reading it as adopting a deferential
posture toward university policy making regardless of the specific
educational policies and values at stake, we might read Grutteras having made a substantive commitment to specific educational valuesand, by extension, to specific politicalvalues. It is to this possible reading of Grutter'sFirst Amendment that I now turn.
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B. Grutter's FirstAmendment as Substantive Commitment
The focus on the institutional autonomy reading of Grutter has
yielded a surprising and wide-ranging set of potential implications for
First Amendment doctrine and other aspects of constitutional law. It is
based, however, on a particular reading of Grutter So far, I have assumed that Grutter adopts a value-neutral conception of academic
freedom. Provided that a university is making "academic decisions"
with respect to policies that serve its "proper institutional mission," 397 it
is entitled to substantial deference. What constitutes a "proper educational mission," on this reading, is substantially up to the university. A
university may decide that its educational mission demands a diverse
student body, or it may conclude that it has a pedagogical interest in
maintaining a gender- or race-exclusive student body. It may decide
that its mission demands the imposition of stringent and viewpointspecific codes of civility in student speech, or that its mission demands
wide open debate and precludes the imposition of speech codes.
In each case, the discretion lies with the educational institution.
Courts are not qualified to judge the "complex educational judgments" 398 that go into the formation of a university mission, and must
assume that the university has reached its judgments about its proper
educational mission, and the policies necessary to support it, in good
faith.3 99 This reading of Grutter, which is substantially based on the
Court's own language, thus preserves universities as "spheres of independence and neutrality" into which the government may not intrude.400
It is not, however, the only available reading of Grutter Another
reading of the opinion is decidedly not value-neutral. Rather, it reads
Grutteras having made a substantive commitment to a particularvision
of the proper educational mission of universities, law schools, and
other institutions of higher education.
On this reading, Grutteroffers a substantive vision of the university
as fulfilling an important democraticfunction. This vision does not simply accept the Law School's arguments for a diverse student body because they are the product of autonomous decision making by an institution within its sphere of expertise. Instead, it asserts that diversity in
"7 Grutter,539 U.S.

at 329.

m Id. at 328
"9 See id. at 329.
400 David Cole, Beyond UnconstitutionalConditions: ChartingSpheres of Neutrality in Government-FundedSpeech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 675, 683 (1992).
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higher education-and particularly within elite bodies such as the Law
School-provides broader goods that are part of our political and constitutional framework.'" 1 Diversity in higher education is not just an
intrinsicgood that brings positive "learning outcomes" 402 to the educational process itself. Rather, it is an important extrinsic good. 403 Diverse
student bodies "better prepare [ ] students for an increasingly diverse
workforce and society, and better prepare[ ] them as professionals." 4 4
They produce a diverse leadership corps that is better able to deal with
the realities of a "global marketplace." 4 5
More importantly, a diverse student body ensures that equal educational opportunity is available to all in order to provide for
"[e]ffective participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups
in the civic life of our Nation."4o6 Additionally, diversity in elite educational institutions undergirds democratic legitimacy: it "cultivate [s] a
set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry" by ensuring
that "the path to diversity [is] visibly open to talented and qualified
individuals of every race and ethnicity."4°7 Thus, under the substantive
reading of Grutter, the Court pledged allegiance to a specific substantive constitutional vision of the nature of higher education, one which
emphasizes its continuity with a broader democratic vision of full and
equal participation "in the civic life of our Nation." 408
A number of early examinations of Grutter have focused on this
reading of the case. Professor Post, for example, sees in Gruttera vision
of education "as instrumental for the achievement of extrinsic social
goods like professionalism, citizenship, or leadership. "409 Universities,
according to this view, are not mere warehouses for researchers. They
are, instead, both models of democratic dialogue 410 and training
grounds for a well-trained and representative body of citizens. Profes401 SeeByrne, supra note 20, at 117-18 (discussing the extent to which the Grutter Court
"made an independentjudgment that diversity in higher education was important").
402 Grutter,539 U.S. at 330.
403 Cf Cynthia Estund, TaingGrutter to Work, 7 GREN BAG 2D 215, 217-18 (2004).
4o Grutter,539 U.S. at 330 (quotation and citation omitted). For commentary on this

aspect of Grutter,see generally Bryan W. Leach, Note, Race as Mission Critical: The OccupationalNeed Rationalein Military Affirmative Action and Beyond, 113 YALE LJ. 1093 (2004).
40

Grutter,539 U.S. at 330. For a thoughtful treatment of this aspect of Grutter, see

generally Thomas H. Lee, University Dons and Warrior Chieftains: Two Concepts of Diversity, 72

L. REv. 2301 (2004).
Grutter,539 U.S. at 330.

FORDHAM
406

407Id. at 332.
408

Id.

4o

Post, supranote 306, at 60.
See id. at 61 (identifying universities as fora "for participation in civic life").

410
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sor Lani Guinier, in a statement that spotlights the two readings of
Grutter that I have stressed thus far, also argues that Grutter makes a
positive statement about "the fundamental role of public education in
a democracy," by "link[ing] the educational mission of public institutions not only to the autonomy that the First Amendment gives universities to fashion their educational goals, but also to the broad democratic goal of providing upward mobility to a diverse cadre of future
leaders." 411 Grutter,in her view, is the starting point for a public discussion about the "democratic purpose of public education." 412
As I have suggested above, this vision of the democratic purpose
of higher education is not precisely the same as the description of the
purposes of education offered in support of student body diversity by
Justice Powell in Bakke.413 The focus of that case was on benefits that
are intrinsic to the educational process. Bakke was concerned with the
exposure of students to diverse ideas and values within the university
itself, in order to foster an atmosphere of "speculation, experiment
and creation." 414 Although that environment might have an impact on
the nation's future, 415 Justice Powell looked only to the educational
environment itself. His diversity argument contemplated "only that
the [nation's future] leaders, who might all be white, should be attuned to a diversity of ideas and mores."416
Grutter,by contrast, is expressly outward-looking; it is concerned
not simply with the intrinsic value of diversity on campus but with the
extrinsicvalue of education, particularly with regard to leadership and
citizenship. Moreover, unlike Bakke, which is concerned only with the
benefits that some putative set of future citizens and leaders might
reap from a diverse student body, Grutter is concerned with the composition of that caste of citizens and leaders. It suggests that the legitimacy of higher education, and of the leaders it produces, rests on
411 Lani Guinier, Admissions Rituals as PoliticalActs: Guardians at the Gates of OurDemo-

cratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. Rav. 113, 175 (2003); see id. at 223 (noting the connection between "institutions' educational and public missions").
412 Id. at 120. Others have focused on Grutter as a substantive commitment to democratic values in education and beyond. See e.g., Michelle Adams, Shifting Sands: The Jurisprudence of Integration Past,Present, and Future,47 How. L.J. 795, 824-25 (2004); Bollinger,
supra note 204, at 1591-92; Greenberg, supra note 203, at 1619; Kenneth L. Karst, Justice
O'Connorand the Substance of Equal Citizenship,55 SUP. CT. REV. 357, 394-401 (2003); Douglas Laycock, The Broader Case for Affirmative Action: Desegregation, Academic Excellence, and
FutureLeadership, 78 TUL. L. REv.1767, 1770 (2004).
413 Cf Post, supra note 306, at 60.
414 438 U.S. at 312 (opinion of PowelI,J.).
415 See id. at 312-13 (opinion of Powell, J.).
416 Greenberg, supra note 203, at 1618.
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its representativeness and inclusiveness. Grutter thus presents a
significantly different picture of the nature and purpose of higher
417
education than that offered in Bakke.
What might we make of this substantive vision of Grutteds First
Amendment-a vision of academic freedom as serving a particular
democratic vision of higher education, as providing both training for
democracy and a miniature model of diversity in democracy? Most obviously, this reading of Grutter may imply a different approach to the
various free speech and other constitutional issues discussed above
than the approach suggested by an institutional autonomy reading of
Grutter An educational institution defending a particular policy, such
as a set of restrictions on campus speech or the establishment of a single-sex university, would be faced with a different justificatory task under this reading. Rather than emphasize the connection between its
policy and its educational mission, it would be obliged to show a connection between the educational mission itself and broader democratic values outside the immediate context of the university.
It is easy to conceive of such arguments regarding some, if not all,
of the issues discussed above. It would be no great stretch, for example, to assert that "'education ...is the very foundation of good citizenship,'" 41 8 and that racial epithets and other instances of campus
speech targeted at particular segments of the university community
erect a barrier to the full participation of some groups in institutions
of higher learning. Consequently, it could be argued, racially offensive
speech on campus ultimately impedes some groups' full enjoyment of
and participation in democratic citizenship. Thus, campus speech restrictions could be as plausibly justified under the democratic reading
of Grutteras they could under the institutional autonomy reading.
417
The changing nature of the Court's vision of educational diversity is acknowledged
in Jeffrey S. Lehman, The Evolving Language of Diversity and Integration in Discussions of
Affirmative Action from Bakke to Grutter, in PATRICIA GURIN ET AL., DEFENDING DivERsrrY:
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AT THE UNIVERSrIY OF MICHIGAN 61, 61-96 (2004). Lehman, who was
involved in the Grutter litigation as Dean of the Law School, discusses the difficulties involved in speaking consistently of diversity over the course of the litigation, in court and in

public. I suspect, however, that Lehman places too much weight on the evolving nature of
diversity discourse in general, and too little on the conflict between the Law School's actual
purposes and its need to find a set of educational and rhetorical goals that would fit safely
within the safe harbor of the juridical category of "diversity" imposed by Justice Powell in
Bakke. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, WRESTLING wrru DIVERSITY 16 (2003) (noting that
"diversity" became a "'mantra' ... of those defending the use of racial or ethnic preferences" in university admissions after Bakke, "not least, it should be obvious, because such
celebrations seem licensed and, indeed, encouraged by the Supreme Court").
418 Grutter,539 U.S. at 331 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
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Other issues might compel different outcomes, however. I have
suggested, for example, that under the institutional autonomy reading of Grutter, a sincere pedagogical justification of single-sex or single-race university education might justify such admissions policies
against any claims of discrimination. It is not clear that equally compelling reasons could be mustered in favor of gender- or raceexclusive admissions policies under the democratic reading of Grutter.
To be sure, one could argue that if educational outcomes for women
or African-Americans are improved under a system of sex- or raceexclusive higher education, then those programs ultimately will increase the ability of traditionally disadvantaged groups to participate
fully in democratic society, both as leaders and as citizens. Nevertheless, if Grutter conceptualizes universities as both a conduit to and a
model of democratic participation-in Professor Post's words, if the
Court sees universities as "for[a] for participation in civic life" 419-

then single-sex or single-race institutions may be seen as falling short
of this inclusive participatory ideal.
I will not develop these alternative arguments at length. Suffice it
to say that it is not clear that the same set of policy implications for
other First Amendment or constitutional issues would follow under
the democratic reading of Grutteras under the institutional autonomy
reading of Grutter The more interesting questions about this reading
of Gruttefs First Amendment, however, reside beyond the realm of
litigation strategy. The democratic reading of Grutte7's vision of academic freedom is interesting because it raises larger questions: questions of fit and consistency with the larger body of First Amendment
doctrine, and questions about the Court's willingness to embrace a
specific, contestable conception of the purpose of the university.
One way to see this problem of consistency is to compare the
democratic reading of Grutters First Amendment-the reading of the
case as embodying a substantive ideal of participatory democracy, and
as a signal that public institutions ought to take steps to enhance full
and equal participation in that democracy"-with one current stream of
First Amendment thought. Several prominent First Amendment theorists, drawing on the work of Alexander Meildejohn, 420 have argued
that the First Amendment should be understood not as supporting an
419 Post, supra note 306, at 61.
42 See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTIruTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1965); Alexander Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment Is an

Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 245.
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individualistic vision of speech as self-actualization, but as serving a substantive vision of democracy as self-government 4 21 In Professor Owen
Fiss's words, "[t]he purpose of free speech is ...the preservation of
democracy, and the right of a people, as a people, to decide what kind
of life it wishes to live. " 422 In Professor Cass Sunstein's terms, this ap-

proach represents a turn from free speech as an unregulated marketplace of ideas to a system dedicated to deliberative democracy. 423
Under this theory, a purely context-insensitive, rule-oriented approach to First Amendment issues may properly be amended or
abandoned when that approach interferes with the larger goal of
democratic self-government. In order that "public debate might be
enriched and our capacity for collective self-determination enhanced," 424 the state "may sometimes find it necessary to restrict the
speech of some elements in our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others."425
This democratic approach to free speech thus may demand a set
of departures from current free speech doctrine. Under this model of
free speech and its relation to self-government, the state may properly
enact greater restrictions on the spread of pornography, to ensure
that "everyone ha[s] an equal chance to speak and to be heard." 426 It
may allocate subsidies in content-specific ways to "further the sovereignty of the people by provoking and stirring public debate."42 7 It
may restrict hate speech where that speech "helps contribute to the
creation of a caste system." 428 The state also may intervene in the
sphere of election-related speech to "promote democratic processes." 429
In short, government may employ a number of regulatory approaches
421 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 228, at xvii (describing his project as the "effort to
root freedom of speech in a conception of popular sovereignty").
422OWEN M. Fiss, LIBERALISM DIVIDED: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF

STATE POWER 13 (1996).
423See SUNsTEIN,

supra note 228, at 17-23, 50-51 (elaborating on this point).
Fiss, supra note 422, at 19.
425 Id. at 30; see SUNSTEIN, supra note 228, at 37 (reasoning that the constitutional questions posed in First Amendment cases should be: "[d]o the rules promote greater attention to public issues" and "[d]o they ensure greater diversity of view?").
426 Fiss, supra note 422, at 87.
427
Id. at 107.
428 SUNsTEMN, supra note 228, at 193. This capsule description misses much of the nuanced flavor of Professor Sunstein's position, which would not demand sweeping departures from current doctrine. Nevertheless, it is accurate enough for these purposes to note
that Professor Sunstein's deliberative democracy account of free speech would compel
both a different approach to problems of hate speech regulation (among other issues) and
a somewhat
different result.
4
29Id.at 85; see id. at 93-120.
424
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to speech in order to enhance our system of self-government and deliberative democracy.
This approach to First Amendment problems has been criticized
elsewhere, and any lengthy treatment of this question is beyond the
proper scope of this Article. 430 For present purposes, I want to make
two observations. First, this democratic self-government approach to
the First Amendment may be seen as closely linked to the democratic
conception of education and academic freedom offered by the second
reading of Grutter that I have described. In both cases, the driving force
behind the First Amendment (or its subsidiary, academic freedom) is a
particular vision of free speech as serving a sphere of democratic selfgovernment in which legitimacy depends on the full and equal participation of all groups. Additionally, in both cases, that vision of democracy may demand intervention by the state (or its subsidiary, the public
university) to ensure access to the democratic forum for all.
Second, both the general democratic approach to the First
Amendment and the democratic reading of academic freedom in
Grutter are arguably in tension with the courts' usual approach to the
First Amendment. Certainly the leading advocates for a democratic
approach to free speech recognize that their views are not consistent
with the larger body of First Amendment jurisprudence. 431 Although
the democratic theorists of the First Amendment stress the need to
shape First Amendment doctrine to meet specific concerns about
equality and diversity of debate in the public sphere, even if that requires state intervention, the courts typically approach free speech
issues through a lens of state neutrality that is suspicious of any state
intervention in the arena of public debate. 432 The resulting laissezfaire attitude toward speech often ends up supporting existing distributions of power and media access, a state of affairs that First
Amendment scholars concerned with enhancing public debate find

430 See generally, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 139; William Marshall, Free Speech and the "Problem" of Democracy, 89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 191 (1994); Robert C. Post, Equality and Autonomy in
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 95 MICH. L. REv. 1517 (1997); Martin H. Redish & Gary
Lippman, Freedom of Expression and the Civic Republican Revival in ConstitutionalTheory: The
Ominous Implications,79 CAL. L. REv. 267 (1991).
4S1 See, e.g., SUNSTEiN, supra note 228, at 16 ("[A] reconnection of the First Amendment with democratic aspirations would require an ambitious reinterpretation of the principle of free expression.").
432 See Fiss, supranote 422, at 5.
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deeply troubling. 433 It is thus clear that these theorists argue for a
significant reshaping of First Amendment theory and doctrine. 43 4
Similarly, the democratic reading of Grutter suggests a different
approach to First Amendment issues, at least in the arena of academic
freedom, than the Supreme Court usually takes. It does not rely on a
view of the university as a marketplace of ideas. Nor, despite the Court's
language, does it directly rely on a conception of the university community as serving the "'robust exchange of ideas.'" 43 5 Instead, the
democratic reading of Grutterdepicts the university as both a small-scale
model of and a gateway for a democracy in which "[e] ffective participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the civic life of our
Nation is essential." 43 6 To that end, the university may intervene in an
ostensibly neutral admissions process to ensure diversity in the body of
students participating in university life and, ultimately, citizenship and
leadership.
This reading of Grutter thus invites questions about whether the
Court's vision of the First Amendment in this case is consistent with its
approach to free speech issues elsewhere in its jurisprudence. If it is
not, at least two responses are possible. One may take this inconsistency as further evidence that Grutters First Amendment is good for
one case and one case only, a conclusion that necessarily undermines
some of the force of the opinion. Alternatively, one may see Gruttefs
First Amendment as an invitation to revisit the Court's general approach to the First Amendment. I take up one aspect of that invitation below.43 7 The only untenable approach is indifference. By taking
a markedly different approach to the First Amendment, Grutter demands either serious consideration of the merits of the opinion, or
serious reconsideration of the merits of the Court's general approach
to the First Amendment.
C. Is Grutter's FirstAmendment Consistent with the Court'sFirst
Amendment Jurisprudence?
In the two previous Sections, I have offered two potential readings
of Grutterasa First Amendment case. One focuses on institutional defSee SUNSTEIN, supra note 228, at 50.
44 See, e.g., id. at 252.
435 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 313 (opinion of Powell, J.)
433

(quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
4
6 Id. at 332.
437 See infra notes 487-575 and accompanying text.
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erence; the other offers a more substantive, democratically oriented
vision of the First Amendment. As I have suggested, if these readings
are inconsistent with the broad run of First Amendment opinions issued by the Supreme Court, two possibilities present themselves: either
Gruttercan be treated as a sport for First Amendment purposes, or the
Court itself ought to reexamine its First Amendment case law.
One might ask at this point, is Grutter,on either of the alternative
readings offered above, really inconsistent with the Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence? One way to approach this question is to
compare the First Amendment analysis undertaken in other cases by
the Justices who joined the majority in Grutter, as well as that taken by
the dissenting Justices in Grutter What emerges from this discussion is
something of a mixed record, which may in itself be revealing.
Focusing first on the majority Justices, the two Justices who seem
most consistent in their approach with respect to both Grutterand other
First Amendment cases are Justices Breyer and Stevens. In both his extrajudicial writing and his writing on the Court, Justice Breyer has emphasized an approach to the First Amendment that "[f]ocus[es] on
participatory self-government." 4 8 Like Professors Sunstein and Fiss,
Justice Breyer argues for an approach that looks back to "the Constitution's more general objectives," 4 9 and considers whether a particular
speech regulation serves "the ability of some to engage in as much
communication as they wish and ... the public's confidence and con-

sequent ability to communicate. " 44° Justice Breyer is thus suspicious of
First Amendment rules that treat all speech as equal, and all speech
restrictions as equally deserving of suspicion. 44 1 He finds that approach
inconsistent with the more general objective of ensuring "democratic
government," 442 which may counsel permitting speech regulations in
some cases despite their conflict with general rules of content neutrality. This context-specific, democratically oriented approach is evident in
Justice Breyer's writing on such issues as campaign finance regulations
and commercial speech."43
4

38 Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 245, 254 (2002).
Id. at 256.
440 Id. at 253 (referring specifically to communication in the electoral process).
439

41See, e.g., id. at 253, 255.
442 Id. at 255.
443 See, e.g., United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 424-25 (2001) (Breyer, J.,

dissenting); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 399-405 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring). See generallyJerome A. Barron, The Electronic Media and the Flightfrom First Amendment Doctrine:JusticeBreyer's New BalancingApproach, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 817 (1998).
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Similarly, Justice Stevens has voiced his suspicion of general First
Amendment rules such as the prohibition on content-based regulation, suggesting that they may "obfuscate[ ] the specific facts at issue
and interests at stake in a given case." 44 He advocates an approach to
First Amendment cases that exhibits "a sensitivity to fact and context
that allows for advancement of the principles underlying the protection of free speech." 445 This approach is evident in his First Amendmentjurisprudence, 446 and, as I have suggested above, it is consistent
with his treatment of academic freedom jurisprudence. 447
So Justices Breyer and Stevens may be seen as taking positions in
Grutter that are broadly consistent with the drift of their general views
on the First Amendment. What of the other Justices who joined the
majority in Grutter? Here, I think, the record is more mixed. To be
sure, at least some of the other Justices have on occasion taken a more
pragmatic, narrow, institutionally oriented view of First Amendment
problems, rather than a broad, institution-indifferent, rule-based approach. For example, Professor Frederick Schauer has argued thatJustice O'Connor's opinion in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,44
although nominally relying on conventional doctrinal rules of First
Amendment analysis, in fact depended on the unique nature of the
arts-funding function performed by the National Endowment for the
Arts.449 Closer to the subject at hand, as we have seen, Justice Souter's
concurring opinion in Southworth rejected the imposition of a "castiron viewpoint neutrality requirement" on the University of Wisconsin,
and argued that "protecting a university's discretion to shape its educational mission may prove to be an important consideration" when
judging the propriety of student fees under the First Amendment 450
Still, these occasional eruptions of dissatisfaction with traditional
doctrinal analysis are not the same thing as a generally consistent and
4

John Paul Stevens, TheFreedom of Speech, 102 YALE LJ. 1293, 1307 (1993).
Id. at 1305.
See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 778 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring);
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 62-63 (1976).
447See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 278 (Stevens, J., concurring). See generally Frederick Schauer,
Justice Stevens and the Size of ConstitutionalDecisions, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 543 (1996).
448See generally 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
449See Schauer, supra note 32, at 96-97.
450 529 U.S. at 239 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). Consistent with the analysis provided above, Justice David Souter was joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and John
Paul Stevens. See id.; see also Barron, supra note 443, at 855-56 (arguing thatJustice Souter's
approach to electronic media cases is "medium-specific and pragmatic," and skeptical
about "the utility of categorical analysis in resolving the First Amendment issues raised by
the new electronic media").
"5
446
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different approach to the First Amendment, whether it resembles the
institution-specific or democratic readings of Grutter or some other
vision of the First Amendment. Instead, most of the Justices who
joined Grutter have, for the most part, willingly followed traditional
categorical First Amendment rules in a substantial number of cases.
Even Justice Stevens, who I have suggested does have a fairly consistent
case-specific approach to the First Amendment, has at times displayed
an unwillingness to depart from traditional First Amendment rules.

451

A review of the dissenting Justices in Grutter results in a similarly
mixed result. In important respects, the Justices who dissented in that
case regularly have hewed close to categorical First Amendment rules,
rejecting any sort of institution-specific or substantive democratic
reading of the First Amendment.452 Thus, Justice Thomas has refused
to draw institutional or fact-bound distinctions in a variety of other
First Amendment contexts, including commercial speech 453 and
broadcast media regulation. 45 4 That rejection of institution- or medium-specific distinctions in the First Amendment is of a piece with
his skepticism in Grutterabout the "constitutionalization of 'academic
freedom,'" 455 and his rejection of the idea that the First Amendment
could provide special constitutional privileges to a public university.456

451 See, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 669, 683-95 (1998)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens rejected any suggestion that a different First
Amendment approach should apply where a state institution acts as a broadcaster, instead
treating the state public television station the same as any other state actor subject to the
usual First Amendment restraints on its exercise of discretion. See Schauer, supra note 32,
at 90. Again consistent with my suggestion that most of the Justices in the Grutter majority
are neither especially loyal nor especially hostile to traditional forms of First Amendment
analysis, Justice Stevens was joined byJustices Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. See Forbes,
523 U.S. at 683. Justice Souter also rejected Justice O'Connor's institution-specific approach in Finley, treating the National Endowment for the Arts as no differently situated
for purposes of First Amendment analysis than any other government actor. See 524 U.S. at
601 (SouterJ., dissenting); Schauer, supra note 32, at 96.
452 See, e.g., Barron, supra note 443, at 859-72 (discussing First Amendment approaches
ofJustices Anthony Kennedy and Clarence Thomas).
45 See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 575 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I doubt whether it is even possible to draw a coherent distinction between
commercial and noncommercial speech.").
'S e4 e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 812 (1996)
(ThomasJ, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); see also Barron, supra
note 443, at 869-70 (arguing that Justice Thomas's opinion in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. u FCC "denie[s] the validity of any First Amendment theory
that is instrumental in its objectives and pluralistic in its coverage or scope").
45 Grutter,539 U.S. at 362 (ThomasJ, dissenting).
456 See id. at 362-64.
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In this sense, it might appear at first blush that the dissenters in
Grutter, to the extent that the case turned on First Amendment values,
acted with greater loyalty and consistency across a range of First
Amendment cases than did the Gruttermajority. That observation might
offer some comfort (albeit decidedly cold comfort) to the dissenting
Justices' more politically or jurisprudentially conservative allies in the
legal academy.
On another view, however, the dissenting Justices in Grutter are
equally guilty of inconsistency with the First Amendment values that
they have advanced elsewhere. For this insight, we may turn to some of
these Justices' own academic supporters. In recent writing, Professor
John 0. McGinnis, among other scholars, has attempted to characterize the Rehnquist Court as moving toward "an encompassing jurisprudence" based on the "decentralization and private ordering of social
norms."457 One vehicle for this process of decentralization is an increased "solicitude for civil associations."458 In a host of cases, including
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,459 Dak 46 0
and California Democratic Party v. Jones,461 the Rehnquist Court has offered a far stronger level of protection for freedom of association than
that provided by the Warren or Burger Courts.46 2 That freedom neces-

sarily includes the power of associations to "exclude individuals whose
mere presence is antithetical to their expressive norms."463
If this is an accurate description of the Rehnquist Court's movement in the area of freedom of expression, let alone an umbrella description of a jurisprudence cutting across various constitutional provisions, as Professor McGinnis would have it, it is hard to square with
the dissents in Grutter Surely the first reading of Grutter that I have
canvassed here-the deferential reading-is far more consistent with
the Tocquevillian approach Professor McGinnis describes than the
dissenters' approach in Grutter It permits educational institutions to
organize their "membership" as they see fit and to shape social norms
457 McGinnis, supra note 27, at 489. See generally Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry
Adams's Soul: Education and the Expression of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1841 (2001) (discussing the role of associations in mediating between individuals and the State, and the
Court's part in protecting them).
458
McGinnis, supra note 27, at 492.
459 See 515 U.S. 557, 580-81 (1995).
- See 530 U.S. 640, 647-61 (2000).
461See 530 U.S. 567, 572-82 (2000).
462See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the FirstPerson Plural.Expressive Associations and
the FirstAmendment, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1483, 1494 (2001).
4
6 McGinnis, supra note 27, at 533.
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through a diversity-based approach to university admissions standards.
It does not mandate that they do so, and recognizes that many universities will not take this approach to the admissions process. Some may
adopt class-based admissions standards, and some simply may open
the gates wide. Those institutions that wish to admit students on the
basis of some diversity-oriented vision of the university, however, are
free to do so, consistent with their status as autonomous social institutions. By contrast, the dissenters in Grutter would shut down entirely
any attempt, by public universities at least, to shape the student community according to a perceived need for diversity.
Thus, if any faction on the Court was following a Tocquevillian vision in Grutter, it was the majority and not the dissent. To the extent
Professor McGinnis can be read as including Grutter's dissenting Justices among those who have championed the jurisprudence he describes, therefore, they stand fairly accused of inconsistency in Grutter 464
To be sure, there are some reasonable objections to this account.
First and foremost, Professor McGinnis recognizes that even a Court
that is more attentive to freedom of association might still "be less willing to permit associations to exclude [certain] identifiable groups,"
such as racial minorities, "on First Amendment grounds."465 But Professor McGinnis himself is at least ambivalent about this prospect.4 56 He
appears to suggest that some greater scope of freedom might be available to institutions such as universities, including freedom to shape
admissions decisions along racial grounds, if the school advanced the
argument that its "expression of... values" would be harmed by state
intervention with respect to its admissions choices. 467 That is precisely
4
the objection raised by the Law School in GrutteO"
464 Professor McGinnis is careful not to ascribe his description of the Rehnquist
Court's jurisprudence to any individual Justices. See id. at 489 n.10. Still, the opinions that
he treats as illustrative of the Court's increased attention to mediating institutions were
authored entirely by Justices-William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy-who dissented in Grutter See id. at 531-43 (discussing Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (Rehnquist,
CJ.); Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (Scalia, J.); Southworth, 530 U.S.
217 (KennedyJ.)).
4Id.
at 536.
46 See id. at 537 n.263.
467 Id. at 537 n.264 (discussing Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976)).
468 I should add that in exploring the tension between the Tocquevillian approach discussed by Professor McGinnis and the dissents in Grutter, I am in no way suggesting any
inconsistency on Professor McGinnis's part. Similarly, as his comment on the FAIR litigation
suggests, Richard Garnett is well aware of the connection between his work on expressive
associations and the sorts of issues raised by the first reading of Grutter offered in this Article. See general Garnett, supra note 296.
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It might also be argued that whatever additional protections Professor McGinnis's Tocquevillian Court has accorded to civic associations, that focus has been on private institutions rather than public
institutions. I do not think this argument can be reconciled fully with
Professor McGinnis's broader constitutional vision, however. That vision treats the Court's protection of private civic associations as only
one component of a broader vision of autonomous and decentralized
institutions both private and public, "states, secular and religious associations, and juries" among them. 469 If the Court's vision instructs us
to "focus on associations themselves, and on the content and function
of their expression," 470 perhaps the associative role of public universities should weigh more heavily in the balance than their tenuous
connection to state action. 471
In sum, the verdict on Grutteis consistency with the Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence is, perhaps surprisingly, at least mixed.
Surely the democratic reading of Grutter's First Amendment offered
above presents a fairly imperfect fit with the larger body of First
Amendment case law. Even here, however, it is at least consistent with
some of the First Amendment writings of Justice Breyer and Justice
Stevens. Similarly, the deferential reading of Grutter,though again not
wholly in line with the Court's generally categorical and institutionindifferent approach to the First Amendment, is consistent with some
of the Justices' prior academic freedom opinions. It may also present
a fit with a broader tendency on the Rehnquist Court to favor the
autonomy of civic associations.
The fit is decidedly an awkward one, to be sure, and it is ultimately hard to resist the conclusion that no Justice writing in Grutter
took seriously its First Amendment implications. The strongest likelihood is that the Court used the First Amendment both to buttress its
conclusions in Grutterand to limit the reach of this affirmative action
decision to educational institutions. Nonetheless, the Court's decision
to frame the case in First Amendment terms leaves those who would
seek to find (or to impose) a coherent shape on the Court's First
Amendment jurisprudence with the obligation to reexamine that jurisprudence with Grutter in mind. Moreover, the very fact that some
coherent tale can be told suggests something. It suggests that the
Court, or some of its individual members, is struggling to find some
9

46 McGinnis, supra note 27, at 495.
470Garnett,

supra note 457, at 1844, 1853.
further discussion of the relationship between Grutter'sFirst Amendment and
the public-private distinction, see infra notes 554-575 and accompanying text.
471 For
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new vision of the First Amendment--one that looses the self-imposed
bonds of a series of generally applicable rules, and instead trusts to
institutions themselves to shape their own, more context-sensitive
rules. That story of Grutter's First Amendment is told in Part III.
Im.

TAKING FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS SERIOUSLY

A. Introduction
Thus far, I have offered two different First Amendment readings
of Grutterv. Bollinger one emphasizing the importance of educational
institutional autonomy, regardless of the content of the academic
policies of the institution in question, and one that champions the
university in advancing a particular substantive vision of democracy.
Each, as we have seen, has its potential and its problems. The institutional autonomy reading of Grutter lets "a thousand flowers bloom,"
encouraging universities to experiment with different visions of education and academic freedom, but it also permits them to shape academic policies that some will find profoundly objectionable or inconsistent with the core values of academic freedom, university
education, or the Constitution itself. The substantive, democratic
reading of Grutter advances a vision of democratic education that
again will find many adherents in the academy. This is especially true
within the ranks of civic republicans and other scholars who have articulated a substantive vision of the role of the Constitution in encouraging participatory democracy. At the same time, it is hard to see
this latter approach as consistent with the broader body of First
Amendment jurisprudence, and it does not present a perfect fit with
visions of academic freedom prevalent outside the courts.
I have refrained from direct discussion of a third reading of Grutter's First Amendment-what we might call an institutional First
Amendment reading of Grutter-until now, although it bears a close
kinship with the institutional autonomy reading of Grutterand may be
gleaned by implication from the discussion that has preceded this
Part. 472 It will become clear that, although this vision of Grutter raises
the most troubling questions and must be much more fully fleshed

472 See e.g., Schauer, supra note 28 (titling his article Towards an Institutional First
Amendment). The phrase actually originates with Bruce C. Hafen. See generally Bruce C.
Hafen, Comment, Hazelwood School District and the Role of First Amendment Institutions,
1988 DUKE LJ. 685.
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out, I also believe it is the most promising reading of Grutter, one
which portends a sea change in First Amendment jurisprudence.
Before turning to that reading of Grutter, it is important to consider the current state of First Amendment jurisprudence. As Professor Schauer has observed, for the most part, the Supreme Court has
been "institutional [ly] agnostic[ ]" in its treatment of First Amendment issues. 473 Its general approach has been one of generality and

principle rather than specificity, narrowness, and policy on the
ground. 474 The Court has viewed the First Amendment through a lens
of "juridical categories," 475 in which all speakers and all factual situations, no matter how varied, are compressed into a series of narrow
legal questions. For example, what general category of speech is implicated here: incitement, commercial speech, pornography? What
kind of legal rule is implicated: content-neutral, viewpoint-specific, or
time, place, and manner restriction? Is the speaker public or private?
These questions sometimes overlap with questions of factual context,
but their contours are hardly the same and the nature of the inquiry
undertaken by the courts is entirely different. The nature of the
speaker, its role in society, the kinds of social or professional norms
that govern a particular kind of speech act even absent the specter of
legal proceedings-all these facts have been less important than the
conceptual cubbyhole into which the dispute must be placed once it
reaches the Court. In Justice Holmes's terms, the Court has thought
about words, not things. 476
This preference for rules over facts, this relative insensitivity to
the nature of the institutions before the courts, is evident throughout
the congeries of rules and principles that govern the law of the First
Amendment. A few examples will suffice to illuminate this point. Consider the role of the press in First Amendment law. As a general rule,
albeit with some exceptions, 477 the Court has rendered the Press
473 Schauer, supra note 32, at 120.

474 See id. at 119-20.
475 Id. at 119. See generally Frederick Schauer, Prediction and Particularity,78 B.U. L. REv.

773 (1998).
476 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HAv. L. REv.
443,460 (1899).
477 See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'n of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 577, 592-93 (1983) (striking down a use tax on the cost of paper and ink products
used in the production of periodicals). See generallyJon Paul Dilts, The Press Clause and Press
Behavior: Revisiting the Implications of Citizenship, 7 COMM. L. & POL'y 25, 27 (2002) (listing
other instances in which the press appears to have been granted a preferred status under
the Constitution); Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the FirstAmendment, 44
STAN. L. REV. 927 (1992).
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Clause of the First Amendment a virtual nullity, refusing to grant special privileges to the press or to treat media institutions differently
than it would any other speaker under the First Amendment. 478 Religious institutions have come in for similarly categorical, rule-oriented
treatment. Thus, a narrow majority of the Court has refused to grant
special accommodations under the Free Exercise Clause to religious
groups when they challenge neutral laws of general applicability,479
disdaining any approach that would require judges to "weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs." 4 0 As many critics have recognized, the Court's treatment of religion has traveled from a substantive concern with the distinctive role
of religious groups and practices to a less protective, but more generally applicable, fact-insensitive focus on formal neutrality. 48 1
That institution-indifferent approach is perhaps best captured,
however, by the Court's focus on content neutrality in free speech
cases. That approach employs a simple, broad taxonomy in evaluating
free speech claims, subjecting them to different levels of scrutiny depending on whether the speech restrictions at issue are contentneutral, content-based, or viewpoint-based. 48 2 As Professor Steven J.

478 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798-802 (1978) (Burger,
C.J., concurring); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 691-92 (1972); see also David Lange,
The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. REv. 77, 118-19 (1975); Anthony Lewis, A Preferred
PositionforJournalism?,7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 595, 605 (1979) ("No Supreme Court decision
has held or intimated that journalism has a preferred constitutional position.").
479See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-80, 890 (1990).
48 Id. at 890; see Douglas Laycock, Forma4 Substantive, and DisaggregatedNeutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. Rlv. 993, 1009 (1990) (stating that free exercise of religion after
Smith "now means that churches cannot be taxed or regulated any more heavily than General Motors"); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term: Foreword-TheJustices of
Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22, 84-86 (1992) (discussing Smith as an exemplar of
Justice Scalia's preference for strict rules over looser standards and balancing tests).
481 See, e.g., Alan Brownstein, Protecting Religious Liberty: The False Messiahs of Free Speech
Doctrine and FormalNeutrality, 18 J.L. & POL. 119, 186-213 (2002); Kent Greenawalt, Quo
Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REv. 323,
390 (noting a "movement [on the Court] away from robust interpretations of the two Religion Clauses, under which religion must be treated as special ... , and toward principles
of equal treatment and legislative discretion"); Frank S. Ravitch, A Funny Thing Happened
on the Way to Neutrality: Broad Principles, Formalism, and the Establishment Clause, 38 GA. L.
REv. 489, 498-544 (2004); Dhananjai Shivakumar, Neutrality and the Religion Clauses, 33
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 505,524-36 (1998).
4m See, e.g., Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Content Neutrality: Inconsistent Applications of an
IncreasinglyMalleableDoctrine, 29 McGEORGE L. REv. 69, 70 (1997). See generally Geoffrey R.
Stone, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1983).
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Heyman has observed, this approach "has become the cornerstone of
the Supreme Court's First Amendmentjurisprudence.48 3
The Court's attempt to craft a one-size-fits-all methodology of adjudicating free speech issues may have much to recommend it as a
general rule.484 If we are concerned about the potential for abuse inherent in allowing courts to weigh the costs and benefits of each
speech act according to a balance of their own devising, it makes perfect sense to constrain them through the application of general rules.
Rules protect us by precluding judges from adding irrelevant or illegitimate factors to the balance.
This approach, however, does carry its own risks.485 In particular,
it carries the risk that the Court, in attempting to shape actual disputes to fit the Procrustean bed of content neutrality or other generally applicable rules, will often miss the facts and policies that counsel
different approaches in different cases. This approach also risks missing what is distinctive about the varied circumstances of speech, and
about the particular institutions and practices that contribute to a full
and rich public discourse. Moreover, by maintaining a focus on what
is internal to law-on how different speech acts should be classified
according to different legal categories-it ignores the fact that, as we
have seen in our discussion of professional academic freedom, various
institutions have their own norms and practices. They have their own
methods of self-governance, and their own distinct contribution to
make to the greater good.
In short, an institution-insensitive approach to the First Amendment gains (some) clarity and predictability. It often, however, may
become unmoored from the particular practices and institutions that
make free speech so worthy of protection in the first place. It is simply
not true that a library is a university is a private speaker is a newspaper
is a religious community. Each acts distinctively; each serves a distinctive purpose; each governs itself distinctively according to its own
norms; and each makes a distinct contribution to the broader environment of free speech. Professor Post puts the point well:
First Amendment doctrine can recover its rightful role as an
instrument for the clarification and guidance of judicial de485 Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content Neutrality Doctrinein First
AmendmentJurisprudence 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTs.J. 647, 650 (2002).
4
See Schauer, supra note 32, at 119-20.
For a powerful discussion of these issues, see generally Frederick Schauer, Harry Kalven and thePerils ofParticularism,56 U. CHI. L. REv. 397 (1989) (reviewing HARRY KALVEN,JR.,
A WORTHY TRKADmTON: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988)).
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cisionmaking only if the court refashions its jurisprudence so
as to foster a lucid comprehension of the constitutional values implicit in discrete forms of social order. The Court must
reshape its doctrine so as to generate a perspicuous understanding of the necessary material and normative dimensions of these forms of social order and of the relationship of
speech to these values and dimensions.B. Grutter and FirstAmendment Institutions
This is where the third, final, and I argue, best reading of Grutter's
First Amendment comes in. What makes Grutter so important as a First
Amendment case is that, like few other cases in the First Amendment
jurisprudence, and more explicitly than most of those, it abandons the
usual posture of institutional indifference. In its conclusion that educational autonomy is a significant interest under the First Amendment,
and in its effort, however fraught and imperfect, to tie that interest to
a broader understanding of the value of universities, Grutter does not
simply look to generally applicable rules. It does not suggest that a
university is governed by precisely the same rules that apply to a normal employer, or a library, or a street-corner speaker. 487 Instead, it
adopts a constitutional approach to free speech that is highly sensitive
to the particular institutional character of the party before the Court.
It takes institutions seriously as First Amendment subjects.
Of the readings of Grutter we have canvassed so far, this is the
First Amendment reading of Grutterthat carries the greatest potential
implications and ought to spark the most interest and debate. By taking institutions seriously, Grutterpoints the way toward the possibility
that the Court's First Amendment approach could vary depending on
the nature of "local and specific kinds of social practices."4 88
4m Robert Post, RecuperatingFirst Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1249, 1280-81
(1995) (emphasis added).
487 Cf Gail Paulus Sorenson, The "PublicForum Doctrine" and Its Application in School and
Colkge Cases, 20J.L. & EDUc. 445, 445-46 (1991) (noting the difficulties courts have had
applying public forum doctrine to schools and colleges).
4m Post, supra note 486, at 1272. It should be evident by now that this Article owes a
significant intellectual debt to Professor Post's work, although it differs from that work in
its particular emphasis on First Amendment institutions rather than broader organizing
principles for social discourse, and in its desire to descend from theory to more immediate
operational concerns. For a more complete exposition of his vision of the First Amendment, focused not on First Amendment institutions but on different domains of social
order, see generally ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNrry, MANAGEMENT (1995). For a similar distinction between Professor Post's work and a
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Indeed, Grutter does not just suggest this approach, but exemplifies it. Consider the gulf between this case and other affirmative
action cases that the Court has decided in recent years. Nowhere has
the Court been as sympathetic to the practices and aims of the institution whose affirmative action policies were under attack as it is herenot when it dealt with a municipal employer,489 nor when it dealt with
the federal government itself as an employer.490 If the Court had
adopted the same approach in Grutter,it is quite likely the outcome
would have favored the plaintiffs, not the Law School.
The Court says in its death penalty jurisprudence that "death is
different," but one could also argue that to the Court, education is different. 491 Speaking of the Court's affirmative action cases, Professors
Akhil Reed Amar and Neal Kumar Katyal once observed that the
Court had said "a lot about contracting and rather little about education." 492 That observation is key to understanding this reading of Grutters First Amendment: it is a First Amendment that is sensitive to the
special character of particular institutions and particular social practices. It does so by singling out universities as having a special interest in
diversity sufficient to give them a compelling interest in race-conscious
policies, and by subjecting those policies to what any reasonable observer must conclude is a far more deferential level of scrutiny than
would apply to other institutions. As a result, Gruttertruly suggests that
not all institutions are equal under the First Amendment. 493
specifically institution-oriented approach to the First Amendment, see Schauer, supra note
32, at 21 n.88.
489See Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477-80, 493-94 (1989).
490See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204-06, 227 (1995) (addressing
policy favoring minority contractors under the Small Business Act). One notable exception
is Metro Broadcasting,Inc. v. FCC which upheld preferential treatment for racial minorities in
the grant of broadcast licenses. See generally 497 U.S. 547, 600 (1990). To the extent that
Metro Broadcasting relied on diversity in upholding the housing scheme in that case, and
applied a lower level of scrutiny to a federal program, it has been assumed widely to have
been curtailed, if not overruled, by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena. See, e.g., Arnold H.

Loewy, Taking Bakke Seriously: DistinguishingDiversityfrom Affirmative Action in the Law School
Admissions Process, 77 N.C. L. Riv. 1479, 1495 n.47 (1999). In any event, because that case
itself involved a First Amendment institution-broadcasters-it can be seen, if anything, as
supporting Grutterv. Bollinge's institution-sensitive approach to constitutional law.
491 See, e.g., Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 238 (1994).
492Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. Rv. 1745, 1746

(1996).
493For this reason, I doubt Grutter carries much significance for the future of affirmative
action programs outside the university. See generally Estund, supra note 403; Rebecca Hanner
White, Affirmative Action in the Workplace: The Significance of Grutter?, 92 Ky.L.J. 263 (2003-

2004); Joshua Wilkenfeld, Note, Newy Compelling: RaxaminingJudicialConstructionofJuries in the
Aftermath of Grutter v. Bollinger, 104 COLUM. L. Rlv. 2291 (2004). The Court of Appeals for
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At the same time, and unlike the educational autonomy and
democratic readings of Grutter offered above, which are only concerned with the special role of universities, the institution-sensitive
reading of Gruttercarries potential implications far beyond the ivory
tower. For where one institution has gone, others may try to follow.
Grutter may counsel other institutions-religious institutions, media
institutions, libraries, perhaps professionals, 494 and even other institutions-to seek from the Court the same recognition that they have
special roles to play in the social firmament and ought, perhaps, to be
treated according to special rules. If one takes Grutter seriously as a
First Amendment decision, as its language certainly permits, it may
provide ammunition for a broader effort to overturn an institutionally
agnostic, top-down approach to the First Amendment in favor of one
that builds from the ground up. This approach would construct First
Amendment doctrine in response to the actual functions and practices of particular social institutions. 495
As I have suggested, this approach is not wholly absent from the
Court's existing jurisprudence, although it is generally disfavored.
This understanding of Grutters First Amendment implications, however, ties the scattered exceptional cases together under the common
concept of taking First Amendment institutions seriously.
Thus, in the same week that it issued its opinion in Grutter, the
Court decided United States v. American Library Ass'n,496 holding that
Congress could validly require public libraries that receive federal funding to install filter software to block the receipt of obscene materials or
child pornography by library computer users. Pivotal to that decision
was that library users could request that the filters be disabled.4 9 7 For
present purposes, however, the result is less important than the Court's
reasoning. The Court began by asking why we value libraries, and how
they operate. 498 It began with the assumption that a crucial legal questhe Seventh Circuit, however, applied Grutterin holding that diversity in a large urban police

department is a compelling government interest in Petit v. City of Chicago. See 352 F.3d 1111,
1114 (7th Cir. 2003).
494 For an argument that the Supreme Court already treats professional speech according to different rules than it applies to other speakers, in an attempt to "preserve its particular social function," see Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, ProfessionalSpeech, and the
ConstitutionalStatus of Social Institutions,147 U. PA. L. REv. 771, 777 (1999).
4 See Philip Selznick, "Law in Context" Revisited 30J.L. & Soc'v 177, 181-82 (2003)
(arguing, in context of discussion of academic freedom, that law ought to recognize the
.requirements and dynamics" of particular social institutions).
496
See generally 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
49 See id. at 209.

4'* See id. at 203-06.

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 46:461

tion in determining the constitutionality of the law was whether libraries were left free to "fulfill their traditional missions." 499 Accordingly, it
held that libraries must be left with substantial discretion to exercise
their professional role of collecting, storing, and distributing information.500 With this institution-specific approach in mind, the Court rejected any attempt to shoehorn the library's practices into some juridical category like the "public forum."501
Similarly, Frederick Schauer and others have observed that the
Court has sometimes set aside traditional modes of analysis such as
public forum doctrine, when the government institution in question is
fulfilling the role of a traditional First Amendment institution and is
governed substantially by the norms and practices of that institution.
Thus, in Arkansas EducationalTelevision Commission v. Forbes,502 the Court,
in a seeming departure from traditional public forum analysis, based its
decision that a federally funded local broadcaster could exclude a candidate from a debate on the fact that the broadcaster was acting as a
professional journalist and exercising editorial discretion.5 03 Furthermore, in NationalEndowment for the Arts v. Finley,504 the Court held that
principles of content neutrality were inapplicable to the government
where it was acting as an arts funding body-an institutional role that
requires and presupposes the need to make content distinctions.
Grutter's First Amendment-an institution-sensitive First Amendment that defers to the practices of particular kinds of First Amendment actors-provides the link between these otherwise far-flung
cases. Viewed through a traditional First Amendment lens, Grutter and
the other cases involve widely different issues: content discrimination
doctrine, public forum doctrine, the constitutionality of affirmative
action. Nor are the facts particularly similar. In each case, however, the
Court confronted the practices of specific First Amendment institutions and recognized that traditional First Amendment doctrine would
not preserve the institutions' ability to "fulfill their traditional mis-

499 Id. at 204.
5

00 See id.

501 See Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 204-07; id. at 205 (noting that public forum prin-

ciples were "out of place in the context of this case"). See generally Sorenson, supra note 487
(noting similar difficulties in cases involving schools and colleges).
- 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
503 See id. at 672-74; see also Schauer, supranote 32, at 91 ("[1]n the end it is the institutional character of public broadcasting as broadcasting ... that appears to have determined the outcome of the case.").
-4 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
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sions."505 Faced with this dilemma, the Court allowed doctrine to give
way to reality.50 6
At this point, even someone who is convinced that there is something to this reading of Grutter is entitled to ask a few questions. How
does it work? What does it mean, precisely? Why should we scrap a
reasonable working set of doctrinal rules in favor of this reading of
Grutter if we do not yet know what rules that reading entails?
In offering a tentative answer to these questions, I am able to offer
something less than a complete blueprint, but something more than a
mere mood or sensibility.5 07 On this institution-oriented reading, Grutteds First Amendment entails at least the following principles.
First, and most obviously, the Court should recognize the special
importance to public discourse of particular First Amendment institutions. It is not yet clear how many such institutions there are, how to
resolve boundary disputes about whether a particular party falls within
this institutional framework (for example, is a blog "the press?"),508 and
whether the institutional turn I advocate here should cover a few important institutions or a large number. Regardless, some candidates are
obvious, both because of their own distinctiveness and because the
Court has already signaled its recognition of some of them: universities,
print and broadcast media organizations, religious groups, libraries,
and public schools.
Second, the Court should adopt a policy of substantial deference
to these organizations, as it did to the Law School in Grutter It should
do so both because of their distinctive importance to public discourse

5 Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. at 204.
506Cf Katyal, supra note 19, at 563 ("In short, Grutterrecognized a limited principle of
comparative academic expertise-a principle that is built on how the Court treats other
special institutions in American society.").
507
1am comforted by the fact that I am in distinguished company in this. See Schauer,
supra note 32, at 118, 119-20 (suggesting that both he and the Supreme Court have yet to
grapple fully with the implications of an institutionally sensitive approach to the First
Amendment); Schauer, supra note 28, at 27 ("I have not here attempted to say very much
about what an institutional approach to the First Amendment would look like ... ."); see

also Post, supra note 486, at 1281 (recognizing that his advice that the Court shape its doctrine in ways that are respectful of particular social practices is "rather abstract advice" that
.certainly will not assist the Court in settling any particular controversy"). Although this
Article cannot offer an equivalent of Professor Post's sophisticated theoretical analysis, I
hope it can advance some slightly more concrete suggestions about how to resolve particular controversies.
50

8 See generally, e.g., Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process ofJournalism
to Protect the Journalist'sPrivilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 Hous. L. REv. 1371

(2003).

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 46:461

and because (as discussed below) of the institutional norms that already serve to constrain them.5°9
Third, the boundaries of the Court's deference will involve two
different sorts of limitations. The first is the limitation acknowledged
by the Court in Grutter-a First Amendment institution is entitled to
deference "within constitutionally prescribed limits."510 At some point, a
First Amendment institution runs up against fundamental constitutional principles that simple deference cannot overcome. But this, I
want to suggest, is the less important limitation. After all, as Grutter
suggests, deference to First Amendment institutions may allow those
institutions to stretch, if not to break, otherwise applicable constitutional rules. Surely this explains the Law School's ability to overcome
what the Court at least nominally labeled "strict scrutiny" so easily.
Indeed, what Grutter's First Amendment ultimately suggests is that, by
allowing First Amendment institutions room to experiment with different means of carrying out their institutional missions, the Court
really is allowing those institutions to help shape constitutional law
outside the courts.5 1'
Fourth, the Constitution, then, does not provide the primary
constraint on First Amendment institutions. What does? The answer is
the institution itself. Taking First Amendment institutions seriously
entails recognizing, far more than current First Amendment jurisprudence does, that these institutions are defined and constrained by
their own institutional culture.5 12 Universities, newspapers, religious
groups-all these institutions live by their own norms and practices,
which are often highly detailed and rigid. All of them also have
means-dismissal, expulsion, denial of tenure-of enforcing those
norms. The most powerful method of enforcement, however, is not
the prospect of formal discipline but the simple fact that members of
5w For detailed discussion on this point, see POST, supra note 488, at
510 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (emphasis added).

257-65.

511 Professor Post provides a useful discussion of the interrelationship between constitutional law inside the courts and constitutional culture outside the courts. See Post, supra
note 486, at 1270-81; see also Nagel, supra note 236, at 1535-36 (arguing that Gruttes acceptance of the Law School's admissions policies, despite the Supreme Court's past declarations suggesting that such race-specific decision making violated the Constitution, might
best be seen as a recognition that the Constitution is both a "legal document" and "a set of
political practices and understandings," and that it allows for "an aspect of constitutional
self-definition that is inherently political and cultural").
512Cf Post, supra note 486, at 1273 ('The most general objection to any single free
speech principle is that speech makes possible a world of complex and diverse social practices precisely because it becomes integrated into and constitutive of these different practices; it therefore assumes the diverse constitutional values of these distinct practices.").
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institutions operate within the norms of those institutions, internalizing the culture of an institution as their own ethos and observing its
rules because they wish to do so. 5 15 Thus, the most powerful con-

straints on the behavior of First Amendment institutions are the constraints that come from the institutions themselves. In judging the nature and scope of a First Amendment institution's liberty to act, the
Court thus should begin, as it did in American Library Ass'n, by applying the norms and values of the institution itself. This is why the
Court's deference in Grutter stemmed from the fact that the Law
School was acting according to a legitimate "academic decision [ ]."514
Fifth, if the Court is to set the boundaries of deference to First
Amendment institutions according to the practices of those institutions themselves, it must also recognize that those boundaries are
constantly shifting and changing. Institutional norms are not fixed.
They change and evolve as institutions do. It once would have been
unthinkable for an elite university to shift its admissions standards for
the sake of racial and ethnic diversity-just as it once would have been
unthinkable for many of the same select institutions to apply admissions standards to achieve absolute meritocracy without regard to
race, ethnicity, or class. Thus, in determining the bounds within
which First Amendment institutions are entitled to substantial constitutional deference, the Court should be responsive to shifts in institutional norms and practices over time. We have already seen that one
possible criticism of Grutter,and of other academic freedom decisions
issued by the Court, is that they fail to realize that the concept of professional academic freedom was itself a fluid one. This does not present an insuperable dilemma, by any means; in other contexts, courts
are experienced at taking evidence on and deciding cases according
to the evolving customary practice of an industry.5 15 But the Court
should be aware of the issue; it should not rush to enshrine a particular institutional norm as a fixed constitutional standard.
Finally-and this admittedly is more of a mood than a principle-taking First Amendment institutions seriously entails the recognition that constitutional law is not simply a creature of the courts. It
51

3 For discussion, see generally, for example, Alex Geisinger, A Group Identity Theory of
Social Norms and Its Implications, 78 TUL. L. REv. 605 (2004); Richard H. McAdams, Group
Norms, Gossip, and Blackmai 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2237 (1996); W. Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal
Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social Norms in Professional Communities, 54 VAND. L. REv.

1955 (2001).

514 Grutter,539 U.S. at 328.
515Cf Schauer, supra note 28, at 5-6, 9-10, 13-14.
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is the product of a constantly shifting, negotiated relationship between a variety of parties and values: the courts' own understanding of
constitutional law, their understanding of the values and norms of
institutions in the "real world" outside the courts, the institutions'
own understanding of their norms and values, and the institutions'
understanding of their role within the broader constitutional structure. In Professor Post's terms, it is a constant negotiation between
constitutional law and constitutional culture.
This negotiation takes place on both sides: just as courts are constantly adjusting their understanding of constitutional doctrine to
take account of real-world social practices, so too are institutions constantly reevaluating their own norms according to their sense of the
boundaries of the Constitution. So, for instance, universities' understanding of academic freedom has been influenced over time both by
professional debate over the concept and by the changing constitutional landscape. In short, one reason for courts to defer to First
Amendment institutions is because this does not represent constitutional abdication. Instead, it represents a more sophisticated understanding of the degree to which First Amendment institutions already
internalize constitutional values, and the extent to which they help
shape constitutional values in turn.
This is decidedly still less than a blueprint. But Grutter and the
other cases discussed above have already gone some of the distance
toward giving us more concrete standards. At bottom, the basic understanding of what it means to take First Amendment institutions
seriously is hardly mysterious. It means refusing to believe that one
size fits all in constitutional doctrine. It means requiring the courts to
defer substantially to decisions made by important First Amendment
institutions within the shifting domain of their own institutional values. And, at a more abstract but wholly fundamental level, it entails
the courts' own recognition that they have a central role to play, but a
shared role, in shaping our constitutional culture.
C. DemocraticExperimentalism, Reflexive Law, and Grutter's
FirstAmendment
I have already argued that the institution-sensitive approach to
the First Amendment I have drawn from Grutter is echoed elsewhere
in the Court's existing jurisprudence, if dimly and imperfectly. Here, I
want to suggest briefly that it also finds echoes in a number of recent
academic approaches to constitutional law. I will focus on two recent
arguments that have been made for a more flexible, decentralized
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approach to constitutional law that relies substantially on the subjects
of constitutional law to shape their own norms and practices and yet
that continues to ensure an important role for the courts.
The first such argument has been made by a number of scholars,
prominently including, but not limited to, Professors Michael C. Dorf
and Charles F. Sabel, who have advocated "a new model of institutionalized democratic deliberation that responds to the conditions of
modern life." 16 Under this approach, which is only briefly sketched
here, courts would accord a variety of local institutions substantial latitude "for experimental elaboration and revision [of their activities] to
accommodate varied and changing circumstances." 517 At the same
time, courts would monitor these institutions to ensure that they met
basic standards of legality and did not infringe individual rights. 518

Perhaps most importantly, experimentalist institutions would provide
information about the relative success or failure of their projects. This
in turn would inform both other institutions engaged in similar practices and the courts themselves, gradually shaping the courts' own
sense of the outer boundaries of permissible experimentation. 519
Thus, the courts would be cast in the role of coordinating authority.
They would allow a web of local players to develop ways of addressing
a particular policy issue-for example, nuclear safety, environmental
regulation, or the treatment of drug criminals 520 -while establishing a
rolling set of benchmarks for "best practices" that flow up from the
local experimenters rather than down from a court or regulator.52'
Although the value of democratic experimentalism perhaps can be
seen best in areas such as administrative law or public policy, rather
than in straight conflicts over rights, the experimentalist school con516 Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of DemocraticExperimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 267, 283 (1998); see Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional
Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 875, 885 n.29 (2003) (citing examples of scholarship exploring
these ideas); cf Guido Calabresi, An Introduction to Legal Thought: FourApproaches to Law and
to the Alocation of Body Parts,55 STAN. L. REv. 2113, 2125 n.50 (2003) (describing this approach as the "Columbia School" of thought). For a recent critical but supportive evaluation of democratic experimentalism, see generally Jamison E. Colburn, "DemocraticExperimentalism": A Separation of Powers for Our Time, 37 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 287 (2004). See also
William E. Scheuerman, Democratic Experimentalism or Capitalist Synchronization? Critical
Reflections onDirectly-DeliberativePolyarhy,
17 CAN.J.L. &JURIS. 101 (2004).

517 Dorf& Sabel, supra note 516, at 283.
518 See id. at 288.

519 See id.
520 See, e.g., id. at 371-88; Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and
EmergentExperimentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REv. 831, 831-36 (2000).
521 See Colburn, supra note 516, at 289.
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tends that here, too, courts can act in a way that "call[s] into existence a
system of experimentation" rather than simply "laying down specific
rules. 522 In these cases, particularly when a debate over constitutional
rights and duties poses questions of judicial competence arising either
from the moral complexity or the factual complexity of the situation, a
court can decide not to decide too much.5 23 It instead can lay down a
general standard that could be met in a variety of ways, and so "devolv[e] deliberate authority for fully specifying norms to local actors."524
For example, in the field of sexual harassment-a statutory regime, albeit one with broader, quasi-constitutional aspects and implications 525 -the Supreme Court has refused to lay down categorical
rules governing workplace behavior. It instead has recognized the
"constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and
relationships" in the workplace that render a concrete rule beyond the
Court's competence. 526 Accordingly, by establishing a safe harbor for
employers that take reasonable care to avoid and to remedy harassment,5 27 the Court has cast lower courts "in the role of monitoring
employers' monitoring of their workplaces," 528 while allowing employers to shape a variety of responses to the problem of workplace
sexual harassment.52 9 In turn, we may expect a set of "best practices"
to emerge as different policies are shown to be effective or ineffective
in addressing the problem. Thus, rather than making itself a central
rights-giver in this area, the Court has tasked local actors with the
primary responsibility for crafting solutions while maintaining a
monitoring and coordinating role.
A similar set of proposals is captured broadly by the overlapping
concepts of "reflexive" or "autopoietic" law.5 30 In short, reflexive law is
522

Dorf, supra note 516, at 961; see Dorf & Sabel, supra note 516, at 444-69.

Dorf, supra note 516, at 886 (noting that experimentalist courts resolve difficult
problems by "giv[ing] deliberately incomplete answers"); cf Horwitz, supra note 122, at
120-25 (arguing that courts, particularly in the early stages of a developing and uncertain
area of constitutional law, should issue minimalist opinions rather than attempt to cover
the doctrinal field too quickly). My argument in that article was based on concerns about
relationships between courts, and did not discuss the role of extralegal actors.
52
4 Dorf, supranote 516, at 978.
525 See id. at 961.
52
6 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998).
527 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805 (1998).
5 28
Dorf, supra note 516, at 963.
52 See Susan Sturm, Second GenerationEmploryment Discrimination:A StructuralApproach,
101 COLUM. L. REv. 458, 480-89 (2001).
530 See generalJEAN L. COHEN, REGULATING INTIMAcy: A NEW LEGAL PARADIGM (2002);
GUNTHER TEUBNER, LAW AS AN ATrroPofTc SYsTM (1993); Gunther Teubner, Substantive
and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAw & Soc'y Rv. 256 (1983). For a related ap523
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"regulation of regulation." 5s1 It advocates the abandonment, in at least
some cases, of command-and-control regulation in favor of a regulatory
model that "set[s] a general standard to govern self-regulation by the
affected actors. "5s2 As noted above, the Court's approach to sexual harassment law is an example of a reflexive regulatory strategy.
Similarly and relatedly, autopoietic theories of law begin with the
presumption that society consists of a series of subsystems, such as
politics, education, and the legal system, 533 each of which operates
according to its own internal and self-referential norms, and each of
which interacts only imperfectly with other subsystems.53 4 Given these
boundary issues, the best way to regulate is not by direct regulation,
but by "specifying procedures and basic organizational norms geared
towards fostering self-regulation within distinct spheres of social activity."53 5 The autopoietic approach requires that local actors observe

certain "basic procedural and organizational norms," but beyond that,
it gives substantial autonomy to those actors to craft their own substantive programs. 53 6 The goal, ultimately, is to find a way to encour-

age local actors to internalize basic norms of self-regulation within the
norms of their own subsystems.5 3 7
The relationship between these approaches and the institutionsensitive approach to the First Amendment that I have argued forms
Grutter's First Amendment should be clear by now.53 8 Each approach

begins from a presumption that local actors and local institutions
should (and, according to autopoietic theory, must) have an important role to play in shaping even fundamental public policies. Each
proceeds from the assumption that imposing general rules from
above is doomed to result in suboptimal decisions, and that there
proach, see generally PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCiET IN TRANSION:

TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW (1978). In describing this complex approach, however briefly, I am
all too aware that "its conceptual architecture is forbidding enough to discourage casual visitors." Hugh Baxter, Autopoiesis and the "RelativeAutonomy" of Law, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 1987,
2083 (1998). I acknowledge the warning, but nevertheless will treat reflexive law and autopoiesis as substantially overlapping approaches, notwithstanding important differences between the two theories that are not of concern in this Article.
531 Michael C. Dorf, The Domain of Reflexive Law, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 384, 391 (2003).
532 Id. at 393.

533 See Baxter, supra note 530, at 1993-94.
53 See Schauer, supra note 28, at 5.

ss William E. Scheuerman, Reflexive Law and the Challenges of Globalization,9J. POL. PHIL.
81,84 (2001).
536 Id.
537 See id.
538

The relationship between democratic experimentalism and reflexive law should be

evident by now. See Dorf, supra note 531, at 386 (acknowledging the similarity).
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should instead be a symbiotic, evolving relationship between the
norms of local actors and the norms adopted by central regulatory
authorities. Each also assumes that the best way to achieve this goal is
to cast the central regulatory authority-here, the courts-in a coordinating role, in which it polices the outer boundaries of acceptable
practice while allowing local actors substantially to craft their own
policies. In turn, each actor-local and central-will learn from and
influence the other.
There are important differences, of course. Crucial to Professor
Dorf's experimentalist project, for instance, is the demand that local
institutions "justify the deference they demand by producing a record
of performance that can withstand comparative assessments." 5 9 By
contrast, the institution-sensitive approach to the First Amendment
that I have advocated nowhere expressly provides for feedback to the
courts or to similar institutions. Its central feature is deference tout
court, without any formal program for monitoring or benchmarking.
Deference is not, in and of itself, experimentation, nor is it necessarily
reflexive in nature.
One should not, however, make too much of the distinction. For
as I have argued, and as Professor Post has convincingly shown,540 the
boundaries between constitutional law and constitutional culture as
understood outside the courts already are constantly blurred. Although the institution-sensitive reading of Grutter described in this
Part relies primarily on deference to First Amendment institutions, it
is to be expected in the nature of things that those institutions will
incorporate basic constitutional norms into their own understanding
of themselves as functioning institutions. The courts, in turn, will incorporate their understanding of the shifting nature of the cultural
norms and practices of First Amendment institutions into constitutional law as they police the shifting boundaries of constitutionally
permissible deference. Indeed, the requirement that courts, in setting
and policing those boundaries, pay attention to both basic constitutional norms and basic institutional practices suggests a fundamentally experimentalist, or reflexive, approach. This approach is one in
which the courts lay down a general procedural requirement-for
example, is this a legitimate academic decision, 541 or is this task properly within the role of a library,542 or is this an exercise of professional
53

9 Dorf, supra note 516, at 981; see Colburn, supra note 516, at 289.

540 See generally Post, supra note 306.
541
5

See Grutter,539 U.S. at 329.

4 See Am. LibraryAss'n, 539 U.S. at 203-04.
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journalistic discretion?543 -- while permitting the institutions substantial latitude to operate within these minimal standards.
Of course, that these approaches are similar does not validate the
institution-sensitive reading of Grutters First Amendment, any more
than my reading of Grutter can validate experimentalist or reflexive
theories of law. Rather, these familial resemblances suggest two things.
First, they suggest that the idea of taking First Amendment institutions seriously is no mere frolic. It has substantial roots in a common
set of approaches to constitutional law. If that does not lend it legitimacy, it at least suggests-particularly when coupled with the fact that
the Court has in fact adopted this approach on several occasions,
most prominently in Grutter-that it is a viable, credible approach.
Second, it suggests a common complaint. Legal doctrine needs to
be sufficiently abstract in order to constrain those who make decisions
under its banner, and to cover a variety of factual situations without
descending into unfettered discretion and judicial usurpation. At the
same time, the tendency toward generally applicable rules of law, at
least in the First Amendment arena, moves the courts in a direction
that ultimately deprives them of the ability to give due regard to the
varied social systems in which speech acts actually take place. 544 If it no

longer makes sense to fit all cases on the rack of content neutrality or
other generally applicable First Amendment doctrines, we need a new
approach before those doctrines become incoherent. A new balance
must be struck. Taking First Amendment institutions seriously is one
means of striking a new bargain between the courts and the First
Amendment institutions that they oversee.
D. Questions and Implications, with a Digressionon State Action
This Part has argued for a reading of Grutters First Amendment
that focuses on the importance of taking so-called First Amendment
institutions seriously. It has suggested that courts should recognize the
important role that First Amendment institutions play as loci for, and
definers of, public discourse. It has advocated that courts grant these
institutions substantial deference to govern themselves, subject to
generous constitutional limits and to procedural and substantive requirements drawn from the norms and practices of the institutions
543 See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 666.
54 Cf Dorf, supra note 516, at 883-84 (noting that laws are intentionally vague be-

cause of the impossibility of foreseeing every possible contingency). See generally Post, supra
note 486 (arguing that the Supreme Court must pay attention to social realities).
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themselves. Finally, it has noted a close kinship between this reading
of Grutter and similar projects aiming to encourage the courts to take
a more generous role in allowing local actors to experiment for themselves in shaping their own practices and in working toward the resolution of pressing social issues.
What questions does this approach raise? What implications does
it carry with it? Looking forward, what can we say about the prospects
and consequences for an approach that advocates taking First
Amendment institutions seriously? Looking backward, how well does
Grutteritself fulfill the desiderata for an institution-sensitive approach
to constitutional law?
It may be too early to make too settled a pronouncement about
these questions. But at least three significant points are worth making.
First, as argued above, Grutteris not about university education alone.
It speaks to the possibility of deference to a potentially wide range of
other institutions that play an equally important role in our system of
public discourse: religious institutions, media institutions, libraries,
the professions, arts funding authorities, and perhaps still other institutional actors.
The Court, of course, might reject those arguments out of hand.
If so, it would lend further credence to the idea that Grutter,like Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, is nothing more than a
.sport" as a First Amendment decision: "a chimera of a doctrine,
affirmed only for that day, to provide an acceptable ground on which
... [to] preserve affirmative action," and not truly a statement of First
Amendment principles after all. 545 This Article should make clear,

however, that, whatever the Court's motives in arming itself with the
First Amendment in Grutter may have been, the case is far from a
mere sport. The Court has taken a broadly similar approach in recent
years in examining government broadcasters, arts funders, and public
libraries. It has wanted only a theory to justify its departure from setfled First Amendment doctrine, the language with which to do so, and
a set of rules by which to chart its course. Drawing on Grutter,this Article has sought to provide the Court with the tools it needs.
Second, this approach is not necessarily a charter of rights for institutions-even institutions, such as the press, that manage to find special recognition by name in the First Amendment. Nor is it an opportunity for the Court simply to surrender its own judgment absolutely to
the "complex judgments" of particular favored institutions under the
55 Byrne, supra note 17, at 320.
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First Amendment. It is, in short, neither a brief in favor of absolute license for First Amendment institutions, nor an argument in favor of
judicial abdication in favor of these institutions. To the contrary, in
some instances an institution-sensitive approach to the First Amendment may limit the freedom to act of First Amendment institutions.
And in some cases, an institutional approach to the First Amendment
may impose greaterduties on the courts that oversee them.
As is evident in Grutteritself, an institution-sensitive approach to
the First Amendment may favor granting greater rights to those institutions in some cases. For example, under the educational autonomy
reading of Grutter,which is consistent with the argument in this Part,
universities may be permitted greater latitude than other institutions
to craft and to enforce campus speech codes. In other cases, the special social obligations of a particular institution may give it less latitude
to speak than a private individual might possess.546 No one demands
that the proverbial soap-box speaker limit himself to a particular subject. No university department should hesitate, however, to require a
university lecturer to confine himself or herself to the subject at hand
and to refrain from taking a chemistry lecture as an occasion to talk
about neoliberalism. A court would hesitate long and hard before enforcing a seemingly gratuitous "contract" without clear promises or
consideration on either side, but it might be more willing to find a
legally enforceable contract where the agreement takes place within
the journalist's professional norm of honoring the confidentiality of
sources. 547 In short, if the gift of taking First Amendment institutions
seriously is that those institutions have substantial latitude to live by
their own norms, the cost of taking them seriously is that they may be
held accountable for failing to live up to those norms.
The posture of deference that I have described above thus does
not utterly liberate the courts from the obligation to give cases involving First Amendment institutions serious consideration. As the democratic experimentalists have observed, liberty to experiment means
little without careful monitoring. If the courts are to defer to First
Amendment institutions based substantially on their compliance with
their own norms, values, and practices, they will have to educate
themselves far more carefully about the shifting content of those
norms, values, and practices. In each case, as Frederick Schauer observes, the Court will be required to "inquire much more deeply into
t6

547

Schauer, supra note 32, at 116 n.149.
SeegeneraUy Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
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the specific character of the institution, and the function it serves,
than it has [so far] been willing to do."54 8
Looking back now at Grutter from that perspective, it is far from
clear that the Court did a proper job of taking seriously the First
Amendment institution at issue there: a university or a professional
department within a university. Its discussion of the social role of universities, although more complete and sophisticated than much of the
discussion the Court has offered in prior cases, still exists at a high
level of generality. The decision contains no indication of how or
whether the university's democratic function, as the Court describes
it, coexists with its truth-seeking function, or with still other social
roles served by the university-and thus whether the social value of
race-conscious admissions programs conflicts with the social value of
any other functions served by the university. Similarly, Gruttercontains
no indication of whether the Court believes all higher education institutions serve, or ought to serve, roughly the same purposes, or
whether there is room for as many conceptions of academic freedom
as there are different kinds of higher educational institutions.
There are still further problems, less important for situations like
Grutter that involve admissions decisions, but with great implications
for future academic freedom cases. Grutter contains no discussion
about the norms of professional responsibility that play such a large
role in discussions about the scope of professional academic freedom.5 49 It is difficult to defer to an educational institution on the basis
that it is acting according to a legitimate academic decision without
some understanding of precisely what constitutes a legitimate academic decision. What if the decision to engage in seemingly preferential admissions had been arrived at by a professional university administrator without faculty input? What if it had been imposed on the
university administration by the board of governors? What if it was a
result of coercion by some outside group, such as the AAUP or the
AALS? None of these questions are answered in the case.
Nor does Grutterdiscuss the implications of an institution-specific
approach to academic freedom for other constituents in campus
life-most notably, professors and students. As the discussion above
indicates, that omission leaves room for a variety of potential implications for student speech, admissions policies, and other matters. What
5

48 Schauer, supra note 32, at 116.
549 See Metzger, supra note 81, at 13 (describing the "notion that rights entail responsi-

bilities, that academic freedom should be wedded to conscientious conduct, and all the
other classic maxims of professionalism" in the academy).
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Gruttermeans for a university's freedom to shape its policies with respect to religious speech, hate speech, on-campus recruiting, and
other issues has much to do not only with the university administration, but also with the other stakeholders involved. If universities are a
special creature of the First Amendment, that still begs the questions
who gets to be counted as a member of the university community, and
what it means to be a member of that community. These disputes between component parts of the university community-tenure disputes, disciplinary appeals, disputes over campus rules and regulations-are precisely the sorts of academic freedom issues that arise
most often in the courts. Yet Grutter has nothing to say about them.
Nor, given the context of the case, does it fully acknowledge that, under professional understandings of academic freedom, those rights
carry significant responsibilities. 55 0 Under an institution-sensitive approach to the First Amendment, a professor, in fact, might have far
fewer speech rights than other citizens. 551
Perhaps, then, Professor Guinier is right to see in Grutter the opportunity for further public discussion concerning "more foundational concerns about the democratic purpose of higher education." 552 If Grutter truly presages a more institution-specific approach
to the First Amendment, it certainly suggests that the Court will have
much more careful work to do to elaborate the nature and scope of
its approach and to tie that approach closely to the particular functions and norms of different institutions. There is, indeed, a need for
further and more careful discussion.
In any event, whether the Court continues to stick to its generally
neutral approach to particular speakers under the First Amendment
or begins to pay more careful attention to speech acts by particular
institutions, Gruttefs significance as a First Amendment decision
should be clear. If it is true that "American free speech doctrine has
never been comfortable distinguishing among institutions," 553 then
Grutterrepresents a rare exception. Whether it is in fact a forerunner
of similar approaches where other institutions are concerned, or simply the exception that proves the rule, remains to be seen.
One last question must be addressed. Thus far, I have bracketed
the distinction between public universities, such as the University of
Michigan, and private universities. There is, however, a crucial distinc550 See generally Metzger, Profession and Constitution, supra note 46; Metzger, supra note 81.
551See generaUy Rabban, Faculty Autonomy, supra note 46.
552 Guinier, supra note 411, at 120.
553 Schauer, supra note 32, at 84.
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tion between them: each lies on a different side of the public/private
divide. Indeed, Grutter took on its constitutional character precisely
because it involved a public university. It is widely recognized that,
under current constitutional doctrine, private universities enjoy a far
broader scope of freedom than public universities. 5 54 What role, if
any, should this distinction play in taking First Amendment institutions seriously? How important is it?
For a number of reasons, I want to suggest that the distinction is
less important than it may seem initially. First, the legal landscape is
far less clear in drawing a firm line between public and private universities than one might assume based on standard state action doctrine.
This is so even if one sets aside arguments that private universities are
entitled to be viewed as state actors because they fulfill a public function, receive significant public funding, or are intertwined with the
affairs of the government.55 5 It remains true even if one ignores the
web of quasi-constitutional civil rights laws and other statutory requirements that may place public and private universities under many
of the same obligations. 556 The reason the public-private distinction
may be less important in this context stems from state law, not federal
state action doctrine.
State law provides two reasons why it may make less sense to treat
private universities as utterly distinct from public universities in their
obligations to observe norms of free speech. First, a number of courts
have held that private universities must honor at least some free
speech norms under state constitutions or statutes. Thus, in the seminal 1980 case of State v. Schmid,557 the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the conviction of a non-student for distributing leaflets without
permission on the campus of Princeton University. To support its
holding, the court relied on a then-recent U.S. Supreme Court case
acknowledging that state constitutions could sweep more broadly in
protecting free speech, even in the absence of state action. 558 Analo554 See, e.g., Byrne, supra note 17, at 299-300; see also Michael A. Olivas, Reflections on
ProfessorialAcademic Freedom: Second Thoughts on the Third "EssentialFreedom," 45 STAN. L.
REV. 1835, 1836-37 (1993); Evan G.S. Siegel, Comment, Closing the Campus Gates to Free

Expression: The Regulation of Offensive Speech at Colleges and Universities, 39 EMORY L.J. 1351,
1381 (1990). See generally HENRY J. FRIENDLY, THE DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PENUMBRA (1969).
55 For an examination of these arguments, see Siegel, supra note 554, at 1382-87.
556 See generally Ellen E. Lange, Note, Racist Speech on Campus: A Title VII Solution to a
FirstAmendment Problem, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 105 (1990).
557 423 A.2d 615, 616, 633 (NJ. 1980).
558 See PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 80-81, 85-88 (1980).
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gizing to this precedent, the court held that the state's constitutional
protection of free speech could reach "unreasonably restrictive or oppressive conduct on the part of private entities that have otherwise
assumed a constitutional obligation not to abridge the individual exercise of such freedoms because of the public use of their property. "5 9
Although this willingness on the part of state courts to reach private action under state constitutional free speech provisions is decidedly in the minority,5 60 New Jersey was not alone in this approach. 561
State courts might also be more willing to apply their states' constitutional free speech provisions to private colleges and universities than
to the shopping malls and other private actors that normally figure in
these cases. Other states, building on this foundation, thus have enacted statutes attempting to guarantee that at least some of the players
in the academic community enjoy free speech rights on private campuses. 562 Thus, under state law, some free speech arguments may be
available to students even on private campuses.
If this discussion suggests that students may not be entirely differently situated depending on whether they attend a public or private
institution, what of the institutions themselves? If they are not arms of
the state, why should they be in the same position as public universities? Here, too, the state constitutional landscape goes some of the
way toward narrowing the gap between public and private universities.
Most state constitutions grant their public universities some degree of
independent constitutional status.

563

Michigan, to take an example

close to the heart of Grutter,states in its constitution that the Board of
Regents of the University of Michigan has "general supervision of the
institution and the control and direction of all expenditures from the
-19 See Schmid, 423 A.2d at 628. For commentary, see Finkin, supra note 143; Comment,
Testing the Limits of Academic Freedom, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 712, 712-18 (1982).
560Se 1JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 9-3, at 9-16 to 9-22 (3d ed. 2000).

-"' See Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382, 1387-91 (Pa. 1981) (applying state free
speech provision to Muhlenberg College, a private institution).
562 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367 (West 2002 & Supp. 2005); Arthur L. Coleman &
Jonathan R. Alger, Beyond Speech Codes: Harmonizing Rights of Free Speech and Freedom from
Discriminationon University Campuses, 23 J.C. & U.L. 91, 93 n.6 (1996). Whether such statutes are themselves constitutional, however, is an open question. See Byrne, supra note 20,
at 174 n.171.
563 See, e.g., John A. Beach, The Management and Governance of Academic Institutions, 12
J.C. & U.L. 301, 310 n.34 (1985);Joseph Beckham, ReasonableIndependencefor PublicEducation: Legal Implications of Constitutionally Autonomous Status, 7 J.L. & EDUC. 177, 179-82
(1978); Kathy L. Wyer, Comment & Note, A Most DangerousExperiment? University Autonomy,
Academic Freedom, and the Concealed-Weapons Controversy at the University of Utah, 2003 UTAH

L. REv. 983, 1001 & nn.88-90.
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institution's funds."564 This provision has been interpreted as granting
the university a general right against state interference in academic
affairs. 565 Thus, public universities are already in an odd position with
respect to state action doctrine-part of the state for some constitutional purposes, but separate from it for others.56 6 As Professor Byrne
notes, "[a] state university is a unique state entity in that it enjoys federal constitutional rights against the state itself. "567
These unusual features of state law suggest that the public-private
distinction is in some ways less important than outside observers
might assume. I want to suggest, however, two additional reasons,
linked less to existing law than to the potential of Grutter's First
Amendment, why the public-private distinction does not present a
significant factor in taking First Amendment institutions seriously, at
least with respect to universities. First, concerns about the publicprivate distinction in the university context normally concern the opposite problem. They involve questions of whether stakeholders within
the private university community, such as professors or students, enjoy
fewer rights than do their counterparts at public universities. 568 Here,
however, I have suggested that Grutters reading of the First Amendment guarantees academic institutions as a whole a substantial right of
autonomy from governmental interference. Thus, Grutter's First
Amendment does not require us to transport First Amendment norms
to the private sector, a phenomenon whose problems were so richly

56' MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 5. For discussion of the effect this fact might have had on
the Grutterlitigation, see Evan Caminker, A Glimpse Behind and Beyond Grutter, 48 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 889, 892-93 (2004).
5' See Byrne, supra note 17, at 327.
566 In some senses, public universities thus resemble quasi-autonomous nongovernmental institutions, or quangos. See, e.g., Lili Levi, Professionalism, Oversight, and InstitutionBalancing: The Supreme Court's "Second Best" Planfor PoliticalDebate on Television, 18 YALE J.
ON REG. 315, 363-79 (2001); Craig Alford Masback, Independence vs. Accountability: Correcting the StructuralDefects in the NationalEndowment for the Arts, 10 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 177,
183-92 (1992); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilitiesof Comparative ConstitutionalLaw, 108 YALE
L.J. 1225, 1257-64 (1999). See generallySANDRA VAN ThIEL, QUANGOS: TRENDS, CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES (2001). The implications of this similarity are discussed in infra notes 570573 and accompanying text.
567 Byrne, supra note 17, at 300; see Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 943 n.25 (5th Cir.
1996) ('Saying that a university has a First Amendment interest in [academic freedom] is
somewhat troubling. Both the medical school in Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke
and, in our case, the law school are state institutions. The First Amendment generally protects citizens from the actions of government, not government from its citizens.").
568 See, e.g., Olivas, supra note 554, at 1836-37.
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discussed by Julian Eule,5 69 but to incorporate private sector norms
into the First Amendment. What implications this trend might have
for student and faculty rights are, as I noted above, unclear at this
point. For now, what is clear is that taking First Amendment institutions seriously demands giving public universities more freedom from
government interference, and so brings the legal status of private and
public universities closer together.
Second, as I have argued, taking First Amendment institutions
seriously demands that we take them seriously as institutions. This
point is particularly clear where the institution, like the Law School, is
a public one, which might be judged according to the standards generally applicable to other state actors or which might be judged according to the purposes and norms of the particular kind of institution it happens to be. 570 Ultimately, it mattered less to the Supreme
Court in Grutter that the Law School was a public institution, although
that fact brought the case within the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court certainly did not treat the Law School as occupying a precisely similar position when considering affirmative action policies as any other government actor would. Rather, what mattered to the court was the nature of the institution. It was a university,
engaged in legitimate academic decision making. That fact insulated
it considerably from the rigors of constitutional strict scrutiny.
This approach need not be, and is not, limited to universities
alone. As we have seen, when it came time to apply standard public
forum doctrine to another "government" actor-the Arkansas public
broadcaster in Forbes---the Court balked. It instead preferred to focus
on the institutional aspects and professional norms of the entity qua
media organization. 571 Again, what mattered to the Court was the institutional status of the government entity rather than its public status.
In short, when we take First Amendment institutions seriously, it
is less important to ask whether a particular institution is public or
private. Instead, we should be asking whether a particular institution,
be it public or private, is "the university," or "the newspaper," or some
other category of speaker. 572 Regardless of their public or private
569 See genera!/yJulian N. Eule & Jonathan D. Varat, TransportingFirstAmendment Norms
to the PrivateSector: With Every Wish There Comes a Curse,45 UCLA L. REv. 1537 (1998).
570See Schauer, supranote 32, at 116.
571 SeeForbes, 523 U.S. at 672-75.
57 See Philip Selznick, "Law in Context" Revisited, 30J.L. Soc'Y 177, 181-82 (2003) (arguing, in context of discussion of academic freedom, that law ought to recognize the "requirements and dynamics" of particular social institutions).
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status, these institutions operate "within a specialized professional culture" whose features are more salient to understanding their role and
function than the source of their funds. 73
The Court's First Amendment approach does not yet fully appreciate and incorporate these distinctions among institutions. 574 Yet, as
cases like Grutter,American Library Ass'n, Finley, and Forbes illustrate, neither is the Court entirely comfortable with the application of standard,
one-size-fits-all First Amendment doctrine to these institutions. The institution-sensitive reading of the First Amendment that I have advanced
here suggests that the Court's reluctance to apply standard doctrinal
tests is well founded, and that the most salient consideration in these
cases should be the nature of the institution and its role in strengthening public discourse. Thus, the public-private distinction, although not
irrelevant, may fade into the background in many cases. At the very
least, it should be less relevant in cases involving conflicts between the
institution (whether public or private) and the state, although its relevance for cases involving intramural disputes is still uncertain.5 75
CONCLUSION

As I said at the outset of this Article, there will be more than
enough discussion of the important Fourteenth Amendment implications of Grutter v. Bollinger This Article has suggested that something
more is needed. Serious attention must be paid to the First Amendment implications of Grutter
This Article has offered three potential readings of Grutter's First
Amendment implications. First, the case may be read simply as counseling a broad degree of deference to academic decisions made by
educationalinstitutions. This reading says little about the implications
573 Randall P. Bezanson, The Quality of First Amendment Speech, 20 HASTINGS COMM. &
ENT. LJ. 275, 377 (1998); see Bezanson & Buss, supra note 311, at 1457-62; Cole, supra
note 400, at 717-47; Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE LJ. 151, 164-76 (1996);
Tushnet, supra note 566, at 1257-64.
574 See Post, supra note 486, at 1273. Professor Post writes that

all legal values are rooted in the experiences associated with local and specific
kinds of social practices. Because law is ultimately a form of governance, it
does not deal with values as merely abstract ideas or principles.... The most
general objection to any single free speech principle is that speech makes possible a world of complex and diverse social practices precisely because it becomes integrated into and constitutive of these different practices; it therefore
assumes the diverse constitutional values of these distinct practices.

Id

S

57 See generally Finkin, supra note 143.
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of the case beyond that narrow set of circumstances. Even within this
confined field, however, I have suggested that an institutional autonomy approach to academic freedom could question or upset a number of settled First Amendment cases, and point toward surprising
results in a number of cases in the future. Second, Gruttermight be
read as advancing a particular substantive vision of education as a
democratic good, and perhaps by extension a particular substantive
vision of the First Amendment as a whole. This reading is fraught with
even greater problems. It sits uneasily with the Court's approach elsewhere in First Amendment jurisprudence, and it fails to acknowledge
the difficulty in enshrining in the First Amendment any particular vision of education or academic freedom when those values are deeply
contested outside the courts, in the very communities at issue.
Finally, and most intriguingly, Grutter's First Amendment can be
read as a First Amendment that finally and fully takes First Amendment institutions seriously. This reading counsels a particular sort of
deference to a wider range of institutions than universities alone. It
suggests that the Court ought to recognize the unique social role
played by a variety of institutions whose contributions to public discourse play a fundamental role in our system of free speech. Equally,
it suggests that the Court ought to attend to the unique social practices of these institutions, allowing the scope of its deference to be
guided over time by the changing norms and values of those institutions. In this way, taking First Amendment institutions seriously may
be one method of recognizing and incorporating into First Amendment jurisprudence a concern for the varied and particular social
domains in which speech occurs. Just as important, this approach acknowledges that constitutional law is not the sole preserve of the
courts. It is a shared activity, in which legal and nonlegal institutions
alike are engaged in a cooperative attempt to build a constitutional
culture that is responsive to the real world of free speech.
Whether Grutteds discussion of the First Amendment proves to be
long-lasting, or merely a ticket good for one day and one trip only,
these readings of Grutter'sFirst Amendment demonstrate that it richly
deserves to be read and considered for all it is worth. It deserves to be
treated as an invitation to ponder a First Amendment that gives full
consideration to the unique role played by various First Amendment
institutions-universities, libraries, private associations, the media,
religious groups-and that allows them to flourish and to develop
their own norms and rules without fitting into a preconceived, generally applicable, sometimes ill-suited legal framework. Moreover, it de-

590

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 46:461

serves consideration because the limits and implications of that approach are still unclear.
I close with a simple plea. Grutterwill obviously have its day under
the microscope of the Fourteenth Amendment scholars. It would be a
great shame, however, if First Amendment scholars, casebook editors,
treatise writers, and other gatekeepers of the First Amendment canon
give Grutterthe same treatment they have accorded Bakke and relegate
it to the footnotes, or ignore it altogether. Grutter has not yet earned
its place in the First Amendment canon, but it is surely knocking at
the door.

